| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
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3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games |
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7 |
12 |
45 |
| A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games |
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0 |
1 |
31 |
1 |
8 |
12 |
63 |
| A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
11 |
| A Core-partition solution for coalitional rankings with a variable population domain |
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0 |
0 |
16 |
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1 |
1 |
37 |
| A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance |
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1 |
18 |
0 |
7 |
8 |
95 |
| A Decomposition of the Space of TU-games Using Addition and Transfer Invariance |
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1 |
3 |
41 |
| A Geometric Examination of Majorities Based on Difference in Support |
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3 |
17 |
| A Myerson Value for Multi-choice Games with a Communication Network |
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1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values |
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1 |
1 |
3 |
| A characterization of the family of Weighted priority values |
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0 |
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15 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
38 |
| A class of solidarity allocation rules for TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
37 |
| A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support |
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3 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
33 |
| A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support |
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0 |
17 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
35 |
| A model of embedded coalition formation and the Shapley values for games with externalities |
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1 |
5 |
7 |
7 |
| A note on control costs and logit rules for strategic games |
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0 |
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2 |
3 |
4 |
| A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games |
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18 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
30 |
| A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games |
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1 |
2 |
26 |
| A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games |
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0 |
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14 |
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10 |
12 |
55 |
| Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core |
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0 |
3 |
26 |
| Adaptive learning and p-best response sets |
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2 |
3 |
30 |
| Adaptive learning and p-best response sets |
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1 |
4 |
8 |
19 |
| Adaptive play with spatial sampling |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
| Algorithme de fictitious play et cycles |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
| Algorythme de fictitious play et cycles |
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0 |
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10 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
73 |
| Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution |
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2 |
4 |
9 |
17 |
| Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution |
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1 |
5 |
6 |
10 |
| Allocation rules for museum pass programs |
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1 |
1 |
35 |
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3 |
4 |
98 |
| An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-Games |
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1 |
3 |
4 |
39 |
| An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach |
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2 |
2 |
2 |
| An axiomatization of the iterated h-index and applications to sport rankings |
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42 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
99 |
| An axiomatization of the iterated h-index and applications to sport rankings |
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0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
58 |
| An optimal bound to acces the core of TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
| An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games |
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1 |
7 |
10 |
41 |
| An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games |
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7 |
40 |
| An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games |
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2 |
5 |
41 |
| An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games |
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0 |
31 |
5 |
10 |
13 |
97 |
| Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near |
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0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
22 |
| Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends |
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0 |
0 |
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1 |
2 |
4 |
48 |
| Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends |
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1 |
3 |
26 |
| Average Tree Solutions and the Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends |
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0 |
17 |
29 |
32 |
66 |
| Average tree solution for graph games |
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0 |
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2 |
3 |
37 |
| Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends |
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33 |
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5 |
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100 |
| Average tree solutions for graph games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
31 |
| Average tree solutions for graph games |
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0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
306 |
| Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
33 |
| Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
42 |
| Axiomatic and bargaining foundations of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games |
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0 |
1 |
27 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
69 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency |
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0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
29 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency |
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0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency |
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0 |
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9 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
32 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
| Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
10 |
19 |
| Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification |
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0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
67 |
| Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification |
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0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
35 |
| Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
40 |
| Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
41 |
| Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
47 |
| Axioms of Invariance for TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
43 |
| Axioms of Invariance for TU-games |
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0 |
2 |
54 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
164 |
| Axioms of invariance for TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
78 |
| Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games |
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0 |
0 |
36 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
70 |
| Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
34 |
| Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel |
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0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
8 |
17 |
61 |
| Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
| Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
31 |
| Characterization of the Average Tree solution and its kernel |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
29 |
| Characterizations of Weighted and Equal Division Values |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
50 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
25 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
33 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
31 |
| Characterizations of three linear values for TU games by associated consistency: simple proofs using the Jordan normal form |
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0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
63 |
| Coalitional desirability and the equal division value |
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0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
67 |
| Coalitional desirability and the equal division value |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
43 |
| Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: Two extensions of the Shapley value |
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0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
99 |
| Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
15 |
| Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and their Subclass of Data Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
43 |
| Compensations in the Shapley Value and the Compensation Solutions for Graph Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
31 |
| Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
35 |
| Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games |
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0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
128 |
| Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
33 |
| Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
33 |
| Constitution et propriété dans l’œuvre de Sismondi |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| Constitution, souveraineté nationale et représentation dans l’œuvre de Sismondi |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
15 |
| Contagion |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
| Contagion |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
| Contagion and dominating sets |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
21 |
| Control costs and potential functions for spatial games |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
