Access Statistics for Aner Sela

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A 2 ×2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 30
A Learning Approach to Auctions 0 0 1 272 4 5 18 848
A learning approach to auctions 0 0 0 99 3 3 28 549
A learning approach to auctions 0 0 0 0 4 10 21 31
ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC EFFORT CONSTRAINTS 0 0 0 10 0 4 16 46
ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH HETEROGENEOUS PRIZES AND PARTIALLY ASYMMETRIC PLAYERS 0 0 0 14 5 7 13 27
ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN CONTESTS WITH PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS 0 0 0 13 2 3 7 71
ASSORTATIVE MATCHING CONTESTS 0 0 0 17 4 6 10 28
Admission Policies in Parallel Contests 0 0 9 9 0 0 20 20
All-Pay Auctions with Two Heterogenous Prizes and Partially Asymmetric Players 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 8
All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers 0 0 0 81 1 3 13 261
All-Pay Matching Contests 0 0 0 5 0 1 7 12
All-Pay Matching Contests 0 0 0 11 3 3 8 26
All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes 0 0 0 17 1 3 10 68
Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions 0 0 1 2 3 7 19 30
Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions 0 0 1 102 2 3 9 308
Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints 0 0 0 19 1 2 6 87
An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests 0 1 1 9 2 5 16 30
An Algorithmic Analysis of Parallel Contests 0 0 3 7 2 3 11 17
Assortative Matching Contests 0 0 0 5 2 2 10 18
Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information 0 0 0 13 1 1 5 38
Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information 0 0 0 15 2 3 15 43
Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions 0 0 0 38 4 8 13 160
Auctions with Private Entry Costs 0 0 1 93 0 1 7 261
Auctions with Weakly Assymmetric Interdependent Values 0 0 0 32 3 5 12 109
BEST-OF-THREE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS 0 0 0 6 2 3 9 59
Belief Affirming in Learning Processes 0 0 0 2 2 3 10 37
Belief Affirming in Learning Processes 0 0 0 111 1 2 8 724
Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions 0 0 0 48 4 5 10 270
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 70 3 4 9 329
Bid costs and endogenous bid caps 0 0 0 4 1 4 7 39
CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS 0 0 0 10 2 2 10 50
COMMON-VALUE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 50 1 5 14 157
COMMON-VALUE GROUP CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 12 1 2 12 21
CONTESTS FOR STATUS 0 0 1 2 2 4 17 62
CONTESTS WITH TIES 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 18
CONTINUITY AND ROBUSTNESS OF BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA IN TULLOCK CONTESTS 0 0 0 12 2 5 14 27
Caps in Sequential Contests 0 0 0 4 3 4 16 40
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 41 5 5 14 243
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 12 2 3 9 156
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 58 5 7 13 254
Carrots and sticks: collaboration of taxation and subsidies in contests 0 0 0 21 2 6 15 35
Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 36 4 8 16 78
Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps 0 0 0 27 1 5 12 87
Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps 0 0 0 15 2 2 7 40
Competing Auctions with Endogenous Quantities 0 0 0 0 2 5 11 12
Contest Architecture 0 0 0 115 3 8 14 776
Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu) 0 0 0 125 1 3 8 485
Contest architecture 0 0 0 5 1 5 16 46
Contests for Status 0 0 0 106 1 4 10 335
Contests with Insurance 0 0 0 43 3 3 7 48
Contests with Prize Contracts 0 0 6 6 0 1 13 13
Contests with Ties 0 0 0 44 2 3 13 185
Contests with identity-dependent externalities 0 0 0 5 0 1 11 20
Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests 0 0 0 21 2 8 13 47
Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information 0 0 0 19 5 5 8 228
EFFORT MAXIMIZATION IN CONTESTS UNDER A BALANCE CONSTRAINT 0 0 0 7 8 8 18 30
Effective Political Contests 0 1 1 14 0 1 7 207
Effective Political Contests 0 1 1 34 1 3 6 150
Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments 0 0 1 2 1 1 7 14
Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments 0 0 0 15 1 5 13 25
Elimination Games 0 0 1 13 4 6 13 24
Elimination contests with long-run efforts 0 0 19 19 3 4 39 39
FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE IN ROUND-ROBIN TOURNAMENTS 0 0 1 26 3 6 14 155
Fictitious play and no-cycling conditions 0 0 0 10 1 4 15 41
Fictitious play and- no-cycling conditions 0 0 0 71 3 6 11 398
First-Mover Advantage in Round-Robin Tournaments 0 0 0 29 1 7 14 84
INEFFECTIVE PRIZES IN MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CONTESTS 0 0 0 3 2 3 8 14
