Access Statistics for Olivier Tercieux

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of Stochastically Stable Networks 0 0 0 65 1 8 11 231
A characterization of stochastically stable networks 0 0 0 2 0 2 5 23
A characterization of stochastically stable networks 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 21
A characterization of stochastically stable networks 0 0 0 11 2 5 6 81
Adaptive learning and p-best response sets 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 30
An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets 0 0 0 12 0 3 10 60
An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets 0 1 1 30 0 3 5 39
Choix d'écoles en France. Une évaluation de la procédure Affelnet 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 9
Continuous Implementation 0 0 2 87 0 6 10 369
Continuous Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 9
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets 0 0 0 25 0 5 11 96
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 30
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets 0 0 0 10 6 15 17 57
Fondements épistémiques de concepts d'équilibre en théorie des jeux 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 8
Fondements épistémiques de concepts d'équilibre en théorie des jeux 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 26
Implementation with Evidence 0 0 0 0 2 7 10 17
Implementation with Evidence: Complete Information 0 0 0 33 2 8 10 130
Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria 0 0 0 14 1 6 8 124
Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 24
Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential 0 0 0 13 1 8 18 105
Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential 0 0 0 28 0 5 14 245
Log-linear dynamics and local potential 0 0 0 0 2 4 8 12
Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools 1 1 18 216 3 13 62 478
Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp 0 0 0 41 4 14 23 167
On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 7
On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors 0 0 0 9 0 4 8 77
Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 26
Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets 0 0 0 15 2 7 9 42
Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets 0 0 0 13 0 9 10 50
Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 36
Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 1 60 1 7 10 171
Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 1 6 0 4 8 75
Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors 0 0 0 35 0 1 3 188
Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors 0 0 0 1 0 7 9 40
Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoff 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3
Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 43
Robust equilibria under non-common priors 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 29
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection 0 0 0 0 2 10 14 33
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty 0 0 0 1 0 6 9 21
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 1 1 17 0 6 12 109
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 4 9 12 28
Sélection d'équilibre par l'information incomplète 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 17
The Cutting Power of Preparation 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 43
The cutting power of preparation 0 0 0 47 0 7 8 276
The cutting power of preparation 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 29
Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money 0 0 2 12 0 10 15 68
p-Best response set 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 18
p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information 0 0 0 0 0 14 18 31
Total Working Papers 1 3 26 806 39 259 437 3,851
9 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A characterization of stochastically stable networks 0 0 0 23 1 8 10 107
Adaptive learning and p-best response sets 0 0 0 1 1 4 7 44
Choix d'écoles en France. Une évaluation de la procédure Affelnet 0 1 3 7 2 9 12 67
Continuous Implementation 0 0 0 15 1 5 8 179
Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets 0 0 2 20 0 6 19 128
Fondements épistémiques de concepts d'équilibre en théorie des jeux 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 18
Implementation with evidence 0 0 0 12 0 4 10 105
Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria 0 0 0 22 3 9 14 131
Log-linear dynamics and local potential 0 0 0 6 0 1 6 78
On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors 0 0 0 6 0 1 6 51
Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets 0 0 0 2 2 5 11 54
ROBUST RATIONALIZABILITY UNDER ALMOST COMMON CERTAINTY OF PAYOFFS 0 0 0 4 4 6 8 60
Rationalizable implementation 0 0 0 12 2 10 13 93
Robust equilibria under non-common priors 0 0 0 26 0 4 8 160
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection 0 0 0 11 5 14 21 107
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty 0 0 3 42 1 4 14 163
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 33 1 11 20 264
Sélection d'équilibre par l'information incomplète 0 0 0 0 2 7 8 19
The cutting power of preparation 0 0 0 1 1 5 8 31
p-Best response set 0 0 0 28 0 6 11 122
p-Best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information 0 0 0 10 0 3 5 70
Total Journal Articles 0 1 8 284 26 123 221 2,051

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Rationalizable Implementation 0 0 0 2 0 10 11 43
Total Chapters 0 0 0 2 0 10 11 43

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04