| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Simple Model of Self-Assessments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
2 |
11 |
12 |
330 |
| A Theory of Policy Reversal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
7 |
13 |
22 |
1,119 |
| A VOTER MODEL BASED ON THE PARTISAN THEORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
338 |
| Aggressive Reporting and Probabilistic Auditing in a Principles-Based Environment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
58 |
| Confidence Management: On Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
183 |
| Decision Making and Learning in a Globalizing World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
138 |
| Decision Making and Learning in a Globalizing World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
103 |
| Delegation or Voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
230 |
| Deliberation, Information Aggregation and Collective Decision Making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
569 |
| Disciplining and Screening Top Executives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
288 |
| Do Elections lead to Informed Public Decisions? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
309 |
| Do More Powerful Interest Groups have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
102 |
| Do Policy Makers, Disrtibutional Desires lead to an Inflationary Bias? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
165 |
| Does Electoral Competition create Incentives for Political Parties to collect Information about the Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
227 |
| Don't demotivate, discriminate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
94 |
| Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
175 |
| Environmental Policy Choice under Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
283 |
| Estimation of Preference Weights in a Model of Monetary Policy with Multiplicative Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
127 |
| How Polarization and Political Instability affect Learning through Experimentation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
293 |
| In Search of the Motives Behind U.S. Fiscal Macroeconomic Economic Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
160 |
| Is Transparency to No Avail? Committee Decision-Making, Pre-Meetings, and Credible Deals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
204 |
| Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
573 |
| Models of Voter Behaviour: An Application to the Netherlands |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
333 |
| On Committees of Experts |
0 |
1 |
1 |
235 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
543 |
| On the Composition of Committees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
364 |
| On the Role of Pre-Determined Rules for HRM Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
| On the Role of the Governmental Agreement in Breaking Political Deadlocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
516 |
| Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control |
0 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
234 |
| Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
325 |
| Popularity Functions Based on the Partisan Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
294 |
| Producing and Manipulating Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
500 |
| Producing and Manipulating Information: Private Information Providers versus Public Information Providers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
477 |
| Rational Voters in Partisanship Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
210 |
| Rational Voters, Election and Central Banks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
163 |
| Sequential Advocacy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
3 |
7 |
10 |
328 |
| Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
412 |
| THE ESTIMATION OF PREFERENCES BEHIND US MONETARY POLICY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
209 |
| Task-specific Human Capital and Organizational Inertia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
4 |
7 |
7 |
119 |
| The Advantage of Tying One's Economist's Hand: The Value of Information in a Monetary Policy Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
179 |
| The Consequences of Endogenizing Information for Herd Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
232 |
| The Effect of Fiscal Rules on Public Investment if Budget Deficits Are Politically Motivated |
0 |
0 |
0 |
429 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,357 |
| The Effect of Fiscal Rules on Public Investment if Budget Deficits are Politically Motivated |
0 |
0 |
1 |
412 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
1,714 |
| The Optimal Degree of Polarization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
305 |
| The Role of Performance Appraisals in Motivating Employees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
298 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
999 |
| The Self-Perception Theory vs. a Dynamic Learning Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
311 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
2,551 |
| Transparency and Pre-meetings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
329 |
| Vanity in Politics: A Problem? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
375 |
| What to put on and what to keep off the Table? A Politician's Choice of which Issues to address |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
41 |
| When Galatea cares about her Reputation: How having Faith in your Workers reduces their Motivation to shine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
| Why Are Residents Reluctant to Consult Attending Physicians? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
83 |
| Why Do Administrations Postpone Policy on Which There is Overall Agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
121 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3,886 |
70 |
160 |
239 |
19,572 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Simple Model of Self-Assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
500 |
| A Theory of Policy Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
550 |
| A comment on sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
69 |
| Adoption Subsidy Versus Technology Standards Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
| Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
112 |
| Confidence Management: On Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
50 |
| Do elections lead to informed public decisions? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
82 |
| Do policymakers' distributional desires lead to an inflationary bias? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
61 |
| Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-party System: An Application to the Netherlands |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
215 |
| Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
152 |
| Electoral and partisan cycles between US economic performance and presidential popularity: a comment on Stephen E. Haynes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
203 |
| Government Spending Cycles: Ideological or Opportunistic? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
305 |
| Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
52 |
| How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory, and Evidence from the FOMC |
0 |
1 |
1 |
61 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
207 |
| In Defense of Boards |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
123 |
| Is Transparency To No Avail? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
| Learning and Signalling by Advisor Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
91 |
| Learning from Others? Decision Rights, Strategic Communication, and Reputational Concerns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
69 |
| On Committees of Experts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
170 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
481 |
| On the bad reputation of reputational concerns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
251 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
474 |
| Partisan Policies, Macroeconomic Performance and Political Support |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
75 |
| Partisan Views on the Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
57 |
| Partisan profiles in presidential policies: An extension of "presidential preferences for inflation versus unemployment" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
39 |
| Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
51 |
| Polarization, Political Instability and Active Learning* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
116 |
| Policy advice, secrecy, and reputational concerns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
| Policy makers, advisers, and reputation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
125 |
| Popularity Functions Based on the Partisan Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
137 |
| Producing and Manipulating Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
450 |
| Rational Voters, Elections, and Central Banks: Do Representative Democracies Need Nonrepresentative Institutions? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
100 |
| Some evidence on policy makers' motives, macroeconomic performance and output-inflation trade-offs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
| The consequences of endogenizing information for the performance of a sequential decision procedure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
74 |
| The optimal degree of polarization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
173 |
| The political economy of American monetary policy: T. Mayer, ed., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990), ISBN 0-521-36316-0, [UK pound]30.00 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
83 |
| The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
| Towards an economic theory of party ideology |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
70 |
| Voting on the Budget Deficit: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
415 |
| When Galatea cares about her reputation: How having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
102 |
| When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
172 |
| Why Do Policy Makers Give (Permanent) Power to Policy Advisers? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
219 |
| Why are junior doctors reluctant to consult attending physicians? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
97 |
| Why do Workers Spend so Much Time on Inferior Tasks? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
94 |
| Why political culture should be in the lexicon of economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
159 |
| Total Journal Articles |
0 |
2 |
3 |
1,372 |
41 |
92 |
154 |
6,942 |
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