Access Statistics for Brock Stoddard

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas 0 0 0 67 0 0 26 143
Do Individualists and Collectivists Cooperate Differently? 0 0 3 42 0 2 16 33
Does reducing inequality increase cooperation?​ 1 1 1 126 1 2 14 67
Endowment inequality in public goods games: A re-examination 0 0 0 122 1 2 19 119
Inequality and the Allocation of Collective Goods 0 0 0 2 1 1 22 32
Inequality and the Allocation of Collective Goods 0 0 1 5 0 0 11 20
Naturally occurring enhancements to competition for talent in teams 0 0 0 8 0 0 13 44
Naturally occurring enhancements to competition for talent in teams​ 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 16
Old habits die hard: The experience of inequality and persistence of low cooperation 0 0 1 78 0 0 16 67
Strategic Thinking in Contests 0 0 1 53 0 2 10 153
The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self- Governance in Teams 0 0 0 9 0 0 5 18
The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self-Governance in Teams 0 0 0 27 0 0 10 62
The market for talent: Competition for resources and self governance in teams 0 0 0 35 0 1 11 47
The productivity puzzle and the problem with the rich: An experiment on competition, inequality and "team spirit" 0 0 1 66 0 0 10 94
Within-group inequality in inter-group competition 0 0 0 55 0 2 11 90
‘Doggedness’ or ‘disengagement’? An experiment on the effect of inequality in endowment on behaviour in team competitions 0 0 0 25 1 3 7 63
Total Working Papers 1 1 8 724 4 15 207 1,068

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Allocating a voluntarily provided common-property resource: An experimental examination 0 0 0 8 0 1 11 96
Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas 0 0 0 9 0 1 11 36
Competition for talent: heterogenous abilities in team production 0 0 3 3 0 1 16 19
Correction to: Experimental (re-)analysis of the house-money effect in a public goods game 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 16
Does reducing inequality increase cooperation? 1 1 3 4 4 4 18 28
Endowment inequality in public goods games: A re-examination 0 0 0 37 1 2 11 169
Experimental (re-)analysis of the house-money effect in a public goods game 0 0 0 1 0 1 16 32
Experiments on Communication in Games: Introduction to the Special Issue 0 0 0 2 1 3 9 21
Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers 0 0 1 16 0 0 19 123
Incentivizing provision of collective goods: Allocation rules 0 0 0 2 1 2 20 32
Inequality and the allocation of collective goods 0 0 0 3 2 5 19 25
Inequality reduction and cooperation: Injection of additional resources 0 0 1 1 0 0 9 12
Is a fine still a price? Replication as robustness in empirical legal studies 0 0 0 5 2 7 41 64
Probabilistic Production of a Public Good 0 0 2 37 1 1 11 101
Probabilistic Production of a Public Good 0 0 0 33 0 2 13 102
Risk in payoff-equivalent appropriation and provision games 0 0 0 5 0 1 27 80
Strategic thinking in contests 0 0 0 3 1 1 19 31
Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams 0 0 0 20 0 1 13 120
Team competition when there is within-team inequality 0 0 1 4 0 2 13 39
The market for talent: Competition for resources and self-governance in teams 0 0 0 2 2 2 14 33
‘Doggedness’ or ‘disengagement’? An experiment on the effect of inequality in endowment on behaviour in team competitions 0 0 0 15 1 3 13 121
Total Journal Articles 1 1 11 210 16 42 335 1,300

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Statistics updated 2026-08-07