Access Statistics for Daniel R. Vincent

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions 0 0 0 243 1 3 13 1,235
Bargaining with Common Values 0 0 0 161 0 0 5 282
Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices are Kept Secret 0 0 0 62 1 2 6 216
Bilateral Monopoly, Non-durable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships 0 0 0 26 0 4 9 210
Delayed Agreements and Non-Expected Utility 0 0 0 9 0 1 8 73
Dynamic Auctions 0 0 1 14 2 5 10 59
Let's Agree that All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad 0 0 0 1 0 4 13 361
Modeling Competitive Behavior 0 0 0 36 0 3 8 207
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly 0 0 0 42 1 7 12 133
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 1 81 0 4 19 403
Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses 0 0 0 189 1 6 20 1,251
Platform Competition With Cash-back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 72 0 2 24 187
Platform Competition With User Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 12 0 1 6 46
Price Regulation and Quality of Service 0 0 1 159 0 2 7 426
Principals and Partners: The Structure of Syndicates 0 0 0 27 0 1 6 127
Same Price, Cash, or Card: Vertical Control by Payment Networks 0 0 0 117 0 1 7 328
Sequentially Optimal Auctions 0 0 0 64 0 6 14 540
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding 0 0 0 340 0 2 10 1,397
The Afternoon Effect 0 0 1 116 1 7 20 1,164
The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 27
Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions 0 0 0 113 0 5 16 425
Total Working Papers 0 0 4 1,884 7 69 240 9,097

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining with common values 0 0 1 59 1 2 11 122
Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 153
Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret 0 0 1 298 0 3 10 924
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist 0 0 1 150 0 5 24 359
Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers 0 0 1 2 0 2 16 27
Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility 0 0 0 6 0 2 7 44
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments 0 0 1 3 0 4 10 37
Duality in procurement design 0 0 0 22 0 1 5 82
Dynamic Auctions 0 0 0 36 0 4 10 140
How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions 0 0 0 87 0 4 9 309
Mixed Bundling and Mergers 0 0 2 8 0 1 10 23
Modelling Competitive Behavior 0 0 0 14 0 2 7 121
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly 0 0 3 150 0 6 16 433
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum 1 1 3 75 4 8 12 174
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 1 388 0 3 15 974
Optimal versus satisfactory decision making: a case study of sales with a target 0 0 0 18 0 2 4 173
Platform Competition With Cash‐Back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 8 0 3 15 40
Punishment Schedules for Capital Flight 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 60
Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 240
Sequentially Optimal Auctions 0 0 0 78 0 3 17 379
Tariffying Auctions 0 0 0 10 0 2 10 200
The Declining Price Anomaly 0 0 2 267 0 4 22 621
The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network 0 1 2 187 0 7 12 598
The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations 0 0 0 24 1 2 5 158
Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 58 0 1 10 243
Total Journal Articles 1 2 18 1,953 6 75 279 6,634

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Daniel R. Vincent on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 7
Factor Price Differences and Multinational Activity 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 15
Total Chapters 0 0 0 1 0 1 6 22

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04