| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
459 |
| A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
545 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
1,891 |
| A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution |
0 |
0 |
1 |
679 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
2,898 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
247 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
31 |
| A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
925 |
| A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
| A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
417 |
| A SIMPLE PROOF OF FOSTER’S (1983) CHARACTERIZATION OF THE THEIL MEASURE OF INEQUALITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
| AN ALTERNATIVE PROOF OF HARDY, LITTLEWOOD, AND P?LYA’S (1929) NECESSARY CONDITION FOR MAJORIZATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
| AN AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE THEIL INEQUALITY ORDER |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
107 |
| An Axiomatization of the Multigroup Atkinson Segregation Indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
162 |
| An axiomatization of the multigroup Atkinson segregation indices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
158 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
281 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
199 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,024 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
765 |
| Bargaining, coalitions and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
901 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
534 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
| CONDORCET WINNERS AND SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY |
0 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
42 |
| CONSENSUS AND SINGLEPEAKEDNESS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
409 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
416 |
| Comment on Mclennan and Sonnenschein |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
131 |
| Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
617 |
| Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
| Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
686 |
| Condorcet winners and social acceptability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
144 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
181 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
225 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
139 |
| Decentralized Trade, Random Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare ("Journal of Economic Theory", 2008, Vol.140,.No. 1, 328-338. ) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
| Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
133 |
| Dynamic Consistency, Consequentialism and The Reduction of Compound Lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
108 |
| EXPERIENTIA DOCET: PROFESSIONALS PLAY MINIMAX IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS |
0 |
0 |
2 |
66 |
0 |
3 |
26 |
345 |
| Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs Without Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
82 |
| Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
124 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
362 |
| FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE IN TWO-SIDED COMPETITIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF ROLE-ASSIGNMENT RULES |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
89 |
| Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
206 |
| Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods |
0 |
0 |
1 |
220 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
1,790 |
| Field Centipedes |
1 |
1 |
13 |
309 |
1 |
3 |
41 |
1,146 |
| First-Mover Advantage in Best-Of-Series: An Experiment Comparison of Role-Assignment Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
57 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
2 |
4 |
20 |
529 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
7 |
35 |
714 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
191 |
| In Defense of DEFECT or Cooperation does not Justify the Solution Concept |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
550 |
| In Defense of Defect |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
60 |
| LEVEL r CONSENSUS AND STABLE SOCIAL CHOICE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
| Level r Consensus and Stable Social Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
| MEASURING SEGREGATION |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
113 |
| MISTAKE IN COOPERATION:the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
208 |
| Measuring School Segregation |
0 |
1 |
2 |
53 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
143 |
| Measuring School Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
| Measuring Segregation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
79 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
305 |
| Measuring Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
74 |
| Measuring Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
592 |
| Measuring Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
335 |
| Measuring school segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
| Measuring school segregation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
| Measuring segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
| Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
192 |
| Mistakes in cooperation: the stochastic stability of edgeworth's recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
179 |
| On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
| On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
353 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1,258 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
350 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
549 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
383 |
| PAIRWISE CONSENSUS AND THE BORDA RULE |
0 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
19 |
| Pairwise consensus and Borda rule |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
9 |
| Pairwise consensus and Borda rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| Payoff Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
94 |
| Public Education, Communities, and Vouchers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
| Public Education, Communities, and Vouchers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
346 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
1,582 |
| Rejecting Small Gambles Under Expected Utility |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
362 |
| SEGREGATION, INFORMATIVENESS AND LORENZ DOMINANCE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
| SEGREGATION:THEORETICAL APPROACHES |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
131 |
| Scale-Invariant Measures of Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
107 |
| Scale-Invariant Measures of Segregation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
229 |
| THE INDIVIDUALLY ACCEPTABLE CHOICE CORRESPONDENCE |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
14 |
| THE VALUE OF A DRAW IN QUASI-BINARY MATCHES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
| The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
509 |
| The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach |
0 |
1 |
6 |
665 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
2,509 |
| The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
118 |
| The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
148 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
801 |
| The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
867 |
| The Evolution of Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
124 |
| The Evolution of Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
188 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,378 |
| The Evolution of Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
188 |
| The Measurement of Income Segregation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
48 |
| The Measurement of Intellectual Influence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
248 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
944 |
| The Measurment of Intellectual Influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
436 |
| The Time-Preference Nash Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
626 |
| The Time-Preference Nash Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
637 |
| The time-preference Nash solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
208 |
| Theft in equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
29 |
| Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
111 |
| Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
| Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
| Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk |
0 |
1 |
1 |
144 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
847 |
| Walrasian Allocations Without Price-Taking Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
| Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
280 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
1,798 |
| Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
144 |
| Will you marry me? A perspective on the gender gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
166 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
6 |
56 |
7,695 |
21 |
65 |
488 |
41,151 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
| A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
439 |
| A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
| A simple proof of Foster's (1983) characterization of the Theil measure of inequality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
67 |
| An alternative proof of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya’s (1929) necessary condition for majorization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
27 |
| An axiomatic characterization of the Theil inequality ordering |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
| Axiomatic measures of intellectual influence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
50 |
| Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
124 |
| Bargaining, coalitions and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
526 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
362 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein 'Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
350 |
| Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
158 |
| Condorcet winners and social acceptability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
| Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
227 |
| Dynamic consistency, consequentialism and reduction of compound lotteries |
0 |
1 |
1 |
67 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
138 |
| Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
68 |
| Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments |
0 |
0 |
2 |
120 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
463 |
| Feasible implementation of taxation methods |
0 |
1 |
1 |
74 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
573 |
| Field Centipedes |
0 |
0 |
3 |
104 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
361 |
| First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare‐State Minded World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
| In Defense of DEFECT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
| Level $$r$$ r consensus and stable social choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
| Measuring school segregation |
1 |
1 |
4 |
52 |
3 |
8 |
25 |
188 |
| Mistakes in Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Mistakes in Cooperation: the Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
116 |
| On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
103 |
| On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
173 |
| Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
| Public education, communities and vouchers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
121 |
| Ranking participants in generalized tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
122 |
| Ranking scholars: A measure representation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
83 |
| Scoring of web pages and tournaments—axiomatizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
81 |
| Segregation, informativeness and Lorenz dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
| THE MEASUREMENT OF INCOME SEGREGATION |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
16 |
| The Measurement of Intellectual Influence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
211 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
729 |
| The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
448 |
| The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
131 |
| The evolution of exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
| The socially acceptable scoring rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| The value of a draw |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
| Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences (*) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
383 |
| Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
110 |
| Will you marry me?: A perspective on the gender gap |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
131 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
4 |
17 |
1,504 |
6 |
23 |
139 |
7,555 |
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