Access Statistics for Thomas Troeger

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of the Conditions for Optimal Auction with Resale 0 0 0 35 0 0 2 124
A Characterization of the Distributions That Imply Existence of Linear Equilbria in the Kyle-Model 0 0 0 73 0 1 1 310
A Characterization of the Distributions That Imply Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle-Model 0 0 0 40 0 0 2 200
A note on Zheng’s conditions for implementing an optimal auction with resale 0 0 0 11 0 1 1 111
Assigning an unpleasant task without payment 0 0 0 5 0 2 4 44
Assigning an unpleasant task without payment 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 33
Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle Model with Multiple Informed Traders 0 0 0 562 0 0 1 2,247
Garbled Elections 1 1 1 29 1 1 1 148
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 10 1 1 1 86
Linear voting Rules 0 0 0 37 0 3 5 87
Linear voting rules 0 0 0 12 1 1 2 39
Linear voting rules 0 0 0 61 0 4 5 132
Matching Heterogeneous Agents with a Linear Search Technology 0 0 0 115 1 1 4 285
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: The Quasi-Linear Private-Values Case 0 0 0 29 0 0 2 66
Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case 0 0 0 30 1 1 7 118
Neo-Optimum: A Unifying Solution to the Informed-Principal Problem 1 2 13 13 3 4 10 10
On the Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Rochet-Vila Model of Market Making 0 0 0 65 0 0 0 400
Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 59
Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information 0 0 0 48 0 1 2 150
Optimal Testing and Social Distancing of Individuals With Private Health Signals 0 0 0 19 0 0 4 41
Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale 0 0 0 45 0 1 2 261
Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale 0 1 1 55 0 1 1 251
Steady States in Search-and-Matching Models 0 0 1 15 0 0 1 39
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 99 0 0 1 163
The Balance Condition in Search-and-Matching Models 0 0 1 14 0 0 5 55
The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder?s Value is Commonly Known 0 0 0 56 0 1 1 192
The Multiple-Volunteers Principle 0 0 1 15 0 1 3 36
The Multiple-Volunteers Principle for Assigning Unpleasant and Pleasant Tasks 0 0 1 15 0 1 4 32
The multiple-volunteers principle 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 14
Total Working Papers 2 4 19 1,547 8 27 75 5,733
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A characterization of the distributions that imply existence of linear equilibria in the Kyle-model 0 0 0 21 0 0 1 118
Collusion via Resale 0 0 0 39 0 1 2 285
Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 77
Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability 0 0 0 23 0 1 2 93
Linear Voting Rules 0 0 0 8 1 5 11 85
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility 0 1 2 19 0 3 8 107
Optimal auction with resale—a characterization of the conditions 0 0 0 41 0 2 3 125
Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale 0 0 1 116 0 0 11 441
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule 0 0 0 25 0 2 7 168
The Balance Condition in Search‐and‐Matching Models 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 62
Total Journal Articles 0 1 3 306 1 15 50 1,561

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Statistics updated 2025-09-05