Access Statistics for Daniel Treisman
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Loans for Shares" Revisited |
1 |
1 |
6 |
68 |
3 |
37 |
161 |
482 |
| A Normal Country |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
322 |
| A Normal Country |
0 |
0 |
0 |
150 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
563 |
| Democracy by mistake |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
1 |
5 |
26 |
185 |
| Donald Trump's words |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
68 |
| Elections in Russia, 1991-2008 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
30 |
| Embezzlement Versus Bribery |
0 |
1 |
1 |
59 |
3 |
10 |
58 |
302 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
72 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
89 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
115 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
34 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism |
0 |
1 |
4 |
117 |
0 |
9 |
49 |
729 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression |
0 |
0 |
5 |
193 |
1 |
8 |
59 |
925 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
36 |
101 |
| Income, Democracy, and the Cunning of Reason |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
124 |
| Misperceiving Inequality |
0 |
1 |
2 |
87 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
293 |
| Misperceiving Inequality |
0 |
0 |
1 |
172 |
4 |
6 |
16 |
320 |
| Normal Countries: The East 25 Years After Communism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
100 |
| Oil and Democracy in Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
249 |
| Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of Chudar |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
642 |
| Public Employment and Redistributive Politics: Evidence from Russia’s Regions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1,289 |
| The Geography of Fear |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
191 |
| The US and Russia: They Don't Need Us |
0 |
0 |
1 |
217 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
392 |
| Twenty Years of Political Transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
69 |
| What makes governments popular? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
121 |
| Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
84 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
5 |
24 |
2,238 |
15 |
103 |
665 |
7,891 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Normal Country: Russia After Communism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
374 |
2 |
4 |
29 |
2,505 |
| A theory of informational autocracy |
3 |
5 |
14 |
81 |
5 |
14 |
77 |
404 |
| Death and prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
72 |
| Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
44 |
| Deciphering Russia's federal finance: Fiscal appeasement in 1995 and 1996 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
23 |
| Democracy by Mistake: How the Errors of Autocrats Trigger Transitions to Freer Government |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
2 |
5 |
32 |
179 |
| Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy |
0 |
0 |
4 |
433 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
1,179 |
| FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: A RECONSIDERATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
341 |
| Fiscal Redistribution in a Fragile Federation: Moscow and the Regions in 1994 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
28 |
| Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover |
0 |
1 |
7 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
84 |
| Informational Autocrats |
0 |
0 |
4 |
25 |
4 |
4 |
58 |
195 |
| Jurisdiction Size and Local Government Policy Expenditure: Assessing the Effect of Municipal Amalgamation |
2 |
3 |
5 |
40 |
3 |
5 |
21 |
120 |
| Misperceiving inequality |
2 |
5 |
22 |
93 |
3 |
13 |
69 |
295 |
| Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of ‘Chudar’ |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
32 |
| Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
92 |
1 |
3 |
28 |
284 |
| Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world |
2 |
5 |
11 |
606 |
4 |
13 |
58 |
1,909 |
| Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin |
0 |
1 |
8 |
41 |
2 |
5 |
26 |
100 |
| Putin's popularity since 2010: why did support for the Kremlin plunge, then stabilize? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
49 |
| Rational Appeasement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
161 |
| Russia's Billionaires |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
258 |
| State corroding federalism |
0 |
0 |
3 |
231 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
704 |
| The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
62 |
| The causes of corruption: a cross-national study |
1 |
3 |
15 |
2,376 |
2 |
13 |
106 |
9,571 |
| The politics of soft credit in post‐Soviet Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| Total Journal Articles |
10 |
23 |
102 |
4,736 |
35 |
97 |
725 |
18,604 |
|
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