| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Continuous-Time Model of Financial Clearing |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
| A Continuous-Time Model of Financial Clearing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| A Political Model of Trust |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
| A Political Model of Trust |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
44 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
1 |
2 |
43 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
261 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
223 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
355 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
762 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
1 |
3 |
192 |
0 |
6 |
22 |
701 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
228 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
284 |
| A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
189 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
957 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
56 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
417 |
| Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Natural Bankruptcy Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
158 |
| Are Russian commercial courts biased?Evidence from a natural bankruptcy experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
| Are Russian commercial courts biased?Evidence from a natural bankruptcy experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
| Authoritarian Institutions |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Banks as Tanks: A Continuous-Time Model of Financial Clearing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
59 |
| Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis |
0 |
0 |
2 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
363 |
| Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
202 |
| Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
69 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
346 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
63 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
491 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
498 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
| Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
201 |
| Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
356 |
| Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Evidence from Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
261 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,064 |
| Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
154 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
755 |
| Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
| Coalition Formation in Political Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
22 |
| Coalition Formation in Political Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
165 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
603 |
| Coalition Formation in Political Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
162 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
573 |
| Collusive market sharing and corruption in procurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
| Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
29 |
| Collusive market-sharing and corruption in procurement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
131 |
| Corruption and Collusion in Procurement Tenders |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
40 |
| Corruption and Collusion in Procurement Tenders |
2 |
2 |
10 |
267 |
5 |
10 |
39 |
1,399 |
| Crisis? What Crisis? Bank stability, financial development and propaganda |
2 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
| Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
191 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
484 |
| Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
177 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
487 |
| Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
14 |
| Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
| Development Based on Commodity Revenues? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
487 |
| Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights |
1 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
109 |
| Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
| Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
| Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships |
0 |
1 |
1 |
147 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
533 |
| Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
396 |
| Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
453 |
| Dictators and Their Viziers: Agency Problems in Dictatorships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
554 |
| Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An ?Eliminations Model? of Stalin?s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
312 |
| Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An “Eliminations Model” of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Dictators, Repression and the Median Citizen: An “Eliminations Model” of Stalin’s Terror (Data from the NKVD Archives) |
0 |
1 |
2 |
147 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
640 |
| Do Political Blogs Matter? Corruption in State-Controlled Companies, Blog Postings, and DDoS Attacks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
262 |
| Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
115 |
| Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
221 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
757 |
| Economic Transition and the Rise of Alternative Institutions: Political Connections in Putin's Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
85 |
| Electoral College and Election Fraud |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
24 |
| Endogenous Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
92 |
| Financial Restrictions and Competitive Balance in Sports Leagues |
0 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
146 |
| Government Control of the Media |
0 |
0 |
1 |
274 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
3,104 |
| Government Control of the Media |
0 |
0 |
5 |
36 |
2 |
6 |
54 |
1,145 |
| How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
| How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
| Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
158 |
| Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
64 |
| Incumbency Advantage in Nondemocratic Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
| Inequality, Property Rights Protection, and Economic Growth in Transition Economies: Theory and Russian Evidence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
169 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
739 |
| Inequality, Property Rights, and Economic Growth in Transition Economies: Theory and Russian Evidence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
648 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1,967 |
| Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
| Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID Response in Russia |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
| Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
| Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
399 |
| Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
295 |
| Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
| Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence |
2 |
2 |
5 |
53 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
99 |
| Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence |
0 |
2 |
6 |
156 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
124 |
| Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence |
2 |
4 |
11 |
115 |
3 |
13 |
38 |
187 |
| Is Political Risk Company-Specific? The Market Side of the Yukos Affair |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
872 |
| Isolation and Insurrection: How Partisanship and Political Geography Fueled January 6, 2021 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
| Market Sharing in Procurement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
| Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives and the Resource Curse |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
348 |
| Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse |
0 |
0 |
1 |
189 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
854 |
| Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
295 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
804 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
311 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
301 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
236 |
| Persuasion on Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
51 |
| Persuasion on Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
90 |
