Access Statistics for Tadashi Sekiguchi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 24
MULTIMARKET CONTACT UNDER DEMAND FLUCTUATIONS: A LIMIT RESULT 0 0 0 35 0 3 8 63
On the Negative Result in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 81
Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships 0 0 0 58 1 3 8 309
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 28 0 2 8 143
Product Quality, Reputation and Turnover 0 0 1 48 0 2 11 250
Repeated Games with Observation Costs 0 0 0 1 0 2 8 245
Repeated Games with Recursive Utility:Cournot Duopoly under Gain/Loss Asymmetry 0 1 2 68 2 5 16 130
Reputation and Turnover 0 0 0 0 1 5 10 162
Reputation and Turnover 0 0 0 92 0 2 17 343
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs 0 0 0 2 0 3 19 321
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs 0 0 0 2 0 6 16 73
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 70 0 4 12 307
Total Working Papers 0 1 3 404 4 40 145 2,451

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 40
Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 1 124 0 2 9 359
Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring 0 0 0 14 1 1 8 70
Finitely repeated games with monitoring options 0 0 0 6 1 1 8 57
Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 49
Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships 0 0 0 4 1 4 17 72
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 105 2 4 14 476
Reputation and turnover 0 0 0 11 0 3 6 64
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 0 3 15 198
The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs 1 1 1 16 1 10 21 120
UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING* 0 0 0 2 0 3 11 51
Total Journal Articles 1 1 2 351 6 31 115 1,556

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Statistics updated 2026-07-10