Access Statistics for Alex Smolin

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 4
Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption 0 0 0 7 1 7 10 17
Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Recommendations 0 1 7 7 0 8 14 14
Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Recommendations 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Recommendations 0 0 0 7 1 4 10 25
Calibrated Mechanism Design 10 24 24 24 0 7 7 7
Cream Skimming and Information Design in Marching Markets 0 0 0 48 0 3 11 67
Data Collection by an Informed Seller 0 0 1 2 1 6 10 13
Data Collection by an Informed Seller 0 0 0 14 2 5 5 24
Data Collection by an Informed Seller 0 0 0 0 3 7 9 9
Data Provision to an Informed Seller 0 0 0 11 0 3 5 18
Data Provision to an Informed Seller 0 0 0 0 6 13 13 13
Data Provision to an Informed Seller 0 0 0 7 3 12 12 27
Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes 0 0 0 0 1 3 8 8
Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes 0 0 1 34 3 7 11 51
Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders 0 0 0 12 0 5 9 46
Dynamic Evaluation Design 0 1 2 23 3 11 13 63
Information Design in Concave Games 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 8
Information Design in Concave Games 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 7
Information Design in Concave Games 0 0 0 33 2 7 9 39
Information Design in Games: Certification Approach 0 0 3 3 1 4 21 23
Information Design in Smooth Games 0 0 7 7 1 5 9 9
Information Design in Smooth Games 0 0 1 16 0 9 15 28
Information Design in Smooth Games 0 1 1 1 0 5 6 6
Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective 0 0 1 11 4 10 11 35
Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective 0 0 0 1 3 7 11 20
Optimal technology design 0 0 5 5 2 21 26 26
Optimal technology design 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 5
Persuasion and Welfare 1 1 1 3 2 7 11 23
Persuasion and Welfare 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 5
Persuasion and Welfare 0 0 0 14 0 3 9 31
Robust Trust 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust Trust 15 15 15 15 1 1 1 1
Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information 0 0 0 84 1 9 12 100
The Design and Price of Information 0 0 1 44 7 14 21 170
The Design and Price of Information 0 0 0 20 3 12 16 197
The Design and Price of Information 0 0 1 96 6 12 17 190
The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine Tuning, and Optimal Pricing 0 0 20 20 16 39 54 65
The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine-Tuning, and Optimal Pricing 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 9
The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine-Tuning, and Optimal Pricing 0 1 25 25 1 15 39 39
The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine-Tuning, and Optimal Pricing 1 1 18 19 2 12 29 41
The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing 0 0 1 2 1 2 6 12
The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing 0 0 0 9 2 6 9 25
The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing 0 0 0 7 1 2 4 18
The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing 0 0 0 13 0 3 7 17
The welfare impact of recommendation algorithms 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
Total Working Papers 27 45 135 644 83 334 527 1,558

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets 0 0 0 5 0 4 9 35
Data provision to an informed seller 0 1 1 1 3 19 26 26
Disclosure and pricing of attributes 0 0 1 4 1 7 14 27
Dynamic Evaluation Design 0 0 0 4 0 6 8 28
Dynamic communication with biased senders 0 0 1 6 1 5 8 51
Optimal technology design 0 0 0 1 1 6 12 17
Persuasion and Welfare 1 1 2 9 3 10 26 48
The Design and Price of Information 1 2 4 130 4 13 27 523
Total Journal Articles 2 4 9 160 13 70 130 755

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04