Access Statistics for Matteo Triossi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets 0 0 0 50 1 2 11 120
A Spatial Model of Voting with Endogenous Proposals: Theory and Evidence from Chilean Senate 0 0 0 38 0 3 10 74
Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 10 0 2 5 59
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 16 0 3 8 97
Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms 0 0 0 23 0 1 5 181
Assessing the extent of democratic failures. A 99%-Condorcet’s Jury Theorem 0 0 0 13 0 4 12 53
Boosting scientific research: evidence from a public program 0 0 0 19 0 1 10 212
Centralized Course Allocation 0 1 1 11 0 5 11 37
Centralized Course Allocation 0 1 1 149 1 4 16 882
Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience 0 0 0 9 0 2 10 200
Converging to efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program experience 0 0 0 25 1 3 11 233
Costly information acquisition. Better to toss a coin? 0 0 0 35 0 2 7 141
Costly information acquisition. Part I: better to toss a coin? 0 0 0 32 0 3 22 220
Expectations, cores, and strategy-proofness under externalities 0 0 4 4 0 1 12 12
Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 67 0 2 8 205
Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 41 0 1 13 205
Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 26 0 5 10 112
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 1 37 2 4 21 192
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 123 0 3 9 480
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 36 0 4 7 507
Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach 0 0 0 38 1 4 20 309
Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent 0 0 0 20 0 2 14 113
Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach 0 0 0 33 0 1 16 277
Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities 0 0 0 33 0 2 15 119
Neutral Mergers Between Bilateral Markets 0 0 0 11 0 1 9 54
Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets 0 0 0 25 0 2 8 84
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 64 0 7 14 223
Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy 0 0 0 35 1 4 9 308
Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment 0 0 0 56 0 3 14 438
Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation 0 0 1 1 3 6 15 22
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 34 0 3 20 515
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 150 0 1 8 575
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 75 0 4 14 248
Total Working Papers 0 2 8 1,339 10 95 394 7,507

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 51 0 5 19 779
BOOSTING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC PROGRAM 0 0 0 29 0 4 11 306
Coalition formation problems with externalities 0 0 0 1 1 6 13 18
Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin? 0 0 0 9 0 3 12 75
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 73 0 2 13 820
Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability 0 0 0 40 0 1 5 188
Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent 0 0 0 18 0 0 10 104
Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities 0 0 0 1 0 1 13 17
Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities 0 0 0 3 0 1 10 27
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 40 0 2 10 325
Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities 0 0 1 1 0 2 7 8
Strategic priority-based course allocation 0 0 1 2 1 7 24 35
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence 0 0 0 8 1 4 6 32
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 1 7 0 4 18 30
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 2 1 8 18 35
Total Journal Articles 0 0 3 285 4 50 189 2,799

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Statistics updated 2026-07-10