Access Statistics for Yannick Viossat

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies 0 0 0 8 1 5 6 27
Elementary Games and Games Whose Correlated Equilibrium Polytope Has Full Dimension 0 0 0 11 1 5 8 94
Equilibrium payoffs in finite games 0 0 1 6 0 0 1 60
Evolutionary Beliefs and Financial Markets 0 0 0 23 0 4 6 32
Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria 0 0 0 14 0 3 5 56
Evolutionary beliefs and financial markets 0 0 0 9 0 1 2 35
Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies 0 0 0 0 1 5 11 38
Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium 0 0 0 53 1 6 10 272
Evolutionary strategic beliefs and financial markets 0 0 0 30 0 4 7 67
Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 0 2 7 9 18
Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games 1 1 1 37 1 5 6 139
I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions 0 0 0 12 0 1 10 33
I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions 0 0 0 5 0 4 8 15
I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions 0 0 0 6 1 10 14 29
I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions 0 0 0 10 1 4 4 7
I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions 0 0 0 8 2 7 10 16
Is Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust? 0 0 0 19 2 5 7 83
No-regret Dynamics and Fictitious Play 0 0 0 9 1 4 9 65
Openness of the set of games with a unique correlated equilibrium 0 0 0 12 0 4 4 105
Properties and applications of dual reduction 0 0 0 6 0 8 11 43
Properties of Dual Reduction 0 0 0 3 2 6 8 61
Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium 0 0 0 7 1 4 5 53
Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium: Elimination of All Strategies in the Support of Correlated Equilibria 0 0 0 4 0 2 4 41
The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games 0 0 0 181 1 6 8 641
The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 16
Time Average Replicator and Best Reply Dynamics 0 0 0 43 5 17 22 138
Total Working Papers 1 1 2 516 25 131 199 2,184

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Equilibrium payoffs of finite games 0 0 0 14 0 7 10 68
Evolutionary Beliefs and Financial Markets 0 0 0 20 2 7 9 60
Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies 1 1 2 7 2 5 9 46
Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium 0 0 0 3 0 5 7 59
I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions 0 0 0 0 1 9 12 19
Is having a unique equilibrium robust? 0 0 0 12 1 5 6 68
No-regret dynamics and fictitious play 0 0 1 24 1 4 8 142
Properties and applications of dual reduction 0 0 0 7 0 1 4 44
Stackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized? 1 1 1 1 4 9 10 10
The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria 0 0 0 11 0 2 2 54
Total Journal Articles 2 2 4 99 11 54 77 570
2 registered items for which data could not be found
logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-03-04