Access Statistics for Daniel R. Vincent

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions 0 0 0 240 0 1 5 1,216
Bargaining with Common Values 0 0 2 161 0 0 3 275
Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices are Kept Secret 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 210
Bilateral Monopoly, Non-durable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 200
Delayed Agreements and Non-Expected Utility 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 65
Dynamic Auctions 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 49
Let's Agree that All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 347
Modeling Competitive Behavior 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 197
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly 0 0 0 42 0 0 1 120
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 0 78 0 1 5 374
Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses 0 0 0 189 1 1 1 1,229
Platform Competition With Cash-back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 72 0 0 0 162
Platform Competition With User Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 39
Price Regulation and Quality of Service 0 0 1 158 0 1 2 419
Principals and Partners: The Structure of Syndicates 0 0 0 27 0 1 2 118
Same Price, Cash, or Card: Vertical Control by Payment Networks 0 0 0 117 0 0 2 321
Sequentially Optimal Auctions 0 0 2 63 0 0 4 523
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding 0 0 2 339 0 0 5 1,381
The Afternoon Effect 0 0 0 115 0 1 4 1,143
The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 16
Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions 0 0 0 113 0 2 2 406
Total Working Papers 0 0 7 1,873 1 9 40 8,810

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining with common values 0 0 0 58 0 0 1 111
Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 142
Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret 0 0 2 292 0 0 3 905
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist 0 0 4 146 0 0 11 328
Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 37
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 24
Duality in procurement design 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 77
Dynamic Auctions 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 130
How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions 0 0 0 87 0 0 0 300
Mixed Bundling and Mergers 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 4
Modelling Competitive Behavior 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 113
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly 0 0 1 146 1 1 3 410
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum 0 0 3 72 0 0 6 156
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 5 384 0 1 11 947
Optimal versus satisfactory decision making: a case study of sales with a target 0 0 0 18 0 0 4 167
Platform Competition With Cash‐Back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 1 8 1 1 3 24
Punishment Schedules for Capital Flight 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 56
Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 224
Sequentially Optimal Auctions 0 0 0 76 0 0 2 347
Tariffying Auctions 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 189
The Declining Price Anomaly 0 0 5 258 1 1 7 588
The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network 0 1 1 185 0 1 3 584
The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 152
Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 57 0 1 3 230
Total Journal Articles 0 1 23 1,907 4 9 67 6,253

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Daniel R. Vincent on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Factor Price Differences and Multinational Activity 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 13
Total Chapters 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 15

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Statistics updated 2024-09-04