Access Statistics for Daniel R. Vincent

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions 0 0 2 243 2 9 15 1,232
Bargaining with Common Values 0 0 0 161 3 4 5 281
Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices are Kept Secret 0 0 0 62 3 4 4 214
Bilateral Monopoly, Non-durable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships 0 0 0 26 1 3 3 204
Delayed Agreements and Non-Expected Utility 0 0 0 9 3 4 4 69
Dynamic Auctions 0 0 1 14 1 2 4 53
Let's Agree that All Dictatorships Are Equally Bad 0 0 0 1 5 6 8 355
Modeling Competitive Behavior 0 0 0 36 3 5 5 204
Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly 0 0 0 42 3 5 6 126
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 1 81 7 12 16 397
Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses 0 0 0 189 2 7 8 1,239
Platform Competition With Cash-back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 72 7 12 14 177
Platform Competition With User Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 12 3 5 6 45
Price Regulation and Quality of Service 1 1 1 159 2 4 5 424
Principals and Partners: The Structure of Syndicates 0 0 0 27 5 5 7 126
Same Price, Cash, or Card: Vertical Control by Payment Networks 0 0 0 117 4 5 6 327
Sequentially Optimal Auctions 0 0 1 64 5 7 9 533
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding 0 0 0 340 1 5 7 1,394
The Afternoon Effect 0 0 0 115 4 7 9 1,153
The Optimal Timing of Procecurement Decisions and Patent Allocations 0 0 0 0 2 4 7 24
Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions 0 0 0 113 3 7 12 419
Total Working Papers 1 1 6 1,883 69 122 160 8,996

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining with common values 0 1 1 59 4 6 9 120
Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model 0 0 0 0 6 6 9 153
Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret 0 0 1 298 2 4 8 920
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist 0 0 1 150 8 12 19 354
Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers 1 1 2 2 5 7 14 23
Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility 0 0 0 6 1 3 3 40
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments 0 0 0 2 2 5 8 32
Duality in procurement design 0 0 0 22 2 3 4 81
Dynamic Auctions 0 0 0 36 2 3 6 136
How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions 0 0 0 87 4 5 5 305
Mixed Bundling and Mergers 1 1 3 8 3 5 10 21
Modelling Competitive Behavior 0 0 0 14 0 3 4 118
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly 0 1 3 150 3 6 12 426
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum 0 0 2 74 2 2 7 166
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms 0 0 1 388 6 9 13 970
Optimal versus satisfactory decision making: a case study of sales with a target 0 0 0 18 1 2 3 171
Platform Competition With Cash‐Back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules 0 0 0 8 2 4 9 34
Punishment Schedules for Capital Flight 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 59
Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships 0 0 0 0 5 6 12 237
Sequentially Optimal Auctions 0 0 2 78 2 12 18 375
Tariffying Auctions 0 0 0 10 4 6 9 198
The Declining Price Anomaly 0 0 4 267 5 12 19 614
The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network 0 0 1 186 1 1 5 591
The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations 0 0 0 24 2 3 4 156
Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions 0 0 0 58 1 7 10 242
Total Journal Articles 2 4 21 1,950 73 134 223 6,542

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Daniel R. Vincent on Hugo F. Sonnenschein 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 6
Factor Price Differences and Multinational Activity 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 15
Total Chapters 0 0 0 1 1 3 6 21

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12