Access Statistics for Tadashi Sekiguchi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	17
MULTIMARKET CONTACT UNDER DEMAND FLUCTUATIONS: A LIMIT RESULT	0	0	0	35	0	0	1	55
On the Negative Result in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	76
Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships	0	0	0	58	0	1	1	301
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring	0	0	0	28	1	2	4	135
Product Quality, Reputation and Turnover	0	0	0	47	0	1	1	239
Repeated Games with Observation Costs	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	237
Repeated Games with Recursive Utility:Cournot Duopoly under Gain/Loss Asymmetry	0	0	0	66	1	4	15	114
Reputation and Turnover	0	0	0	92	0	0	1	326
Reputation and Turnover	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	151
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	57
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs	0	0	0	2	1	2	11	302
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma	1	1	1	70	1	1	3	295
Total Working Papers	1	1	1	401	5	13	46	2,305

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	37
Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring	0	1	4	123	0	3	11	350
Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring	0	0	0	14	0	0	2	62
Finitely repeated games with monitoring options	0	0	0	6	0	1	4	49
Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	45
Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships	0	0	1	4	0	0	2	55
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring	0	0	0	105	1	2	2	462
Reputation and turnover	0	0	0	11	0	1	1	57
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma	0	0	0	63	2	3	4	183
The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs	0	0	0	15	0	0	1	99
UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING*	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	40
Total Journal Articles	0	1	5	349	3	10	29	1,439

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Statistics updated 2025-06-06