Access Statistics for Daniel Treisman
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Loans for Shares" Revisited |
2 |
3 |
13 |
67 |
15 |
64 |
101 |
395 |
| A Normal Country |
0 |
0 |
1 |
150 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
555 |
| A Normal Country |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
7 |
13 |
14 |
320 |
| Democracy by mistake |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
9 |
10 |
10 |
169 |
| Donald Trump's words |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
7 |
11 |
22 |
61 |
| Elections in Russia, 1991-2008 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
| Embezzlement Versus Bribery |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
6 |
13 |
49 |
272 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
2 |
22 |
3 |
6 |
12 |
29 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
4 |
9 |
14 |
71 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
5 |
7 |
10 |
86 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
2 |
7 |
12 |
110 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism |
0 |
1 |
6 |
115 |
10 |
23 |
47 |
706 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
22 |
81 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression |
2 |
3 |
7 |
192 |
14 |
32 |
46 |
903 |
| Income, Democracy, and the Cunning of Reason |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
5 |
8 |
10 |
120 |
| Misperceiving Inequality |
0 |
0 |
3 |
172 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
310 |
| Misperceiving Inequality |
0 |
0 |
3 |
86 |
4 |
7 |
15 |
280 |
| Normal Countries: The East 25 Years After Communism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
94 |
| Oil and Democracy in Russia |
0 |
0 |
1 |
67 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
238 |
| Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of Chudar |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
637 |
| Public Employment and Redistributive Politics: Evidence from Russia’s Regions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
3 |
8 |
10 |
1,279 |
| The Geography of Fear |
0 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
3 |
10 |
13 |
182 |
| The US and Russia: They Don't Need Us |
1 |
1 |
1 |
217 |
6 |
6 |
8 |
386 |
| Twenty Years of Political Transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
66 |
| What makes governments popular? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
2 |
7 |
9 |
119 |
| Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
78 |
| Total Working Papers |
5 |
9 |
42 |
2,230 |
124 |
281 |
479 |
7,575 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Normal Country: Russia After Communism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
374 |
6 |
13 |
21 |
2,491 |
| A theory of informational autocracy |
2 |
4 |
9 |
73 |
12 |
35 |
56 |
370 |
| Death and prices |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
5 |
6 |
8 |
66 |
| Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
41 |
| Deciphering Russia's federal finance: Fiscal appeasement in 1995 and 1996 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
11 |
21 |
| Democracy by Mistake: How the Errors of Autocrats Trigger Transitions to Freer Government |
0 |
2 |
6 |
58 |
2 |
7 |
19 |
158 |
| Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy |
1 |
2 |
2 |
431 |
8 |
17 |
24 |
1,170 |
| FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: A RECONSIDERATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
336 |
| Fiscal Redistribution in a Fragile Federation: Moscow and the Regions in 1994 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
25 |
| Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover |
0 |
1 |
9 |
28 |
3 |
14 |
27 |
77 |
| Informational Autocrats |
2 |
3 |
3 |
24 |
13 |
31 |
39 |
172 |
| Jurisdiction Size and Local Government Policy Expenditure: Assessing the Effect of Municipal Amalgamation |
0 |
1 |
4 |
37 |
2 |
6 |
18 |
110 |
| Misperceiving inequality |
1 |
5 |
17 |
81 |
7 |
20 |
49 |
260 |
| Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of ‘Chudar’ |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
26 |
| Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation |
1 |
2 |
8 |
92 |
7 |
13 |
29 |
272 |
| Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world |
0 |
2 |
7 |
599 |
8 |
19 |
57 |
1,880 |
| Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin |
0 |
6 |
8 |
39 |
4 |
18 |
22 |
92 |
| Putin's popularity since 2010: why did support for the Kremlin plunge, then stabilize? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
6 |
9 |
13 |
34 |
| Rational Appeasement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
152 |
| Russia's Billionaires |
0 |
0 |
2 |
36 |
9 |
15 |
26 |
244 |
| State corroding federalism |
1 |
2 |
2 |
230 |
2 |
7 |
13 |
699 |
| The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
60 |
| The causes of corruption: a cross-national study |
1 |
5 |
16 |
2,370 |
6 |
33 |
72 |
9,520 |
| The politics of soft credit in post‐Soviet Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| Total Journal Articles |
10 |
36 |
99 |
4,689 |
119 |
300 |
556 |
18,280 |
|
|
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.