Access Statistics for Lars A Stole

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games 0 0 1 68 0 3 12 112
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games 0 0 0 46 1 2 14 96
A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game 0 0 0 64 1 5 11 67
A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 85 0 5 25 159
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 0 1 3 15 23
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 0 1 3 13 53
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 0 47 1 3 12 121
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 31
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game 0 0 0 0 1 4 7 18
A necessary and sufficient condition for non-smooth linear-state optimal control problems 0 0 0 23 0 1 6 84
Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games 0 0 0 90 3 10 21 219
Barter relationships 0 0 0 16 0 7 15 134
Barter, Liquidity and Market Segmentation 0 0 0 110 4 6 11 541
Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types 0 0 0 63 0 1 4 242
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria 0 0 0 99 1 5 20 313
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria 0 0 0 63 1 2 11 239
Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in Long-Term Projects 0 0 1 94 0 3 11 463
Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information 0 1 2 14 1 6 23 55
Menu Auctions Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 0 0 6 14 16
Menu Auctions and Influence Games with Private Information 0 0 0 108 0 2 9 130
Non-Monetary Exchange Within Firms and Industry 0 0 0 180 0 5 13 1,468
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias 0 0 0 56 1 2 12 116
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias 0 0 0 0 2 5 10 29
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 24
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 35
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 15
Organizational Design and Technology Choice with Nonbinding Contracts 0 0 0 227 0 2 6 1,217
Participation Constraints in Discontinuous Adverse Selection Models 0 0 0 5 1 3 15 34
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 12
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 10
Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games 0 0 0 68 0 2 11 186
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 16
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 19
The Collective Wisdom of Beauty Contests 0 0 0 77 0 7 20 158
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games 1 1 1 197 1 4 13 596
Total Working Papers 1 2 5 1,800 24 129 412 7,051
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement 0 0 1 26 6 9 41 181
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game 0 0 0 17 0 2 7 61
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria 0 0 1 208 0 3 17 612
Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects? 1 1 4 167 1 3 19 661
Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games 0 0 0 34 0 2 16 96
Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning 2 3 4 413 3 9 27 1,448
Information expropriation and moral hazard in optimal second-source auctions 0 0 0 38 1 3 8 116
Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts 1 1 10 602 1 5 45 1,310
Mandated countertrade as a strategic commitment 0 0 0 41 0 3 7 190
Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games 0 0 0 60 0 5 13 200
Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly 0 0 0 12 1 4 17 48
Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 1,657
Nonlinear Pricing with Average-Price Bias 0 1 1 17 1 9 16 74
Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation 0 1 3 79 3 10 36 948
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection 0 0 0 7 0 3 14 64
Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining 0 0 0 374 0 1 19 1,439
Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining: Reply 0 0 0 67 0 1 13 237
Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models 0 0 1 1 1 4 18 26
Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency 0 0 0 20 0 5 12 96
Restricting the means of exchange within organizations 0 0 1 21 0 2 10 114
Selecting equilibria in common agency games 0 0 0 37 0 1 10 149
The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 224
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games 0 0 0 160 1 2 9 599
The non-monetary nature of gifts 0 0 6 153 2 5 21 433
Total Journal Articles 4 7 32 2,554 22 95 418 10,983

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Price Discrimination and Competition 7 10 42 1,748 16 49 151 4,041
Total Chapters 7 10 42 1,748 16 49 151 4,041

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04