Access Statistics for Daniel J. Seidmann

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees 0 0 0 75 0 2 8 298
A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees 0 0 0 38 3 4 9 212
Bargaining in Standing Committees 0 0 0 36 2 10 15 169
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda 0 0 0 21 2 11 17 92
Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda 0 0 0 36 1 7 8 174
Corruption and Power in Democracies 0 0 0 82 0 10 11 259
Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States 0 0 0 31 1 5 7 177
Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States 0 0 0 35 2 3 4 115
Optimal Quotas in Private Committees 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 78
Perverse Committee Appointments May Foster Divide and Rule 0 0 0 10 1 10 12 132
Preferential Trading Arrangements as Strategic Positioning 0 0 0 75 1 7 9 308
TRANSACTIONS/LIST PRICING 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 82
The first and last word in debates: Plaintive plaintiffs 0 0 0 0 1 5 9 19
Transactions/List Pricing 0 0 0 0 2 7 7 12
Total Working Papers 0 0 0 452 17 85 120 2,127

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling 1 1 4 548 2 8 17 1,628
A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation 0 0 1 112 1 6 10 312
A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees 0 0 0 26 1 6 8 125
Anticipatory pricing with negligible uncertainty 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 74
Asymmetric price adjustment and information 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 26
Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default 0 0 0 14 1 4 9 118
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda 0 0 0 13 3 13 23 114
Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes 0 0 0 72 0 0 2 231
Corruption and power in democracies 0 0 0 10 0 2 7 53
Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment 0 0 0 97 1 2 6 237
Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests 0 0 0 150 1 2 15 253
Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy 0 0 0 11 4 7 7 90
Incentives for Information Production and Disclosure: Comment 0 0 0 12 1 3 5 83
Industry Factor Demand Curves Can Be Upward Sloping 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 121
Optimal Quotas in Private Committees 0 0 0 0 0 7 9 11
Optimal Quotas in Private Committees 0 0 0 9 3 3 6 67
Perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule 0 0 0 8 0 7 11 75
Preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning 0 0 0 52 3 8 9 252
Protecting buyers from fine print 0 0 0 12 0 3 6 61
Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence 0 1 1 79 0 5 6 162
Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages 0 0 0 1 0 4 9 511
Target buffer stocks 0 0 0 1 3 5 8 43
The Effects of a Right to Silence 0 1 3 133 1 8 17 459
The Formateurs’ Role in Government Formation 0 0 0 9 0 5 6 77
The Impact of Interest Rates on Price and Supply 0 0 0 21 0 0 3 133
The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs 0 0 1 3 0 5 6 13
The real effects of nominal price rigidity 0 0 0 15 1 2 3 61
Transactions/List Pricing 0 0 0 18 0 4 4 115
Why are idiosyncratic goods produced to order? 0 0 0 7 0 2 3 93
Total Journal Articles 1 3 10 1,467 26 127 224 5,598

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04