| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
470 |
| A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
545 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
1,908 |
| A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
682 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
2,916 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
39 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
255 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
| A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
934 |
| A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
55 |
| A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
426 |
| A SIMPLE PROOF OF FOSTER’S (1983) CHARACTERIZATION OF THE THEIL MEASURE OF INEQUALITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
78 |
| AN ALTERNATIVE PROOF OF HARDY, LITTLEWOOD, AND P?LYA’S (1929) NECESSARY CONDITION FOR MAJORIZATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
37 |
| AN AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE THEIL INEQUALITY ORDER |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
| An Axiomatization of the Multigroup Atkinson Segregation Indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
165 |
| An axiomatization of the multigroup Atkinson segregation indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
| Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
163 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
289 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
773 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
199 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
1,032 |
| Bargaining, coalitions and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
910 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
135 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
543 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
31 |
| CONDORCET WINNERS AND SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
58 |
| CONSENSUS AND SINGLEPEAKEDNESS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
71 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
413 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
419 |
| Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
134 |
| Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
690 |
| Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
| Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
622 |
| Condorcet winners and social acceptability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
227 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
1 |
1 |
29 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
188 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
147 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
147 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ("Journal of Economic Theory", 2008, Vol.140,.No. 1, 328-338. ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
56 |
| Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
136 |
| Dynamic Consistency, Consequentialism and The Reduction of Compound Lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
112 |
| EXPERIENTIA DOCET: PROFESSIONALS PLAY MINIMAX IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
371 |
| Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs Without Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
86 |
| Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
376 |
| FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE IN TWO-SIDED COMPETITIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF ROLE-ASSIGNMENT RULES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
99 |
| Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
221 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
1,806 |
| Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
209 |
| Field Centipedes |
0 |
0 |
3 |
327 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
1,228 |
| First-Mover Advantage in Best-Of-Series: An Experiment Comparison of Role-Assignment Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
75 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
770 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
576 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
245 |
| In Defense of DEFECT or Cooperation does not Justify the Solution Concept |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
554 |
| In Defense of Defect |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
| LEVEL r CONSENSUS AND STABLE SOCIAL CHOICE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
119 |
| Level r Consensus and Stable Social Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
66 |
| MEASURING SEGREGATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
121 |
| MISTAKE IN COOPERATION:the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
211 |
| Measuring School Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
167 |
| Measuring School Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
85 |
| Measuring Segregation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
136 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
600 |
| Measuring Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
319 |
| Measuring Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
17 |
22 |
23 |
361 |
| Measuring Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
86 |
| Measuring school segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
| Measuring school segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
13 |
| Measuring segregation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
| Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
196 |
| Mistakes in cooperation: the stochastic stability of edgeworth's recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
187 |
| On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
353 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
1,268 |
| On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
107 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
11 |
12 |
14 |
402 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
557 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
357 |
| PAIRWISE CONSENSUS AND THE BORDA RULE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
| Pairwise consensus and Borda rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
| Pairwise consensus and Borda rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| Payoff Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
| Public Education, Communities, and Vouchers |
0 |
1 |
1 |
347 |
4 |
7 |
7 |
1,592 |
| Public Education, Communities, and Vouchers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
81 |
| Rejecting Small Gambles Under Expected Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
368 |
| SEGREGATION, INFORMATIVENESS AND LORENZ DOMINANCE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
73 |
| SEGREGATION:THEORETICAL APPROACHES |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
141 |
| Scale-Invariant Measures of Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
121 |
| Scale-Invariant Measures of Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
238 |
| THE INDIVIDUALLY ACCEPTABLE CHOICE CORRESPONDENCE |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
23 |
| THE VALUE OF A DRAW IN QUASI-BINARY MATCHES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
5 |
8 |
10 |
51 |
| The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
518 |
| The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
671 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
2,541 |
| The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
819 |
| The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
880 |
| The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
122 |
| The Evolution of Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
189 |
| The Evolution of Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
189 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
1,387 |
| The Evolution of Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
135 |
| The Measurement of Income Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
57 |
| The Measurement of Intellectual Influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
248 |
4 |
11 |
17 |
972 |
| The Measurment of Intellectual Influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
443 |
| The Time-Preference Nash Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
629 |
| The Time-Preference Nash Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
643 |
| The time-preference Nash solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
216 |
| Theft in equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
34 |
| Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
| Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
| Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
113 |
| Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
854 |
| Walrasian Allocations Without Price-Taking Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
166 |
| Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
280 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
1,817 |
| Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
153 |
| Will you marry me? A perspective on the gender gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
170 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
3 |
12 |
7,785 |
183 |
350 |
517 |
42,262 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
174 |
| A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
454 |
| A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
57 |
| A simple proof of Foster's (1983) characterization of the Theil measure of inequality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
73 |
| An alternative proof of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya’s (1929) necessary condition for majorization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| An axiomatic characterization of the Theil inequality ordering |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
54 |
| Axiomatic measures of intellectual influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
59 |
| Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
133 |
| Bargaining, coalitions and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
536 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
366 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein 'Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
356 |
| Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
161 |
| Condorcet winners and social acceptability |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
2 |
7 |
12 |
24 |
| Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
234 |
| Dynamic consistency, consequentialism and reduction of compound lotteries |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
147 |
| Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
77 |
| Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments |
0 |
0 |
3 |
129 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
492 |
| Feasible implementation of taxation methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
576 |
| Field Centipedes |
0 |
0 |
2 |
115 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
401 |
| First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
29 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare‐State Minded World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
11 |
| In Defense of DEFECT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
49 |
| Level $$r$$ r consensus and stable social choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
30 |
| Measuring school segregation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
77 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
285 |
| Mistakes in Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
11 |
| Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
123 |
| On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
112 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
177 |
| Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
65 |
| Public education, communities and vouchers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
128 |
| Ranking participants in generalized tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
130 |
| Ranking scholars: A measure representation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
92 |
| Scoring of web pages and tournaments—axiomatizations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
91 |
| Segregation, informativeness and Lorenz dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
50 |
| THE MEASUREMENT OF INCOME SEGREGATION |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
29 |
| The Measurement of Intellectual Influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
214 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
743 |
| The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
149 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
463 |
| The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
| The evolution of exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
192 |
| The socially acceptable scoring rule |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
35 |
| The value of a draw |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
| Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences (*) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
392 |
| Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
114 |
| Will you marry me?: A perspective on the gender gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
138 |
| Total Journal Articles |
0 |
2 |
18 |
1,589 |
42 |
110 |
225 |
8,048 |
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