| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A PRIMER ON CARDINAL VERSUS ORDINAL TOURNAMENTS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
36 |
| A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
77 |
| A new look at demographic and technological changes: England, 1550 to 1839 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
138 |
| Advances in the Theory and Applications of Contests and Tournaments: Introduction to the Special Issue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Are outsiders handicapped in CEO successions? |
1 |
1 |
1 |
55 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
277 |
| Are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
73 |
| Bailing out conflicted sovereigns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
12 |
| Business commonality, standardization and product cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
| Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
150 |
| Do tournaments solve the adverse selection problem? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
31 |
| Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
262 |
| Effort, talent, and inequality in a small open economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
| Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal |
0 |
1 |
1 |
60 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
185 |
| Global Innovation Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
| Hybrid Cardinal Tournaments |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
87 |
| Integrator Contracts with Many Agents and Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
| Introduction to the Symposium on Tournaments, Contests, and Relative Performance Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
78 |
| Labor and credit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
91 |
| Performance Pay and Offshoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
27 |
| Regulating Broiler Contracts: Tournaments Versus Fixed Performance Standards |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
167 |
| Renegotiation‐proof Labour and Credit Contracts with Worker Mobility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Strategic transmission of information and short-term commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
431 |
| The good, the bad and the ugly: agent behavior and efficiency in open and closed organizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
73 |
| Tournaments with Ex Post Heterogeneous Agents |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
83 |
| Tournaments, Contests and Relative Performance Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
| Tournaments, Contests and Relative Performance Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
| Tournaments, Contests and Relative Performance Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
32 |
| Why do countries in financial distress strategically delay seeking help? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
4 |
6 |
456 |
16 |
40 |
83 |
2,464 |
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