Access Statistics for Matteo Triossi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets 0 0 1 50 0 1 4 110
A Spatial Model of Voting with Endogenous Proposals: Theory and Evidence from Chilean Senate 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 64
Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 54
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 89
Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 176
Assessing the extent of democratic failures. A 99%-Condorcet’s Jury Theorem 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 41
Boosting scientific research: evidence from a public program 0 0 0 19 1 1 4 203
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 0 148 1 1 9 867
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 1 10 0 0 1 26
Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience 0 0 0 9 1 1 1 191
Converging to efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program experience 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 222
Costly information acquisition. Better to toss a coin? 0 0 0 35 0 0 3 134
Costly information acquisition. Part I: better to toss a coin? 0 0 0 32 1 2 2 200
Expectations, cores, and strategy-proofness under externalities 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 2 67 0 2 5 199
Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 41 0 0 1 192
Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 26 0 1 2 103
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 36 1 2 2 173
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 123 0 0 3 471
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 36 0 0 5 500
Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 289
Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent 0 0 0 20 0 1 2 100
Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 261
Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities 0 0 0 33 0 1 5 105
Neutral Mergers Between Bilateral Markets 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 45
Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 76
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 1 64 0 1 8 210
Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy 0 0 0 35 1 1 2 300
Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment 0 0 0 56 0 0 2 424
Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 10
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 34 0 0 5 495
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 150 0 0 2 567
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 2 75 0 0 8 234
Total Working Papers 0 0 7 1,331 8 19 92 7,132

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 51 1 6 13 766
BOOSTING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC PROGRAM 0 0 0 29 1 1 2 296
Coalition formation problems with externalities 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5
Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin? 0 0 0 9 0 1 2 64
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 73 0 2 6 809
Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability 0 0 0 40 0 1 4 184
Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 94
Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 5
Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 17
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 315
Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
Strategic priority-based course allocation 0 0 1 1 0 0 10 11
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence 0 0 1 8 0 0 2 26
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 3 6 1 1 6 13
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 17
Total Journal Articles 0 0 6 282 3 14 53 2,624

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Statistics updated 2025-10-06