Access Statistics for Tomas Sjostrom

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Arms Races and Negotiations 0 0 0 85 1 2 3 265
Arms Races and Negotiations 0 0 0 78 1 1 2 201
Arms Races and Negotiations 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 51
Arms Races and Negotiations 0 0 0 102 1 3 6 429
Bringing GATT into the Core 0 0 0 19 2 2 2 285
Conflict Games with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 86 0 0 0 204
Contracting with Third Parties 0 0 0 116 0 0 0 278
Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent 0 0 0 60 1 1 2 392
Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent 0 0 0 171 1 1 3 478
Credit rationing, wealth inequality and allocation of talent 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 127
Credit rationing, wealth inequality, and allocation of talent 0 0 0 94 1 2 2 414
Decentralization and Collusion 0 0 0 266 0 0 0 659
Decentralization and Collusion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 586
Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace? 0 0 1 65 2 2 3 202
Durable Cheap Talk Equilibria 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 124
Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Choice, and the American Dream 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 440
Dynamic Incentives, Occupational Mobility, and the American Dream 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4
Elections, Public Debt and Migration 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 211
Free Trade, Customs Unions, and Transfers 0 0 0 493 0 0 1 2,084
Free to Choose: Testing the Pure Motivation Effect of Autonomous Choice 0 0 0 97 1 2 2 205
General Equilibrium Incentives and the American Dream 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 162
Global Free Trade is in the Core of a Customs Union Game 0 0 0 71 0 0 0 167
Grants Vs. Investment Subsidies 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 30
Implementation Theory 0 0 5 550 1 4 24 1,669
Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 374
Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games 0 0 0 102 0 0 2 275
Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages, and Involuntary Unemployment 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 1,127
Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages, and Involuntary Unemployment 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 722
Interactive Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 470
Is Grameen Lending Efficient? 0 0 0 706 1 1 1 1,638
Is Grameen Lending Efficient? 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 14
Leader Reputation and Default in Sovereign Debt 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 9
Leader Reputation and Default in Sovereign Debt 0 0 0 77 0 0 1 199
Local Public Goods, Debt and Migration 0 0 0 174 0 0 11 507
Local Public Goods, Debt and Migration 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 576
Long Wars 1 1 9 22 4 7 32 41
Moral hazard and overlapping generations with endogenous occupational choice 0 0 0 28 0 0 2 120
Not Invented Here 0 0 0 106 0 0 0 605
Not Invented Here 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 568
On the Convergence of Ficticious Play 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 197
On the Convergence of Fictitious Play 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 52
On the Convergence of Fictitious Play 0 0 1 322 0 0 1 992
On the Convergence of Fictitious Play 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 159
Optimal Compellance 0 1 11 16 2 4 25 35
Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes 0 0 0 120 0 0 0 510
Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining 0 0 0 41 0 2 4 136
Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining 0 0 0 42 0 1 4 159
Profit Sharing May Stabilize Wages 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 228
Public Debt, Property Values and Migration 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 229
Secure Implementation 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 113
Secure Implementation 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 220
Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Really Work? 0 0 0 52 0 0 1 269
Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work? 0 0 0 83 1 1 1 398
Secure Implementation Experiments:Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work? 0 0 1 40 0 0 2 318
Secure Implementation: Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 228
Secure Implementation:Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 202
Sovereign Debt - Election Concerns and the Democratic Disadvantage 0 0 0 42 1 1 3 115
Sovereign Debt: Election Concerns and the Democratic Disadvantage 0 0 0 28 0 1 1 76
Sovereign debt: election concerns and the democratic disadvantage 0 0 0 18 2 2 3 51
Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation 0 0 0 89 0 0 0 253
THE THEORY OF IMPLEMENTATION WHEN THE PLANNER IS A PLAYER 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 85
The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict 1 1 1 105 1 1 1 312
The Theory of Implemetation when the Planner is a PLayer 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 383
Undominated Nash Implementaion with Collusion and Renegotiation 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 277
Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegociation 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 227
Total Working Papers 2 3 30 4,811 31 54 176 23,136

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A new characterization of the Groves- Clarke mechanism 0 0 0 186 0 1 2 565
Arms Races and Negotiations 0 2 5 153 3 6 12 560
Bargaining and War: A Review of Some Formal Models 1 1 2 85 3 5 12 208
Competition and the evolution of efficiency 0 0 0 38 1 1 3 111
Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities 0 1 2 109 1 2 5 228
Contracting with Third Parties 0 0 0 46 0 0 1 164
Decentralization and Collusion 1 1 4 73 1 1 5 207
Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace? 0 0 2 40 2 3 7 233
Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies 0 0 2 85 0 1 7 220
Global Free Trade is in the Core of a Customs Union Game* 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 7
Implementation and information in teams 0 0 0 11 0 1 1 35
Implementation by demand mechanisms 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 50
Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games 0 0 0 71 0 0 1 287
Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games 0 0 0 21 1 1 3 85
Insider Bargaining Power, Starting Wages and Involuntary Unemployment 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 9
Interactive Implementation 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 97
Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies 0 0 0 323 1 1 6 821
Local public goods, debt and migration 0 1 1 44 1 2 6 151
Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives 0 0 0 5 0 0 8 383
Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 328
Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining 0 1 3 32 0 4 14 313
Public Debt, Migration, and Shortsighted Politicians 0 0 0 40 0 0 2 171
Secure implementation 0 0 0 69 1 1 3 292
Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work? 0 1 1 71 2 3 4 291
Sovereign debt: election concerns and the democratic disadvantage 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 76
Stahl's bargaining model 0 1 4 224 0 3 9 484
Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation 0 0 1 66 1 2 6 386
The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games 0 0 0 27 0 0 2 208
The Strategy and Technology of Conflict 0 0 1 17 1 2 6 91
The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict 0 0 0 42 1 1 6 237
The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player 0 0 1 80 0 1 3 226
Trade as transfers, GATT and the core 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 84
Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 58
Total Journal Articles 2 9 29 2,042 23 47 140 7,666
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Implementation theory 1 4 13 618 2 12 76 3,484
Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 24
Total Chapters 1 4 13 622 2 13 78 3,508

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03