| Control costs and potential functions for spatial games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
| Cooperative Games with Externalities, Marginalism and the Average approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
| Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
12 |
26 |
29 |
69 |
| Cooperative games on intersection closed systems and the Shapley value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
27 |
| Cooperative games with unpaid players |
0 |
1 |
15 |
15 |
0 |
8 |
23 |
23 |
| Cooperative games with unpaid players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
31 |
| Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
2 |
8 |
9 |
57 |
| Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
23 |
| Dilemma with approval and disapproval rules |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
22 |
| Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
29 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
32 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
72 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
33 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
35 |
| Discounted Tree Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
29 |
| Economie, républicanisme et république |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
| Fairness and Fairness for Neighbors: The Difference between the Myerson Value and Component-Wise Egalitarian Solutions |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
36 |
| Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions |
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0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
70 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
39 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
38 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
45 |
| Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
12 |
14 |
364 |
| Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games |
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0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
52 |
| Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem |
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0 |
0 |
252 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
887 |
| Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
| Flow methods for cooperative games with generalized coalition configuration |
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0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
13 |
14 |
| Flow methods for cooperative games with generalized coalition configuration |
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0 |
3 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
| GAMES WITH IDENTICAL SHAPLEY VALUES |
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0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
9 |
11 |
103 |
| Games with Identical Shapley Values |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
6 |
7 |
| Good neighbors are hard to find: computational complexity of network formation |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
24 |
| Harsanyi Power Solutions for Cooperative Games on Voting Structures |
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0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
9 |
36 |
| Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games on voting structures |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
| Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games on voting structures |
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0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
79 |
| Infinite-population approval voting: A proposal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
9 |
14 |
| Interaction on Hypergraphs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
275 |
| Interaction on Hypergraphs |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
23 |
| Interaction on hypergraphs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
41 |
| La notion de propriété chez Sismondi - Un premier positionnement à partir des Nouveaux Principes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
| La notion de propriété chez Sismondi - Un premier positionnement à partir des Nouveaux Principes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
| Le critère de stabilité stochastique en théorie des jeux évolutionnaires |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
| Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
12 |
| Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances |
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0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
24 |
| Local interactions and p-best response set |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
| Modeling medical material shortage using Markov processes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
24 |
| Models of adaptive learning in game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
49 |
| Métaphores, analogies et comportements: la position d'Edith T. Penrose |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
| Neutral candidates in approval and disapproval vote |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
147 |
| Nonspecific Networking |
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0 |
1 |
125 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
397 |
| Nonspecific networking |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
39 |
| On the Number of Blocks Required to Access the Core |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
50 |
| On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core |
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0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
8 |
9 |
63 |
| On the number of blocks required to access the core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
14 |
15 |
151 |
| On the number of blocks required to access the core |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
40 |
| Ordinal Games |
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0 |
1 |
75 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
532 |
| Ordinal Games |
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0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
163 |
| Ordre naturel, raison et catallactique: l'approche de F. Bastiat |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
| Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
33 |
| Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
56 |
| Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
135 |
| Processus de contagion et interactions stratégiques |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
16 |
| Processus de contagion et interactions stratégiques |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
| Procédure de découverte, sélection naturelle et coordination des activités industrielles |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| REACH legislation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
74 |
| Ranking Rankings: An Axiomatic Analysis |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Recension de l'ouvrage: Von Neumann, Morgenstern, and the Creation of Game Theory From Chess to Social Science, 1900–1960 par Robert Leonard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
| Rooted-tree Solutions for Tree Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
10 |
47 |
| Règles d'allocation pour les programmes de pass culturel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
| Règles d'allocation pour les programmes de pass culturels |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
32 |
| Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
24 |
| Sharing the cost of hazardous transportation networks and the Priority Shapley value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
| Solidarity within a Fixed Community |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
39 |
| Stochastic Evolutionary Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Système national d'innovation, division du travail et territoire: un retour à F. List et H.C. Harvey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
| The Average Tree Solution for Multi-Choice Forest Games |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
47 |
| The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
42 |
| The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
106 |
| The Notion of Property in Sismondi's Work |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
| The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
| The Priority Value for Cooperative Games with a Priority Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
133 |
| The River Sharing Problem: a Survey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
112 |
| The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Rooted Forest Games and an Application to Sharing a River with Bifurcations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
31 |
35 |
95 |
| The Sequential Equal Surplus Division for Sharing International Rivers with Bifurcations |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
1 |
9 |
15 |
197 |
| The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
15 |
| The proportional Shapley value and an application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
40 |
| The proportional Shapley value and an application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
11 |
15 |
119 |
| The proportional Shapley value and applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
28 |
| The proportional Shapley value and applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
41 |
| The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
68 |
| The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
42 |
| The sequential equal surplus division for sharing a river |
0 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
94 |
| The sequential surplus division for sharing a river with bifurcations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
| The social cost problem, rights and the (non)empty core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
20 |
| The social cost problem, rights and the (non)empty core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
19 |
| The social cost problem, rights and the (non)empty core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
13 |
| The social cost problem, rights and the (non)empty core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
| The social cost problem, rights and the (non)empty core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
26 |
| The social cost problem, rights and the (non)empty core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
23 |
| The social cost problem, rights, and the (non)empty core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
| Théorie des jeux coopératifs: applications en sciences économiques et politiques. Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
| Théorie des jeux et applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
73 |
| Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
34 |
| Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
56 |
| Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
6 |
11 |
28 |
| Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
46 |
| Weighted Component Fairness for Forest Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
97 |
| Weighted component fairness for forest games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
29 |
| Total Working Papers |
6 |
9 |
38 |
2,001 |
127 |
769 |
1,198 |
10,482 |
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