Access Statistics for Tetsuya Shinkai

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Cross-Licensing System Discourages R&D Investments In Completely Complementary Technologies 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 199
Cannibalization may Allow a Cost-inefficient Firm to Earn more than a Cost-effcient Firm in a Duopoly with Two Vertically Differentiated Goods 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 104
Cannibalization within the Single Vertically Di¤erentiated Duopoly 0 0 1 44 0 0 2 74
Corrigendum to "Product Line Strategy within a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly" [Econom Lett.137 (2015) 114-117] 0 0 3 3 0 2 9 9
Delegating Infrastructure Projects with Open Access 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 164
Delegation and Limited Liability in a Modern Capitalistic Economy 0 0 0 53 2 2 2 125
Effects of Change in Local Content Requirement and Exchange Rate Volatility in an International Oligopoly 0 1 1 41 0 1 3 82
Effects of Changes in Exchange Rate Volatility on Short-run Equilibrium in International Oligopoly 0 0 0 26 0 2 5 78
Effects of Exchange Rate Volatility on Behaviors of Affliate Firms in a Foreign Oligopoly under the Revision of Supply Chains 0 1 1 32 0 1 6 35
Endogenous Determination of the Liability Rule in Oligopolistic Markets 0 0 0 32 0 0 3 89
How Do the Relative Superiority of a High-quality Good and Cost Inefficiency between Firms Affect Product Lines in Multiproduct Firms? 0 0 0 20 0 2 2 43
Licensing and R&D Investment of Duopolistic Firms with Partially Complementary Technologies 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 147
Menu-pricing and Quality Decisions of a Platform Monopolist 0 1 6 42 0 1 10 49
Organizational Entry Deterrence Barrier:The Japanese Firm vs.the American Firm 0 0 0 55 0 0 9 365
Parallel Imports, Drag Price Control and Pharmaceutical Innovation 0 1 1 127 1 2 3 553
Price and quality decision of a monopoly platform for transaction with shipping 0 1 9 54 0 3 26 119
Product Line Strategy in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly 0 0 2 62 1 2 9 86
Product Line Strategy within a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly under Non-negativity Outputs Constraints 0 0 1 46 1 1 2 56
Production Substitution of Goods Within and Between Firms in a Multiproduct Duopoly 0 0 0 47 0 2 4 104
Sales-Maximization vs. Profit-Maximization: Managerial Behavior at Japanese Regional Banks 1980-2009 0 0 0 136 0 0 3 1,589
Strategic Choice on Product Line in Vertically Differentiated Duopoly 0 0 0 90 0 0 4 110
Strategic Delegation of Indebted Firms in a Duopoly with Uncertain Demand 0 1 1 44 0 5 6 82
The Economics of Cannibalization: A Duopoly in which Firms Supply Two Vertically Differentiated Products 0 0 2 178 1 2 8 429
The Effects of the Asymmetry of Information Intrafirms on Oligopolistic Market Outcomes 0 0 1 54 0 0 8 276
Why did the Dutch East India Co. outperform the British East India Co.? —A theoretical explanation based on the objective of the firm and limited liability— 0 0 1 146 1 1 6 211
Total Working Papers 0 6 30 1,508 7 29 130 5,178

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Delegating Infrastructure Projects with Open Access 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 82
Product line strategy within a vertically differentiated duopoly 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 79
Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information 0 0 0 189 0 0 1 1,247
THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTI-COMMONS IN THE LONG RUN IN A COMMON-RESOURCE ECONOMY 0 0 0 10 2 2 3 63
Total Journal Articles 0 0 0 240 2 2 4 1,471

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Statistics updated 2025-10-06