Access Statistics for Solymosi Tamás

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Assignment games satisfy the CoMa property 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 20
Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes 0 0 1 12 0 0 3 14
Bargaining sets and the core in permutation games 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 12
Core Stability in Chain-Component Additive Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
Core Stability in Chain-Component Additive Games 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 37
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games 0 0 0 32 1 1 3 49
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games 0 0 0 26 2 6 7 50
Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 13
Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6
Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 27
On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games 0 0 1 11 0 0 2 23
On the Core of Directed Acyclic Graph Games 0 0 0 65 6 9 10 111
On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
On the Shapley value of liability games 0 0 0 19 0 2 2 52
On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 23
On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Strongly Essential Coalitions and the Nucleolus of Peer Group Games 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 22
Strongly Essential Coalitions and the Nucleolus of Peer Group Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
The kernel is in the least core for permutation games 1 1 1 12 2 2 3 52
Type Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Multi-Glove Games 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 4
Type Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Multi-Glove Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11
Type monotonic allocation schemes for multi-glove games 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 12
Universal Characterization Sets for the Nucleolus in Balanced Games 0 0 0 31 1 1 2 69
Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 23
Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions (extended version) 0 0 0 10 2 2 4 22
Total Working Papers 1 1 4 266 21 31 50 686

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A method for determining the weights of criteria: The centralized weights 0 0 0 43 1 3 3 179
An Algorithm for Finding the Nucleolus of Asignment Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 298
Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 165
Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 7
Assignment games with stable core 0 0 0 195 1 1 4 705
Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games 0 0 0 9 3 3 3 46
Computing the nucleolus of cyclic permutation games 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 92
Core stability in chain-component additive games 0 0 0 11 0 0 4 388
Introduction 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 6
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games 0 0 1 7 0 2 5 35
Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 14
Neighbor games and the leximax solution 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 13
On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games 0 0 0 4 1 2 4 37
On the Shapley value of liability games 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 8
On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games 0 0 0 102 2 2 3 303
On the nucleolus of neighbor games 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 113
Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games 0 0 0 27 1 1 1 144
The bargaining set of four-person balanced games 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 283
The kernel is in the least core for permutation games 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 22
Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 30
Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions 0 0 0 2 1 1 5 52
Total Journal Articles 0 0 1 543 16 23 45 2,941
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Statistics updated 2025-11-08