Access Statistics for Andrzej Skrzypacz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 71
Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 44
Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design 0 0 2 31 0 2 7 46
Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65
Bargaining with Deadlines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43
Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions 0 0 1 221 0 0 4 929
Bidding With Securities: Auctions and Security Design 0 0 1 120 0 0 4 520
Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 359
Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 339
Collusion under Monitoring of Sales 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 247
Collusion under Monitoring of Sales 0 0 1 110 0 0 3 509
Comments on the FCC’s Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 73 0 0 1 9 0 0 1 72
Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market 0 0 0 57 0 0 2 174
Design of Macro-prudential Stress Tests 0 0 0 58 2 2 2 97
Design of Macro-prudential Stress Tests 0 0 0 57 0 1 2 155
Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality 0 0 1 21 0 1 3 33
Dynamic Oligopoly with Network Effects 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 63
Dynamic Trading: Price Inertia and Front-Running 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 54
Economic Comments on the Design of the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 107
Economist Letter to NTIA on 700 MHz Spectrum Auction 0 0 1 15 0 0 3 81
Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 277
Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production 0 0 1 24 0 0 3 135
Inflation and Price Setting in a Natural Experiment 0 0 0 75 0 0 1 297
It's Payback time: new insights on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 11
It’s Payback Time: New Insights on Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 0 0 14 0 1 1 21
Learning, Search and Arbitrage - Evidence from a Natural Experiment 0 0 0 37 0 0 2 150
Limited Records and Reputation 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 120
Market Structure and the Direction of Technological Change 0 0 0 87 0 2 8 343
Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Shares 0 0 0 60 0 0 2 228
Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure 0 0 0 21 0 0 1 127
Persuading the Regular to Wait 0 0 1 10 0 0 3 48
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices 0 0 1 37 0 0 5 190
Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 68
Private monitoring with infinite histories 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 225
Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction 0 0 0 12 0 1 2 12
Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown 0 0 0 15 0 0 3 127
Ratings, certifications and grades: dynamic signaling and market breakdown 0 0 0 43 0 0 1 216
Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 136
Revenues in the 700 MHz Spectrum Auction 0 0 0 27 0 1 2 193
Rules with Discretion and Local Information 0 0 0 42 0 0 2 109
Search, Costly Price Adjustment and the Frequency of Price Changes - Theory and Evidence 0 0 1 47 0 1 4 270
Search, Costly Price Adjustment and the Frequency of Price Changes – Theory and Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 230
Selling Information 0 0 1 39 0 0 1 182
Selling Information 0 0 0 5 0 0 14 116
Selling Information 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 169
Selling Information 0 0 0 77 1 2 6 109
Sequential Equilibria with Infinite Histories 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 107
Standards Coalitions Formation and Market Structure in Network Industries 0 0 0 201 0 0 2 583
Standards Coalitions Formation and Market Structure in Network Securities 0 0 0 19 1 1 1 67
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions 0 0 0 73 1 1 3 288
The 700 MHz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity to Protect Competition In a Consolidating Industry 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 137
The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions 0 0 0 84 0 0 2 256
Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time 0 0 0 36 0 0 4 168
Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time 0 0 0 87 0 0 1 300
Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time 0 0 0 49 0 0 4 224
Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 182
Transparency and Distressed Sales under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 23 0 0 3 55
Transparency and Distressed Sales under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 83
Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 126
Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services 0 0 1 51 0 0 2 203
Total Working Papers 0 0 15 2,320 6 19 129 10,896

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Market Pioneers, Dynamic Capabilities, and Industry Evolution 0 0 1 8 0 0 1 49
Auctions with contingent payments — An overview 1 5 6 58 3 7 15 244
Bargaining with Arrival of New Traders 0 0 1 24 0 0 4 187
Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information 0 0 0 10 1 1 3 117
Beliefs and Private Monitoring 0 0 1 10 0 1 3 74
Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design 0 0 1 199 0 3 6 721
Bridging the gap: Bargaining with interdependent values 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 75
Collusion under monitoring of sales 1 2 3 18 1 2 4 133
Corrigendum to "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions" [J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169] 0 0 0 51 0 0 1 162
Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market 0 0 0 14 1 1 5 151
Disclosing a Random Walk 1 1 3 3 1 2 9 14
Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality 0 0 2 13 1 1 3 49
Dynamic signaling and market breakdown 0 0 0 75 0 1 3 280
Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection 0 1 1 45 0 2 5 217
Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production 0 0 1 60 0 1 3 330
Inflation and price setting in a natural experiment 0 1 3 115 0 1 6 362
Limited records and reputation bubbles 0 0 0 7 0 2 4 93
Mechanisms for Repeated Trade 0 0 0 13 1 1 2 106
Network externalities and long-run market shares 0 0 1 54 0 1 6 184
Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure 0 2 2 52 1 4 7 227
Persuading the Principal to Wait 2 2 4 21 2 4 17 125
Persuasion with Multiple Actions 0 1 1 1 3 6 6 6
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices 0 0 1 61 0 0 7 267
Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction 0 0 2 16 2 2 7 204
Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring 0 0 0 5 0 1 4 44
Recall and private monitoring 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 70
Reclaiming spectrum from incumbents in inefficiently allocated bands: Transaction costs, competition, and flexibility 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 13
Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers 0 0 1 30 1 2 6 281
Rules with Discretion and Local Information 0 0 0 28 3 4 7 217
Selling Information 1 2 6 106 1 8 21 408
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions 0 0 1 284 2 3 6 703
Test Design and Minimum Standards 0 0 2 16 1 1 4 149
The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 7
The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions 0 0 0 46 1 1 1 203
Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time 0 0 0 18 0 0 9 140
Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 108
Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining 0 0 0 113 1 1 1 397
Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services 0 0 6 22 0 2 10 128
Yuliy Sannikov: Winner of the 2016 Clark Medal 1 1 2 34 1 5 10 226
Total Journal Articles 7 18 52 1,648 29 74 223 7,471

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Dynamic Bargaining with Private Information 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 21
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 21
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Statistics updated 2025-07-04