| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Simple, Non-Recursive Model of the Spread of COVID-19 With Applications to Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
58 |
| An Incentive Problem in the Dynamic Theory of Banking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
387 |
| An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
402 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
1,372 |
| Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: The Winner's Curse |
0 |
0 |
1 |
956 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
2,666 |
| Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
962 |
| Blocks, liquidity and corporate control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
| Blocks, liquidity and corporate control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
80 |
| Capital Structure with Multiple Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
895 |
| Divided We Fall: International Health and Trade Coordination During a Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
| Divided We Fall: International Health and Trade Coordination During a Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
37 |
45 |
127 |
| Divided we Fall: International Health and Trade Coordination during a Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
396 |
| Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
199 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1,313 |
| European Financial Markets After EMU: A First Assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
783 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1,919 |
| European Financial Markets After EMU: A First Assessment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
254 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
796 |
| European Financial Markets After EMU: A First Assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
221 |
| European Financial Markets After EMU: A First Assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
408 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,066 |
| How Does Liquidity Affect Government Bond Yields? |
0 |
1 |
2 |
272 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
1,311 |
| How Does Liquidity Affect Government Bond Yields? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
127 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
447 |
| How Does Liquidity Affect Government Bond Yields? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
440 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1,663 |
| Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability New Results and Classic Applications |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
70 |
| Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
158 |
| Incentive-Compatibility, Limited Liability and Costly Liquidation in Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
90 |
| International Policy Coordination in a Multisectoral Model of Trade and Health Policy |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
44 |
44 |
44 |
| Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
263 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
713 |
| Liquidity Creation through Banks and Markets: Multiple Insurance and Limited Market Access |
0 |
0 |
0 |
278 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,003 |
| Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theory of Corporate Ownership Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1,426 |
| Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
3 |
311 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
709 |
| Optimal Liquidity Provision and Dynamic Incentive Compatibility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
643 |
| Optimal Retail Contracts With Return Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
39 |
| Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparancy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
444 |
| Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
454 |
| Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
154 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
627 |
| Public Debt and the Balance Sheet of the Private Sector |
0 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
26 |
| Repo Runs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
64 |
| Repo Runs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Repo Runs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
177 |
| Repo Runs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
132 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
236 |
| Repo Runs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Repo runs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
397 |
| Sand in the Wheels of Capitalism, On the Political Economy of Capital Market Frictions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
137 |
| Stock Exchange Competition in a Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
361 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
1,330 |
| Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
289 |
| Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
95 |
| Strategic Transparency and Informed Trading: Will Capital Market Integration Force Convergence of Corporate Governance ? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
230 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
923 |
| The COVID-19 pandemic: a letter to G20 leaders |
0 |
1 |
11 |
120 |
0 |
4 |
25 |
326 |
| The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
738 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
2,252 |
| The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries |
0 |
1 |
1 |
942 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
2,185 |
| The Commitment of Finance, Duplicated Monitoring and the Investment Horizon |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
1,021 |
| The European Bond Markets Under EMU |
0 |
0 |
0 |
440 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,684 |
| The European Bond Markets under EMU |
1 |
1 |
1 |
724 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1,988 |
| The Fragility of Short-Term Secured Funding Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
| The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
129 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
426 |
| The Political Economy of Bank- and Market Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
393 |
| The Political Economy of Bank- and Market Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
444 |
| The Political Economy of Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
204 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
511 |
| The Political Economy of Dominant Investors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
191 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
482 |
| The Term-Structure of Investment and the Banks' Insurance Function |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
793 |
| The fragility of short-term secured funding markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
90 |
| Transparency, Liquidity and Information in Dealer Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
224 |
| Valutation, Liquidity and Risk in Government Bond Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
302 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
1,201 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
6 |
33 |
10,651 |
10 |
121 |
255 |
39,951 |
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