INFORMATION IN TULLOCK CONTESTS 0 0 0 20 10 14 30 69
Information Advantage in Common-Value Classic Tullock Contests 0 0 1 22 2 4 18 97
Information advantage and dominant strategies in second-price auctions 0 0 0 32 7 7 12 427
It's not always best to be first 0 0 0 27 0 3 7 32
MULTI-STAGE SEQUENTIAL ALL-PAY AUCTIONS 0 0 0 56 1 11 25 242
Manipulations in Contests 0 0 1 33 1 3 13 145
Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions 0 0 0 37 3 4 11 66
On the Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions 0 0 0 7 1 3 8 33
One against all in the fictitious play process 0 0 0 1 2 3 12 17
One against all in the fictitious play process 0 0 0 27 1 1 3 333
Optimal Allocations in Round-Robin Tournaments 0 0 0 15 1 6 11 71
Optimal Rewards in Contests 0 0 0 56 0 0 2 228
Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments 0 0 0 117 7 7 18 471
Optimal Seedings in Interdependent Contests 0 0 0 7 0 1 5 18
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 0 1 3 25 90
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 335
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 2 3 16 27
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS IN MULTI-STAGE CONTESTS 0 0 0 19 1 5 12 21
REVERSE CONTESTS 0 0 0 6 1 2 19 74
ROUND-ROBIN TOURNAMENTS WITH EFFORT CONSTRAINTS 0 0 0 23 0 2 10 97
Reputation in Contests 0 1 2 22 1 3 12 22
Resource Allocations in Multi-Stage Contests 0 0 0 1 2 3 7 12
Reverse Contests 0 0 0 9 0 1 8 38
Round-Robin Tournaments with Effort Constraints 0 0 0 14 2 4 12 84
Round-Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player 0 0 0 25 3 6 14 91
Round-Robin Versus Elimination in Tournaments with a Dominant Player 0 0 0 13 5 13 24 100
SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS WITH SYNERGY AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 0 0 0 20 3 5 15 109
SIGNALING IN CONTESTS 0 0 1 38 5 7 16 94
STATUS CLASSIFICATION BY LOTTERY CONTESTS 0 0 0 2 1 1 8 15
Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts 0 0 0 18 2 5 12 95
Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts and Noisy Outputs 0 0 1 26 1 3 16 125
Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Noisy Outputs 0 0 0 13 1 2 8 41
Sequential Contests with Synergy and Budget Constraints 0 0 0 35 1 3 6 96
Sequential Two-Prize Contests 0 0 0 17 2 2 10 89
Sequential Two-Prize Contests 0 0 1 14 3 4 16 82
Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes 0 0 0 2 1 3 12 34
Signaling in Contests 0 0 0 43 0 0 3 66
Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments 0 0 0 15 3 6 13 49
Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete 0 0 0 15 2 3 10 27
Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete 0 0 0 10 1 1 8 23
Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete Information 0 0 0 3 2 6 12 21
THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PUNISHMENTS IN TULLOCK CONTESTS 0 0 0 29 2 5 11 76
THE OPTIMAL DESIGN OF ROUND-ROBIN TOURNAMENTS WITH THREE PLAYERS 0 0 1 5 2 2 10 52
THE THIRD PLACE GAME 0 0 0 12 3 9 25 71
TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 0 0 1 70 6 9 19 117
TWO STAGE CONTESTS WITH EFFORT-DEPENDENT REWARDS 0 0 0 14 4 8 17 43
TWO-STAGE MATCHING CONTESTS 0 0 0 11 1 5 9 22
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 0 280 6 6 20 999
The Optimal Allocation of Punishments in Tullock Contests 0 0 0 12 1 1 8 50
The Optimal Design of Round-Robin Tournaments with Three Players 0 0 0 46 4 8 16 100
The Optimal Rewards in Contests 0 0 0 5 0 1 7 54
The Optimal Rewards in Contests 0 0 0 1 2 2 8 33
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 97 3 5 11 370
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 151 1 1 13 481
The Third Place Game 0 0 0 9 1 4 8 44
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests 0 1 1 10 7 20 33 128
Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 59 0 2 11 106
Tullock contests with asymmetric information 0 0 1 31 1 3 29 240
Two-Stage Elimination Contests with Optimal Head Starts 0 0 0 33 4 5 12 82
Two-Stage Matching Contests 0 0 0 6 2 2 5 22
Two-stage contests with effort-dependent rewards 1 1 2 21 2 4 13 58
You play (an action) only once 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 17
You play (an auction) only once 0 0 0 30 0 0 8 264
Total Working Papers 1 6 61 3,956 284 542 1,618 16,863

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Learning Approach to Auctions 0 0 0 11 6 8 17 130
A2 x 2Game without the Fictitious Play Property 0 0 0 9 0 2 5 177
All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints 0 0 0 2 1 2 8 21
All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes 0 0 0 5 1 2 8 41
All-pay auctions with risk-averse players 0 0 0 40 3 4 11 146
All-pay matching contests 0 0 0 1 1 4 8 12
Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints 0 0 0 6 2 3 9 37
