| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Crowdfunding |
0 |
0 |
2 |
291 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
792 |
| A Theory of Crowdfunding - A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
251 |
| A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
113 |
| A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
376 |
| Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
151 |
| Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
208 |
| Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
246 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,518 |
| Certification and Market Transparency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
119 |
| Certification and Market Transparency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
107 |
| Certification and market transparency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
89 |
| Collective Brand Reputation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
15 |
| Collective Brand Reputation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
86 |
| Collective Brand Reputation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
| Collusion and Durability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
198 |
| Collusion and Durability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
124 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
411 |
| Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
23 |
| Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
| Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent- Relationship (REVISION) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
370 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,489 |
| Consumer Consent Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
| Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
57 |
| Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
47 |
| Consumer standards as a strategic device to mitigate ratchet effects in dynamic regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
84 |
| Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
500 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,377 |
| Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
296 |
| Correlation-Savvy Sellers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Correlation-Savvy Sellers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
| Crowdfunding, demand uncertainty, and moral hazard: A mechanism design approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
396 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
821 |
| Delegation and Dynamic Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
64 |
| Delegation and Dynamic Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
107 |
| Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
75 |
| Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal--Agent Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
623 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2,657 |
| Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal–Agent Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
202 |
| Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
10 |
| Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
| Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
830 |
| Ex Post Information Rents in Sequential Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
| Ex post information rents and disclosure in sequential screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
| Ex post information rents in sequential screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
51 |
| Ex post information rents in sequential screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
| Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
| Getting to Know your Agent: Interim Information in Long Term Contractual Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
927 |
| Hierarchical Structures and Dynamic Incentives |
0 |
1 |
1 |
108 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
298 |
| Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture |
0 |
0 |
2 |
214 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
669 |
| Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
284 |
| Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
466 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,680 |
| Informative Certification: Screening vs. Acquisition |
9 |
30 |
90 |
90 |
14 |
73 |
359 |
359 |
| Insourcing Vs Outsourcing in Vertical Structure |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
| Interim Information in Long Term Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
| Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
121 |
| Mediated Contracts and Mechanism Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
229 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
498 |
| Mediated Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
18 |
| Mediated Renegotiation |
3 |
8 |
13 |
20 |
3 |
8 |
24 |
29 |
| Mediation in Situations of Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
148 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
418 |
| Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
174 |
| Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
225 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,453 |
| Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants |
0 |
0 |
2 |
334 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1,272 |
| Migration of the highly skilled: Can Europe catch up with the US? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
131 |
| Mitigating Non-contractible actions by randomness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
681 |
| Monopoly Distortions in Durability and Multi-Dimensional Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
| Moral Hazard in Sequential Teams |
0 |
0 |
2 |
291 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,202 |
| On the (Ir)Relevance of Fee Structures in Certification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| On the timing of climate agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
63 |
| Optimal Information Revelation by Informed Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
237 |
| Optimal Non-Linear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
17 |
| Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
483 |
| Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
193 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
592 |
| Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
| Planned Obsolescence and the Provision of Unobservable Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
478 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
1,880 |
| Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
| Politically Induced Regulatory Risk and Independent Regulatory Agencies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
43 |
| Politieke machtsverhoudingen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
| Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence |
0 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
24 |
| Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence |
0 |
4 |
12 |
14 |
1 |
11 |
30 |
35 |
| Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
| Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
647 |
| Regulation in a Political Economy: An explanation of limited commitment of governments in the context of the ratchet effect |
1 |
1 |
1 |
357 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1,917 |
| Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
| Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
258 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
626 |
| Selling Certification of Private and Market Information |
1 |
1 |
18 |
18 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
14 |
| Separating Equilibria with Imperfect Certification |
0 |
1 |
1 |
61 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
188 |
| Sequential versus Static Screening: an Equivalence Result |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
114 |
| The Benefits of Sequential Screening |
0 |
0 |
3 |
94 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
340 |
| The Benefits of Sequential Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
| The Bologna Process: How student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
177 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
588 |
| The Bologna Process: How student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
421 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1,740 |
| The Effect of Fair vs. Book Value Accounting on the Behavior of Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,604 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6,658 |
| The Effectiveness of Taxation and Feed-in Tariffs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
162 |
| The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
213 |
| The Timing of Climate Agreements under Multiple Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
104 |
| The irrelevance of fee structures for certification |
2 |
3 |
4 |
18 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
18 |
| The political economy of regulatory risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
148 |
| Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
355 |
| Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
298 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,609 |
| Unidirectional Incentive Compatibility |
1 |
3 |
28 |
49 |
2 |
12 |
67 |
89 |
| VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
4 |
11 |
21 |
465 |
| Who Should Pay for Certification? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
95 |
| Who Should Pay for Certification? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
235 |
| Who Should Pay for Certification? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
123 |
| Who should pay for certification? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
| Total Working Papers |
17 |
53 |
195 |
11,959 |
47 |
172 |
771 |
43,872 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard |
0 |
1 |
4 |
285 |
2 |
5 |
19 |
1,172 |
| Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
| Bolton, P., and Dewatripont, M.: Contract Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
253 |
| Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
203 |
| Certification and Market Transparency |
0 |
0 |
4 |
82 |
0 |
4 |
26 |
411 |
| Collective Brand Reputation |
0 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
75 |
| Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
662 |
| Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
75 |
| Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
1,513 |
| Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
120 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
269 |
| Correlation‐savvy sellers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
8 |
| Delegation and dynamic incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
163 |
| Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship |
1 |
1 |
1 |
670 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
3,062 |
| Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle |
0 |
0 |
2 |
285 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
617 |
| Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models |
0 |
1 |
4 |
121 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
323 |
| Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
152 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
416 |
| Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
127 |
| Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening |
0 |
0 |
2 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
159 |
| Ex post information rents in sequential screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
140 |
| Feed-in Subsidies, Taxation, and Inefficient Entry |
0 |
1 |
2 |
46 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
275 |
| Honest certification and the threat of capture |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
271 |
| Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case |
0 |
0 |
2 |
93 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
229 |
| Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
| Interim Information in Long‐Term Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
162 |
| Internalization of Knowledge Spillovers in R&D Joint Ventures: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Mediated contracts and mechanism design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
177 |
| Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
320 |
| Migration of the Talented: Can Europe Catch Up with the U.S.? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
77 |
| Mitigating Non-Contractability with Interim Randomization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
119 |
| Monopoly distortions in durability and multi-dimensional quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
72 |
| On the Timing of Climate Agreements |
0 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
94 |
| Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
18 |
| Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
251 |
| Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
230 |
| Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
79 |
| Ordinary Shares and Managers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
113 |
| Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
| Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
332 |
| Politically induced regulatory risk and independent regulatory agencies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
119 |
| Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
| Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Regulation in a political economy: explaining limited commitment and the ratchet effect |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
474 |
| Regulatory Risk Under Optimal Monopoly Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
154 |
| Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result |
0 |
0 |
2 |
62 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
290 |
| The Bologna process: how student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
354 |
| The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
| Timing of verification procedures: Monitoring versus auditing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
273 |
| VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
196 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
6 |
39 |
3,147 |
14 |
60 |
251 |
14,396 |
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