Access Statistics for Bruno Versaevel

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 27
Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 15
Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 13
Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 10
Better than a compromise, a third way: Using patent pooling to accelerate access to vaccines and treatments against Covid-19 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 4
Better than a compromise, a third way: patent pool to accelerate access to vaccines and treatments against Covid-19 0 1 1 1 0 1 3 5
Biopharmaceutical R&D outsourcing: Short-term gain for long-term pain? 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Biopharmaceutical R&D outsourcing: Short-term gain for long-term pain? 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 17
Caveat Preemptor: Coordination Failure and Success in a Duopoly Investment Game 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 36
Caveat preemptor: Coordination Failure and Success in a Duopoly Investment Game 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
Conflict and Cooperation on R&D Markets 0 0 0 90 0 0 0 282
Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities? 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 101
Covid-19: Should intellectual property rights be challenged? 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 73
Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 35
Dynamique des marchés et ajustement de la protection Intellectuelle 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 13
Dynamique des marchés et ajustement de la protection intellectuelle 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Développements récents de l'approche économique des sanctions dans le cas des cartels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Développements récents de l'approche économique des sanctions dans le cas des cartels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28
Développements récents de l'approche économique des sanctions dans le cas des cartels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
From Private to Public Common Agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40
From private to public common agency 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
Horizontal R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Evidence from France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Implications des licences FRAND pour la concurrence: un regard économique 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
Implications des licences FRAND pour la concurrence: un regard économique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Innovation and Imitation Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
Innovation and Imitation Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 31
Innovation and imitation incentives in dynamic duopoly 0 0 0 49 0 1 1 93
Investment Timing and Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 89
Investment Timing and Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Investment timing and vertical relationships 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10
Market Share, R&D Cooperation, and EU Competition Policy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 25
Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Mise en oeuvre de la collusion et détection: approches actives et passives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Mise en oeuvre de la collusion et détection: approches actives et passives 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 14
On the Optimal Timing of Innovation and Imitation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
On the Timing of Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 45 0 0 2 80
On the tacit collusion equilibria of a dynamic duopoly investment game 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
On the timing of innovation and imitation 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 42
On the timing of innovation and imitation in dynamic duopoly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
On the timing of vertical relationships 0 0 0 36 0 0 2 69
One Lab, Two Firms, Many Possibilities: on R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry 0 0 0 27 1 1 2 56
One Lab, Two Firms, Many Possibilities: on R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27
One lab, two firms, many Possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
One lab, two firms, many Possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 33
Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability and Policy Implications 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability and Policy Implications 0 0 0 52 0 0 1 118
Optimal collusion with limited liability 0 0 0 40 0 0 1 87
Patent Pools and Dynamic R&D Incentives 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 22
Patent Pools and R&D Dynamics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41
Pool patents to get COVID vaccines and drugs to all 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 33
Quel rôle pour la part de marché quand le droit de la concurrence porte son regard sur la coopération et l'innovation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Quel rôle pour un critère de part de marché dans la réglementation de la coopération en recherche et développement ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Quelles spécificités des accords de distribution en ligne ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12
Tacit Collusion in Investment Timing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 131
Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 242
Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline 0 0 0 47 0 0 1 247
Timing Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
Timing Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
Timing Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 72
Timing Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
Timing Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 20
Timing Vertical Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 22
When should a winner take all, or pay some? Innovation and imitation incentives in a dynamic duopoly 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 53
Total Working Papers 0 1 1 705 3 10 54 2,782

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 36
Caveat preemptor: Coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 103
Co-ordination costs and vertical integration in production franchise networks: a common agency model 0 0 1 46 0 0 1 135
Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development 0 0 1 7 0 0 5 74
From private to public common agency 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 117
Horizontal R and D cooperation and spillovers: evidence from France 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 41
Investment timing and vertical relationships 0 0 0 16 0 1 3 45
La spéculation sur le marché des actions: un phénomène monétaire ? 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 18
Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption 0 0 1 11 0 0 4 80
Mieux qu’un compromis, une troisième voie: le panier de brevets pour accélérer l’accès aux vaccins et traitements contre la COVID-19 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 10
On the tacit collusion equilibria of a dynamic duopoly investment game 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 76
One lab, two firms, many possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 36
Optimal collusion with limited liability 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 64
Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives 0 0 0 27 0 0 4 111
Pool patents to get COVID vaccines and drugs to all 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 8
R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers 0 0 1 25 0 1 2 107
Total Journal Articles 0 1 6 210 0 3 30 1,061

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Statistics updated 2024-09-04