Access Statistics for Marilda Antonia de Oliveira Sotomayor

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Further Note on the Stable Matching Problem 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 29
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure 0 0 0 0 3 4 6 3,298
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure 0 0 0 109 1 2 6 391
Comparative Statics in the Multiple-Partners Assignment Game 0 0 0 29 1 7 9 71
Constrained-Optimal Tradewise-Stable Outcomes in the One-Sided Assignment Game: A Solution Concept Weaker than the Core 0 0 1 27 4 6 10 60
LABOR TIME SHARED IN THE ASSIGNMENT GAME GENERATING NEW COOPERATIVE AND COMPETITIVE STRUCTURES 0 0 0 37 6 7 7 65
LABOR TIME SHARED IN THE ASSIGNMENT GAME LENDING NEW INSIGHTS TO THE THEORY OF TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS 0 0 0 36 1 4 4 56
Multi-Item Auctions 0 0 0 0 4 6 10 102
ON THE CORE OF THE COALITIONAL GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE PAYOFF AND FINITE SET OF PLAYERS 0 0 0 50 2 4 7 64
On Simple Outcomes and Cores 0 0 0 30 3 5 5 56
THE ROLE PLAYED BY SIMPLE OUTCOMES IN COALITION FORMATION PROCESS OF THE CORE OUTCOMES 0 0 0 36 7 9 11 64
THE ROOLE PLAYED BY THE WELL-BEHAVED MATCHINGS IN THE COALITION FORMATION PROCESS OF THE STABLE MATCHINGS FOR THE ROOMMATE MARKET 0 0 0 44 3 8 8 98
TWO FOLK MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS IN THE GENERAL ONE-TO-TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS WITH MONEY 0 0 0 16 5 6 6 80
TWO FOLK MANIPULABILITY THEOREMS IN TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKETS 0 0 0 52 2 3 4 56
The Outcome of Competitive Equilibrium Rules In Buyer-seller Markets When the Agents Play Strategically 0 0 0 14 14 19 21 79
Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money 0 0 0 41 1 2 5 81
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 521 58 94 122 4,650

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Market Clearing Price Mechanism with Multiple Demands 0 0 0 5 1 3 7 45
A Dynamic Price-Setting Mechanism for a Hybrid Matching Market 0 0 0 1 5 6 8 24
A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages 0 0 0 56 2 2 3 202
A Selling Mechanism 0 0 0 0 5 5 6 19
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure 0 0 0 57 4 7 7 300
A Simultaneous Descending Bid Auction for Multiple Items and Unitary Demand 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 13
A collection of papers dedicated to David Gale on the occasion of his 85th birthday 0 0 0 31 2 2 4 83
A further note on the college admission game 0 0 0 13 3 4 5 64
A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers 0 0 1 76 1 4 7 185
A note on the multiple partners assignment game 0 0 0 46 3 4 8 179
Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game 0 0 0 24 1 2 5 79
An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf 0 0 0 19 3 5 6 127
Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game 0 0 0 3 2 3 4 38
Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication 0 0 1 8 3 4 9 34
Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game 0 0 0 32 5 7 10 128
Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market 0 0 0 15 1 2 5 76
ESTRUTURA ESTRATÉGICA DE UM SIMPLES MERCADO DE COMPRA E VENDA 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 17
Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market 0 0 0 46 1 1 2 106
Implementation in the many-to-many matching market 0 0 0 78 8 19 20 177
Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets 0 2 2 57 3 8 11 227
Mecanismos de Admissão de Candidatos às Instituições. Modelagem e Análise à Luz da Teoria dos Jogos 0 0 0 1 3 4 6 15
Michael Maschler, a special friend 0 0 0 17 1 3 6 64
Multi-Item Auctions 0 0 5 562 5 13 38 1,405
My encounters with David Gale 0 0 0 71 1 1 6 132
On income fluctuations and capital gains 0 0 3 96 1 2 13 186
On income fluctuations and capital gains with a convex production function 0 0 0 8 5 7 9 57
On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 42
Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism 0 0 0 39 1 4 6 133
Redesenho e Análise do Mercado de Admissão aos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia no Brasil à Luz da Teoria dos Jogos: Um Experimento Natural em Desenho de Mercados 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 24
Resultados de Estática Comparativa para um Mercado de Matching Misto de Dois Lados 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 11
Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game 0 0 0 32 1 3 5 95
Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets 0 0 0 2 1 1 4 10
Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games 0 0 0 22 1 5 6 70
Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatment 0 0 0 7 6 7 8 32
The College Admissions Problem Revisited 0 0 1 423 4 5 8 1,871
The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game 0 0 0 103 4 6 7 393
The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer–seller markets when the agents play strategically 0 0 1 4 5 5 7 44
The pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences 0 0 0 33 3 4 5 113
The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules 0 0 0 34 3 4 7 108
Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem 1 1 1 177 5 11 15 402
Um Simples Mercado de Compra e Venda 0 0 0 3 6 6 8 24
Total Journal Articles 1 3 15 2,208 114 187 301 7,354

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Two-Sided Matching 0 0 0 0 5 10 19 481
Total Books 0 0 0 0 5 10 19 481

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
The Multiple Partners Game 0 0 0 0 3 5 12 32
Two-sided matching 0 5 17 791 8 25 60 2,082
Total Chapters 0 5 17 791 11 30 72 2,114

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12