Access Statistics for Marco Serena

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games 0 0 0 0 1 5 12 25
An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining 0 0 1 2 1 3 13 15
Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests 0 0 0 18 0 2 8 26
Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies 0 0 0 5 1 5 8 21
Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size 0 0 0 22 0 0 7 25
Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size and Asymmetric Beneï¬ ts 0 0 0 0 1 4 12 14
Disclosure Policies in All-pay Auctions with Affiliation 0 0 0 7 1 2 18 21
Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect 0 0 0 1 0 3 12 24
Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests 0 0 0 6 1 2 10 52
Level-k Models Rationalize Overspending in Contests 0 0 0 1 0 6 12 32
On the (Im-)Possibility of Representing Probability Distributions as a Difference of I.I.D. Noise Terms 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6
On the (im-)possibility of representing probability distributions as a difference of i.i.d. noise terms 0 0 1 5 0 3 12 20
Properties of Contests 0 0 0 1 2 4 9 26
Reputation for Toughness 0 0 1 12 1 3 20 67
Successful Opaque Management 0 0 1 1 0 0 11 63
Winner's Effort Maximization in Large Contests 0 0 0 10 0 0 19 27
Total Working Papers 0 0 4 91 9 42 187 464

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Game-Free Microfoundation of Mutual Optimism 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 24
An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining 0 1 1 7 0 5 12 27
Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players 0 0 1 2 0 6 19 27
Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants 0 0 0 0 0 3 16 22
Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size 0 0 0 2 1 3 17 30
Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits 0 0 0 3 0 2 14 30
Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Bid Caps 0 0 0 0 1 7 22 23
Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with affiliated values 0 0 1 1 2 3 15 17
Fair representation in primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire effect 0 0 1 1 0 2 5 5
Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants’ types 0 0 0 0 0 5 14 22
Level- k Models and Overspending in Contests 0 0 1 6 2 3 11 18
On the (Im-)Possibility of Representing Probability Distributions as a Difference of I.I.D. Noise Terms 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 5
Quality contests 0 0 0 6 0 0 13 73
R&D contest design with resource allocation and entry fees 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 9
Repeated contests with commitment types 0 0 2 2 0 2 26 26
Sequential contests revisited 0 0 0 3 0 1 9 29
The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 12
Type-projection, pro-social behavior, and a public good game 0 0 0 0 4 5 8 8
Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests 0 0 1 1 1 2 21 29
Winner’s effort maximization in large contests 0 0 0 6 0 2 7 18
Total Journal Articles 0 1 8 40 11 62 259 454

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Contest theory 0 0 6 82 1 5 31 206
Total Chapters 0 0 6 82 1 5 31 206

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04