Access Statistics for Vasiliki Skreta

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Mechanism Design for Complicated Type Spaces 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 13
A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms 0 0 1 17 0 0 4 62
A Note on Optimal Auctions 0 0 1 49 0 0 2 98
Constrained Information Design 0 1 2 6 0 2 6 25
Dynamic Optimal Non-linear Taxation Under Non-commitment 0 0 0 2 1 2 6 212
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 1 44 2 2 3 60
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 58
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 0 59 1 2 7 118
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 0 55 0 1 2 183
Extensions on "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" 0 0 0 17 0 0 2 39
Gone Shopping: A Theory of Ratings Inflation 0 0 0 6 0 1 1 42
Immunity 0 0 1 10 5 17 29 82
Immunity 0 0 0 44 0 0 3 54
Immunity 0 0 1 65 2 3 18 734
Incentive-driven Inattention 0 1 4 29 1 6 23 48
Incentive-driven Inattention 0 0 0 8 1 6 11 56
Incentive-driven Inattention 0 1 3 17 1 3 6 23
Information Design by an Informed Designer 0 0 27 27 0 1 14 14
Information Design by an Informed Designer 0 0 33 33 6 9 64 64
Information Design by an Informed Designer 0 0 8 8 0 0 7 7
Information Design under Falsification 0 0 1 13 1 2 11 40
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 31
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7
Interconnection Negotiations between Telecommunication Networks and Universal Service Objectives 0 0 0 97 2 2 3 305
Mechanism Design under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 45 0 7 24 160
Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment 0 2 5 22 1 5 17 58
Models, Inattention and Bayesian Updates 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 23
Models, Inattention and Expectation Updates 0 0 0 21 1 3 6 43
Models, Inattention and Expectation Updates 0 0 4 59 1 3 13 220
Models, inattention and expectation updates 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 15
Note on Optimal Auctions 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 156
On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure 0 0 0 23 0 0 2 120
On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure 0 0 0 45 1 1 5 141
On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure 0 0 0 52 1 1 2 160
Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 262
Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities 0 0 1 95 0 0 3 246
Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 50 0 0 1 155
Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 27 0 1 3 67
Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities 0 0 0 49 2 2 5 116
Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 12 1 3 7 68
Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 70 0 0 3 191
Optimal Auctions with General Distribution 0 0 0 17 0 0 3 50
Optimal Auctions with General Distributions 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 61
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 0 0 5 15 48 114
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 1 70 3 6 17 214
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 0 37 3 9 19 113
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 0 20 1 7 26 170
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good 0 0 0 22 0 0 6 33
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good 1 1 2 34 1 3 8 60
Purchase history and product personalization 0 0 15 15 1 2 16 16
Purchase history and product personalization 0 0 10 10 0 1 15 15
Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation 0 0 1 121 0 1 10 366
Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation 0 0 0 60 1 2 6 182
Revenue Equivalence for Arbitrary Type Spaces 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 57
Selling Through Referrals 0 0 0 19 0 0 5 36
Selling Through Referrals 0 0 0 18 0 0 4 66
Selling with Evidence 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 19
Selling with Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5
Selling with Evidence 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 18
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 121
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms 0 0 0 47 0 0 2 149
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms 0 0 0 51 0 0 2 189
Technical Appendix for "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 51
Test Design Under Falsification 0 0 6 21 1 3 26 50
Test Design Under Falsification 0 0 2 8 0 1 5 18
Test Design under Falsification 0 0 13 13 1 2 21 21
The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design 0 1 2 37 0 5 21 116
The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design 0 0 0 53 0 0 2 146
The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design 0 0 0 82 0 1 6 295
What to Put on the Table 0 0 0 39 1 1 7 332
What to Put on the Table 0 0 0 18 2 2 8 127
What to put in the table 0 0 1 14 1 1 3 158
Total Working Papers 1 7 147 2,226 53 151 627 7,947

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on optimal allocation mechanisms 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 37
Asymmetric partnerships 0 0 0 17 0 1 6 64
Dynamic strategic information transmission 0 0 1 10 2 5 19 72
Heterogeneity, Inattention, and Bayesian Updates 0 0 3 9 0 0 15 45
IMMUNITY 0 0 1 2 1 3 8 16
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity 0 0 1 8 2 4 11 45
Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces 0 0 3 47 0 0 4 98
On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure 0 0 2 27 2 2 11 98
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 0 154 3 8 19 550
Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information 0 0 1 16 1 2 5 96
Optimal auction design under non-commitment 1 3 6 18 1 8 21 82
Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation 1 4 20 303 3 8 57 964
Selling through referrals 0 0 1 1 1 4 25 45
Selling with evidence 0 0 1 2 2 2 10 34
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms -super-1 0 0 1 70 0 0 2 198
The role of optimal threats in auction design 0 0 0 33 1 3 6 123
Total Journal Articles 2 7 41 731 19 50 220 2,567

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Statistics updated 2022-01-05