| Political Economy in a Changing World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
202 |
| Political Economy in a Changing World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
478 |
| Political Economy in a Changing World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
289 |
| Political Economy of Crisis Response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
44 |
| Political Economy of Crisis Response |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
53 |
| Political Economy of Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
95 |
| Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
241 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
665 |
| Poverty and Economic Dislocation Reduce Compliance with COVID-19 Shelter-in-Place Protocols |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
73 |
| Poverty and Economic Dislocation Reduce Compliance with COVID-19 Shelter-in-Place Protocols |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
122 |
| Private Protection of Property Rights, Inequality, and Economic Growth in Transition Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
290 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
692 |
| Provincial Protectionism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
440 |
| Rebel Capacity and Combat Tactics |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
| Social Media and Corruption |
0 |
0 |
2 |
160 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
675 |
| Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Re-evaluating De Tocqueville |
0 |
0 |
1 |
190 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
311 |
| Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Re-evaluating De Tocqueville |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
176 |
| Structural or Cyclical? Unemployment in Latvia Since the 2008-09 Financial Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
137 |
| Technological Foundations of Political Instability |
0 |
1 |
2 |
79 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
175 |
| The Historical Perspective on the Trump Puzzle: A Review of Barry Eichengreen’s “The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era†|
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
52 |
| The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
559 |
| The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
617 |
| The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
162 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
1,276 |
| The Political Economics of Non-democracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
34 |
| The Political Economics of Non-democracy |
1 |
2 |
4 |
25 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
57 |
| The Political Economics of Non-democracy |
0 |
1 |
3 |
30 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
82 |
| The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
251 |
| The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
317 |
| The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
| Unmasking Partisanship: Polarization Undermines Public Response to Collective Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
| Unmasking Partisanship: Polarization Undermines Public Response to Collective Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
33 |
| Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy |
1 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
42 |
| Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
268 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
788 |
| Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights |
0 |
0 |
1 |
317 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1,296 |
| Winning by Losing: Incentive Incompatibility in Multiple Qualifiers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
105 |
| Total Working Papers |
11 |
27 |
97 |
9,607 |
51 |
157 |
594 |
40,674 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Political Economy Model of a Research University |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| A Political Theory of Populism |
0 |
2 |
7 |
235 |
2 |
5 |
25 |
1,158 |
| A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
299 |
| Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a bankruptcy law transplant |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
222 |
| Basics of contract theory (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 2016 - Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström) |
0 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
36 |
| Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Businessman Candidates |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
99 |
| Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
153 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
535 |
| Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in Procurement |
1 |
1 |
1 |
69 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
268 |
| DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY–COMPETENCE TRADE‐OFF |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
244 |
| Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
404 |
| Dictators and oligarchs: A dynamic theory of contested property rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
516 |
| Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
320 |
| Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
504 |
| Economic transition and the rise of alternative institutions: Political connections in Putin's Russia |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
75 |
| Economics and Politics of Russian Bankruptcies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Economics of Development Based on Commodity Revenues |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Economics of the Resource Curse |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
| Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
135 |
| Elections in Non-Democracies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
38 |
| FINANCIAL MARKETS EFFICIENCY(NOBEL MEMORIAL PRIZE IN ECONOMICS 2013) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Government control of the media |
3 |
6 |
37 |
209 |
6 |
15 |
108 |
799 |
| How Does Kompromat Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
| Information Operations Increase Civilian Security Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
17 |
| Information revelation and efficiency in auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
| Institutional Theory of Endless Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
25 |
| Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
| Passive Creditors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
439 |
| Political Economy in a Changing World |
0 |
0 |
4 |
218 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
933 |
| Political Economy of Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
125 |
| Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
183 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
842 |
| Poverty and economic dislocation reduce compliance with COVID-19 shelter-in-place protocols |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
85 |
| Provincial protectionism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
171 |
| Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin's archives |
1 |
3 |
7 |
120 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
458 |
| Social Media and Corruption |
0 |
1 |
7 |
91 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
415 |
| Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Reevaluating De Tocqueville |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
6 |
23 |
313 |
| The Historical Perspective on the Donald Trump Puzzle: A Review of Barry Eichengreen's The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
47 |
| The Political Economics of Non-democracy |
0 |
1 |
26 |
26 |
5 |
11 |
70 |
70 |
| The end of economic transition |
0 |
0 |
3 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
115 |
| The killing game: A theory of non-democratic succession |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
110 |
| Theory of Mechanism Design (2007 Nobel Prize in Economics) |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
| Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Applications (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics 2012) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Unmasking partisanship: Polarization undermines public response to collective risk |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
26 |
| Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
103 |
| Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
690 |
| Winning by Losing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
177 |
| {'italic': 'Kompromat', '#text': 'Corrigendum: How Does Affect Politics? A Model of Transparency Regimes'} |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Total Journal Articles |
5 |
16 |
114 |
2,322 |
36 |
98 |
501 |
10,994 |
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