Access Statistics for Daniel Treisman
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Loans for Shares" Revisited |
1 |
2 |
12 |
63 |
1 |
9 |
57 |
327 |
| A Normal Country |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
307 |
| A Normal Country |
0 |
0 |
1 |
150 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
549 |
| Democracy by mistake |
0 |
0 |
2 |
158 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
159 |
| Donald Trump's words |
0 |
2 |
7 |
20 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
45 |
| Elections in Russia, 1991-2008 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
| Embezzlement Versus Bribery |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
7 |
13 |
38 |
256 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
79 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
102 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
22 |
| Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
60 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism |
0 |
1 |
7 |
113 |
0 |
2 |
38 |
681 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression |
0 |
1 |
6 |
189 |
2 |
3 |
22 |
869 |
| How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation, Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
66 |
| Income, Democracy, and the Cunning of Reason |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
112 |
| Misperceiving Inequality |
0 |
0 |
3 |
85 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
270 |
| Misperceiving Inequality |
1 |
1 |
4 |
172 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
305 |
| Normal Countries: The East 25 Years After Communism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
| Oil and Democracy in Russia |
0 |
0 |
1 |
67 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
233 |
| Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of Chudar |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
634 |
| Public Employment and Redistributive Politics: Evidence from Russia’s Regions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,270 |
| The Geography of Fear |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
171 |
| The US and Russia: They Don't Need Us |
0 |
0 |
0 |
216 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
379 |
| Twenty Years of Political Transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
63 |
| What makes governments popular? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
111 |
| Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology |
0 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
75 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
8 |
51 |
2,218 |
17 |
44 |
270 |
7,259 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Normal Country: Russia After Communism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
374 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
2,476 |
| A theory of informational autocracy |
1 |
2 |
5 |
68 |
3 |
9 |
29 |
332 |
| Death and prices |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
59 |
| Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
35 |
| Deciphering Russia's federal finance: Fiscal appeasement in 1995 and 1996 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
| Democracy by Mistake: How the Errors of Autocrats Trigger Transitions to Freer Government |
0 |
1 |
4 |
56 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
151 |
| Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
429 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
1,152 |
| FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: A RECONSIDERATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
329 |
| Fiscal Redistribution in a Fragile Federation: Moscow and the Regions in 1994 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
19 |
| Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover |
1 |
2 |
9 |
26 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
60 |
| Informational Autocrats |
0 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
138 |
| Jurisdiction Size and Local Government Policy Expenditure: Assessing the Effect of Municipal Amalgamation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
102 |
| Misperceiving inequality |
1 |
4 |
17 |
74 |
2 |
9 |
41 |
233 |
| Political Business Cycles and Russian Elections, or the Manipulations of ‘Chudar’ |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
20 |
| Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation |
0 |
4 |
6 |
90 |
0 |
5 |
19 |
258 |
| Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world |
1 |
3 |
5 |
596 |
3 |
10 |
48 |
1,857 |
| Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin |
0 |
0 |
3 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
74 |
| Putin's popularity since 2010: why did support for the Kremlin plunge, then stabilize? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
23 |
| Rational Appeasement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
146 |
| Russia's Billionaires |
0 |
0 |
2 |
36 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
227 |
| State corroding federalism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
228 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
690 |
| The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
57 |
| The causes of corruption: a cross-national study |
2 |
4 |
20 |
2,364 |
13 |
23 |
68 |
9,485 |
| The politics of soft credit in post‐Soviet Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Total Journal Articles |
6 |
21 |
85 |
4,645 |
31 |
88 |
339 |
17,939 |
|
|
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