| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Scarce Water Resources |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
122 |
| COMPETITION VS. QUALITY IN AN INDUSTRY WITH IMPERFECT TRACEABILITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
| Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
294 |
| Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Safety Standard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
168 |
| Competition vs. quality in an industry with imperfect traceability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
| Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters' Turnout? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
642 |
| Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters’ Turnout? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
201 |
| Contracting Under Unverifiable Monetary Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
29 |
| Crop Prices and Deforestation in the Tropics |
0 |
0 |
9 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
10 |
| Crop Prices and Deforestation in the Tropics |
0 |
0 |
16 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
16 |
| Diplomatic Intervention in Civil War: Trade for All or Trade for One? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
227 |
| Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
182 |
| Does equity induce inefficiency? An experiment on coordination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
24 |
| Does equity induce inefficiency? An experiment on coordination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
| Does equity induce inefficiency? An experiment on coordination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
| Does equity induce inefficiency? An experiment on coordination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
27 |
| Drought and Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
227 |
| Drought and Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
| Drought and Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
151 |
| Exploitation and Recycling of Exhaustible Resources: The Case of Rare Earths and Phosphorus |
1 |
1 |
3 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
82 |
| Farmer Impatience and Grain Storage for the Hunger Season |
0 |
0 |
3 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
132 |
| Fertile Ground for Conflict |
0 |
1 |
3 |
49 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
103 |
| Fertile Ground for Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
207 |
| Fertile Ground for Conflict |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
43 |
| Heterogeneous efforts in voluntary programmes on food safety |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
| Incentives, Pro-social Preferences and Discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
44 |
| Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
| Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
29 |
| Inequality Aversion and the Distribution of Rewards in Organizations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
| Inequality Aversion and the Distribution of Rewards in Organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
25 |
| Inventory credit as a commitment device to save grain until the hunger season |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
| Inventory credit as a commitment device to save grain until the hunger season |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
| Inventory credit as a commitment device to save grain until the hunger season |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
28 |
| Inventory credit as a commitment device to save grain until the hunger season |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
| Joint Venture Breakup and the Exploration-Exploitation Trade-off |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
223 |
| Joint venture breakup and the exploration-exploitation trade-off |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
33 |
| Knowledge Accumulation Within An Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
| Knowledge Accumulation within an Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
120 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
844 |
| Knowledge accumulation within an organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
| Knowledge acquisition within an organization: How to retain a knowledge worker using wage profile and non-monotonic knowledge accumulation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
112 |
| Less Risk, More Effort: Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
| Linking Risk Aversion, Time Preference and Fertiliser Use in Burkina Faso |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
44 |
| Linking Risk Aversion, Time Preference and Fertilizer Use in Burkina Faso |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
68 |
| Linking risk aversion, time preference and fertilizer use in Burkina Faso |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
111 |
| Linking risk aversion, time preference and fertilizer use in Burkina Faso |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
27 |
| Linking risk aversion, time preference and fertilizer use in Burkina Faso |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
61 |
| Linking risk aversion, time preference and fertilizer use in Burkina Faso |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
50 |
| Motivating versus Funding |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
129 |
| Overburdened judges |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
| Overburdened judges |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
| Overburdened judges |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
16 |
| Overburdened judges |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
| Political Cycles: Issue Ownership and the Opposition Advantage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
688 |
| Political Cycles: The Opposition Advantage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
156 |
| Political Cycles: the Opposition Advantage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
380 |
| Pro-social Motivations, Externalities and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
| Pro-social Motivations, Externalities and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
| Rainwater harvesting and groundwater conservation: when endogenous heterogeneity matters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
42 |
| Social Preferences and the Distribution of Rewards |
11 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Social Preferences and the Distribution of Rewards |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Social preferences and coordination: An experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| Technology adoption and pro-social preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
30 |
| Technology adoption and pro-social preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
29 |
| The Pace of Technology Transfer in Anticipation of Joint Venture Breakup |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
119 |
| The pace of technology transfer in anticipation of joint venture breakup |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
| Valence Advantages and Public Goods Consumption: Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
293 |
| Wait and sell: farmers' individual preferences and crop storage in Burkina Faso |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
35 |
| When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflD72icts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
434 |
| Total Working Papers |
13 |
16 |
57 |
1,979 |
16 |
33 |
352 |
7,443 |
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