Access Statistics for Dongsoo Shin

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures 1 1 1 38 2 6 11 162
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures 0 0 0 20 0 5 8 15
Capital-labor distortions in project finance 0 0 0 32 1 4 5 86
Delegation and Dynamic Incentives 0 0 0 33 1 7 11 116
Delegation and Dynamic Incentives 0 0 0 26 0 5 7 70
Demand-Investment in Distribution Channels 0 10 11 11 2 13 15 15
Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency 0 0 0 2 2 11 14 233
General Distorted Input Ratios in Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 7 0 2 5 31
Hierarchical Structures and Dynamic Incentives 0 0 1 108 1 2 3 300
Hybrid Contracting in Repeated Interactions 0 1 21 21 2 9 11 11
Hybrid contracting in repeated interactions 0 1 13 13 2 17 26 26
Insourcing Vs Outsourcing in Vertical Structure 0 0 1 10 5 9 14 25
Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation? 0 0 0 34 0 2 3 121
Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider 1 1 1 5 2 3 3 16
Total Working Papers 2 14 49 360 20 95 136 1,227

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF WORKAHOLICS AND ALCOHOLICS 0 0 1 33 1 3 10 105
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures 0 1 1 1 1 6 8 14
Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure 0 0 0 62 1 5 5 240
Collusion and Outcome Equivalency 0 0 0 15 0 2 3 64
Conducting inaccurate audits to commit to the audit policy 0 0 0 36 0 6 7 123
Contracts under Wage Compression: A Case of Beneficial Collusion 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 8
Delegation and dynamic incentives 0 0 1 28 1 5 14 176
Disregarding the Attorney's Advice: An Agency Perspective 0 0 0 9 0 8 9 68
Distorted Input Ratios in Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 13
Exit option in hierarchical agency 0 0 0 25 5 12 14 102
GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT 1 3 3 3 1 8 9 19
GRANTING AN EXIT OPTION TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT 0 0 0 4 1 2 2 46
Incentives and management styles 0 0 0 15 0 8 10 104
Information acquisition and countervailing incentives 0 0 1 4 2 6 12 19
Information acquisition and optimal project management 0 0 0 50 1 6 9 194
Information provision before a contract is offered 0 1 1 13 1 7 8 55
Informed principal and information gathering agent 0 0 0 27 0 3 4 113
Innovation and waste in supply chain management 1 1 1 18 1 10 14 129
Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure 0 0 0 1 2 10 18 22
Limited Communication and Responsibility Budgeting 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 38
MANAGING R&D IN VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11
Motivating Loyal Bureaucrats in Sequential Agency 1 1 4 6 1 5 9 14
Obstructive monitoring 0 0 1 6 2 4 8 31
Optimal Loyalty‐Based Management 0 0 0 6 0 8 14 48
Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation? 0 1 1 45 0 5 6 196
Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents 0 0 0 2 0 6 9 430
Overachieving and Obsessive Behavior as Signaling Devices under Career Concern 0 0 1 4 0 1 4 23
Price Discrimination with Demarketing 0 0 0 7 1 4 7 61
Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider 1 1 1 3 1 4 8 20
Risk Taking as Self Discipline in Contractual Relationships 0 0 0 10 0 2 2 69
Supervisory information and loss aversion 0 0 0 1 1 4 7 24
Underwriter syndication and corporate governance 0 0 0 6 0 3 5 81
Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability 0 0 0 13 1 3 4 36
Upstream Market Power and Wasteful Retailers 0 0 0 11 0 6 6 45
Vertical Relationships with Hidden Interactions 0 1 1 2 0 3 6 8
Voluntary Quality Disclosure under Price‐Signaling Competition 0 0 0 0 2 5 6 70
Warranties as a device to extract rent from low-risk users of a product 0 0 0 46 0 0 1 196
Total Journal Articles 4 10 18 523 29 180 276 3,015

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-03-04