Access Statistics for Vasiliki Skreta

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Mechanism Design for Complicated Type Spaces 0 0 1 3 1 2 7 21
A Note on Optimal Allocation Mechanisms 0 0 0 18 0 0 14 81
A Note on Optimal Auctions 0 0 1 51 0 0 7 106
Constrained Information Design 0 0 1 18 0 0 8 72
Dynamic Optimal Non-linear Taxation Under Non-commitment 0 0 0 2 0 0 9 223
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 0 55 0 0 14 202
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 0 60 0 1 17 141
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 0 44 0 0 10 76
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 0 31 0 0 19 80
Extensions on "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" 0 0 0 17 0 0 3 43
Fraud-proof non-market allocation mechanisms 0 0 2 2 1 2 11 13
Gone Shopping: A Theory of Ratings Inflation 0 0 0 7 0 0 4 51
Immunity 0 0 0 44 0 2 10 67
Immunity 0 0 0 69 0 0 19 769
Immunity 0 0 0 10 0 1 14 112
Incentive-driven Inattention 0 0 0 30 0 3 15 76
Incentive-driven Inattention 0 0 0 12 0 0 11 93
Incentive-driven Inattention 0 0 0 17 0 1 8 39
Information Design by an Informed Designer 0 0 1 18 1 3 29 56
Information Design under Falsification 0 0 0 14 0 2 12 58
Informed Communication Equilibrium 0 8 8 8 0 2 2 2
Informed Information Design 0 1 1 41 0 2 13 65
Informed Information Design 0 0 1 2 1 3 21 34
Informed Information Design 0 0 1 39 0 1 14 103
Informed communication equilibrium 0 0 0 2 1 1 9 15
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 13
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 18
Interconnection Negotiations between Telecommunication Networks and Universal Service Objectives 0 0 0 97 0 0 9 315
Mechanism Design under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 45 1 1 10 176
Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment 0 0 0 23 0 0 19 97
Models, Inattention and Bayesian Updates 0 0 0 13 0 1 11 41
Models, Inattention and Expectation Updates 0 0 1 63 0 0 15 245
Models, Inattention and Expectation Updates 0 0 0 23 0 1 8 56
Models, inattention and expectation updates 0 0 0 8 0 0 3 20
Note on Optimal Auctions 0 0 0 40 1 1 7 166
On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure 0 0 0 53 0 1 11 175
On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure 0 0 0 45 0 1 12 155
On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure 0 0 0 23 0 3 10 130
Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities 0 0 0 2 1 1 10 279
Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities 0 0 0 95 0 0 18 271
Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 27 0 2 16 88
Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 50 0 0 24 186
Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities 0 0 0 50 0 0 12 132
Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 12 0 1 22 92
Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment 0 0 0 70 0 0 11 203
Optimal Auctions with General Distribution 0 0 0 17 1 1 5 56
Optimal Auctions with General Distributions 0 0 0 37 0 0 7 69
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 0 20 0 0 12 274
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 0 71 0 0 8 270
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 0 0 0 1 15 178
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 0 38 0 1 14 157
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good 0 0 1 39 1 4 15 87
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good 0 0 0 22 1 3 12 49
Purchase history and product personalization 0 0 0 15 0 1 23 51
Purchase history and product personalization 1 1 1 16 2 3 33 63
Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation 1 1 1 123 2 4 18 392
Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation 0 0 0 61 1 4 25 210
Revenue Equivalence for Arbitrary Type Spaces 0 0 0 16 0 0 5 63
Score-based mechanisms 0 0 0 14 0 2 15 41
Selling Through Referrals 0 0 0 18 0 0 12 82
Selling Through Referrals 0 0 0 22 1 2 9 51
Selling with Evidence 0 0 0 0 1 2 9 15
Selling with Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 38
Selling with Evidence 0 0 0 24 0 1 17 47
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms 0 0 0 39 0 0 13 137
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms 0 0 0 51 0 0 8 201
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms 0 0 0 47 0 1 13 166
Technical Appendix for "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms" 0 0 1 25 1 1 5 64
Test Design Under Falsification 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 10
Test Design Under Falsification 0 0 0 23 0 1 11 69
Test Design Under Falsification 0 1 1 17 0 2 12 22
Test Design Under Falsification 0 0 0 8 0 2 22 47
Test Design Under Falsification 0 0 0 6 0 0 9 13
Test Design under Falsification 0 0 1 20 0 2 35 79
The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design 0 0 0 54 0 0 11 160
The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design 0 0 0 84 0 1 8 314
The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design 0 0 0 42 0 0 12 143
What to Put on the Table 0 0 1 40 1 2 12 349
What to Put on the Table 0 0 0 18 1 1 13 141
What to put in the table 0 0 0 14 0 1 7 168
Total Working Papers 2 12 25 2,394 21 83 1,014 9,732
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on optimal allocation mechanisms 0 0 0 14 0 2 14 54
An issue dedicated to Konrad Mierendorff: Introduction 0 0 5 11 0 0 14 24
Asymmetric partnerships 0 0 0 22 1 1 3 81
Dynamic strategic information transmission 0 0 0 19 0 0 18 139
Efficient Mechanisms for Multi‐Asset Bilateral Trading 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Heterogeneity, Inattention, and Bayesian Updates 0 0 0 16 0 1 11 84
IMMUNITY 0 1 1 9 1 5 28 73
Incentive-driven inattention 0 0 1 14 0 2 11 50
Informed Information Design 0 0 2 8 1 2 26 51
Informed communication equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
Informed seller with taste heterogeneity 0 0 0 13 0 4 19 85
Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment 0 0 2 9 2 6 32 65
Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces 0 0 1 51 0 0 9 116
Mechanism design with limited commitment: Markov environments 0 0 2 2 1 1 17 20
On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure 0 1 3 30 0 1 12 118
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection 0 0 1 158 0 1 15 629
Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information 0 0 0 16 0 0 8 109
Optimal auction design under non-commitment 0 0 1 20 0 2 12 105
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good 0 0 0 4 1 3 18 29
Purchase History and Product Personalization 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 6
Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation 0 0 2 326 5 7 31 1,082
Reflecting on the First 20 Years of the Journal of the European Economic Association 0 0 0 3 1 3 9 16
Selling through referrals 0 0 0 3 0 1 11 67
Selling with evidence 0 0 0 3 0 1 14 63
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms -super-1 0 0 0 70 0 0 5 211
Test Design Under Falsification 0 0 1 6 0 5 29 64
The role of optimal threats in auction design 0 0 1 37 0 0 6 134
Total Journal Articles 0 2 23 864 13 54 381 3,478

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11