Allocation of prizes in asymmetric all-pay auctions 0 0 0 14 0 1 14 75
All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards 0 0 0 2 1 6 11 25
Assortative Matching by Lottery Contests 0 0 0 2 1 2 9 15
Asymmetric sequential search under incomplete information 0 0 0 1 4 5 16 27
Belief Affirming in Learning Processes 0 0 0 10 1 1 6 78
Best-of-three all-pay auctions 0 0 0 7 0 0 8 69
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 1 2 6 20 296
CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS 0 0 0 1 0 8 19 54
CARROTS AND STICKS: PRIZES AND PUNISHMENTS IN CONTESTS 0 0 0 16 2 10 22 144
Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information 0 0 0 2 1 4 14 58
Common-value group contests with asymmetric information 0 0 0 2 0 1 6 19
Competing auctions with endogenous quantities 0 0 0 48 3 4 15 209
Contest architecture 1 1 1 155 1 4 12 478
Contests for Status 0 0 2 237 5 7 20 735
Contests with Ties 0 0 1 21 4 5 11 106
Contests with insurance 0 0 2 6 2 4 15 33
Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests 0 0 2 2 3 4 10 21
Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information 0 0 0 7 2 2 7 57
Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions 0 0 0 94 1 2 7 423
Dynamic contests with resource constraints 0 0 0 16 1 2 17 70
Effective contests 0 0 1 28 2 3 8 101
Effort allocations in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 11
Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information 0 0 1 11 2 4 18 78
Fictitious Play in 2 x 3 Games 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 64
Fictitious play in `one-against-all' multi-player games 0 0 0 31 2 5 15 494
Fictitious play in coordination games 0 0 0 47 2 4 9 250
First-mover advantage in round-robin tournaments 0 0 0 3 4 7 19 66
Information in Tullock contests 0 0 0 4 0 5 19 56
Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests 0 0 0 0 3 7 10 11
Is there free riding in group contests? 0 0 0 0 4 6 10 14
Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions 0 0 0 19 1 7 13 75
Manipulations in contests 0 0 1 36 1 8 15 123
Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions 0 0 2 8 2 3 20 91
On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions 0 0 0 2 0 2 11 26
Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests 0 0 0 5 3 4 15 40
Optimal rewards in contests 0 0 0 22 0 2 8 110
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 18 12 13 19 118
Optimal seedings in interdependent contests 0 0 0 0 2 5 8 11
Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors 0 0 0 53 3 7 18 171
Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts 0 0 0 3 2 5 12 46
Resource allocations in the best-of-k ( $$k=2,3$$ k = 2, 3 ) contests 0 0 0 6 1 3 10 20
Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions 0 0 0 33 0 4 8 115
Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player 0 0 0 2 1 3 14 42
Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs 0 0 0 1 1 2 9 14
Sequential (one-against-all) contests 0 0 0 2 0 3 9 52
Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts 0 0 0 2 2 5 17 46
Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs 0 0 0 4 3 5 12 46
Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes 0 0 0 3 3 4 12 33
Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints 0 0 0 8 2 6 11 52
Sequential two-prize contests 0 0 0 2 1 1 8 39
Splurging with Alexa: How voicebots increase product upgrades 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 3
Status classification by lottery contests 0 0 2 2 4 6 24 28
Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments 0 0 0 1 2 6 12 18
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information 0 0 0 0 4 4 7 12
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 5 340 5 13 41 1,151
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 1 1 76 1 11 41 315
The Third Place Game 0 0 0 3 2 5 14 41
The assortative matching scheme in a survival battle 0 0 0 1 3 3 10 33
The optimal allocation of prizes in two-stage contests 0 0 0 6 2 2 11 28
The optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three players 0 0 0 1 2 10 16 51
The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes 0 0 2 2 3 4 14 17
Tullock contests reward information advantages 0 0 0 2 0 1 11 32
Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning 0 0 0 5 2 3 6 29
Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts 0 0 0 11 6 8 20 59
Two-stage elimination games 0 0 0 2 3 11 17 21
Unsolicited prizes in contests 0 0 0 0 1 1 18 18
You play (an action) only once 0 0 0 10 2 2 7 75
Total Journal Articles 2 3 25 1,546 150 328 964 7,902

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 0 0 3 41 81 90
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 3 41 81 90

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06