Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
A Sense of No Future in an Uncertain Present: Altruism and Risk-Seeking among Syrian Refugees in Jordan |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
128 |
Are International Merchants Stupid? - A Natural Experiment Refutes the Legal Origin Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
349 |
Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
155 |
Correlates and Determinants of Direct Democracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
135 |
Courts as Monitoring Agents: The Case of China |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
391 |
Der „more economic approach“ in der Missbrauchsaufsicht: Einige kritische Anmerkungen zu den Vorschlägen der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb |
0 |
0 |
0 |
435 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1,420 |
Determinant of Social Norms |
1 |
1 |
4 |
100 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
182 |
Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
384 |
0 |
3 |
27 |
4,632 |
Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why do Countries Change their Form of Governments? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
139 |
3 |
9 |
38 |
3,564 |
Does Arbitration Blossom when State Courts are Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
181 |
Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments' Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
319 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,946 |
Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
407 |
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence, a Dozen Years On: Cross-Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators |
0 |
0 |
2 |
179 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
447 |
Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators |
0 |
0 |
1 |
531 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1,444 |
Endogenous Constitutions: Leaders Matter for Changes in the Form of Government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
99 |
Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcomes Don’t |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
301 |
Explaining Constitutional Change: The Case of Judicial Independence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
115 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
189 |
Explaining Constitutional Change: The Case of Judicial Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
312 |
Explaining de facto Judicial Independence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
111 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
772 |
Explaining de facto judicial independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
417 |
Explaining de facto judicial independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
230 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
1,062 |
Family Types and Political Development |
0 |
0 |
3 |
55 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
456 |
Federalism and Decentralization – A Critical Survey of Frequently Used Indicators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
291 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
910 |
How (Not) to Measure Institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
627 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1,325 |
How to Measure the Rule of Law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
390 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
819 |
Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence: The Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
41 |
Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System |
0 |
0 |
0 |
255 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
703 |
Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System |
0 |
0 |
1 |
159 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
514 |
Islam and the Institutions of a Free Society: Many Problems, Little Hope |
0 |
0 |
1 |
327 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
988 |
Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
152 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
530 |
Judicial Independence in the EU – A Puzzle |
0 |
1 |
2 |
79 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
160 |
Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
79 |
Leader Characteristics and Constitutional Compliance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
8 |
15 |
21 |
Leader Characteristics and Constitutional Compliance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
149 |
Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary |
0 |
0 |
1 |
234 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
753 |
Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary+ |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
367 |
Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey |
0 |
1 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
172 |
Measuring Constitutional Loyalty: Evidence from the Covid-19 Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
122 |
Membership has its Privileges - The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
189 |
Membership has its Privileges: On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
Membership has its privileges: The effect of membership in international organizations on FDI |
0 |
0 |
4 |
85 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
260 |
Militant Constitutionalism – A Promising Concept to Make Constitutional Backsliding less likely? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
366 |
Mind the Gap – Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality |
0 |
2 |
4 |
76 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
511 |
No Man is an Island - Trust, Trustworthiness, and Social Capital among Syrian Refugees in Germany |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
203 |
Non-Majoritarian Institutions - A Menace to Constitutional Democracy? |
0 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
3 |
8 |
16 |
124 |
Norm Compliance and Lying Patterns: an Experimental Study Among Refugees and Non-refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Germany |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
148 |
Perception vs. Experience: Explaining Differences in Corruption Measures Using Microdata |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
319 |
Perception vs. Experience: Explaining Differences in Corruption Measures Using Microdata |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
153 |
Perception vs. experience: Explaining differences in corruption measures using microdata |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
37 |
Plea bargaining procedures worldwide: Drivers of introduction and use |
0 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
2 |
3 |
22 |
31 |
Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments |
0 |
1 |
5 |
308 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
764 |
Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
200 |
Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
220 |
Preliminary References - Analyzing the Determinants that Made the ECJ the Powerful Court it Is |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
283 |
Preliminary References — Analyzing the Determinants that Made the ECJ the Powerful Court it Is |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
64 |
Quantitative analysis of constitutions |
0 |
1 |
3 |
72 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
197 |
Reforming federalism German style: A first step in the right direction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
Risk-taking, Trust, and Traumatization of Refugees in Germany – A Field Experiment |
0 |
1 |
2 |
66 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
100 |
Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
200 |
Strategic choices for redistribution and the veil of ignoranceː theory and experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
Supreme Audit Institutions: Supremely Superfluous? A Cross Country Assessment |
0 |
0 |
3 |
95 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
304 |
Syrian Civil War Victims Trust Each Other, but Punish When and Whomever They Can |
0 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
225 |
Taking the Rule of Law Seriously – How the EU Could Foster Its Own Values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
340 |
Terrorism and Emergency Constitutions in the Muslim World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
287 |
The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts - A Cross-Country Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
258 |
The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts – A Cross-Country Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
142 |
The Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
325 |
The Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
27 |
The Economic Effects of Competition Policy Cross Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators |
0 |
0 |
1 |
124 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
301 |
The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating – and Extending – Persson and Tabellini |
0 |
2 |
3 |
278 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
903 |
The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy - A Cross-Country Assessment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
223 |
The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A First Global Assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
324 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
2,339 |
The Economic Effects of Federalism and Decentralization - A Cross-Country Assessment |
1 |
1 |
2 |
407 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
2,982 |
The Economic Effects of Federalism and Decentralization – A Cross-Country Assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
229 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
786 |
The Economic Effects of Human Rights |
0 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
101 |
The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability. Some Preliminary Insights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
230 |
The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability: Some Preliminary Insights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability |
0 |
1 |
2 |
79 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
199 |
The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
169 |
The Nation-State Foundations of Constitutional Compliance |
0 |
0 |
5 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
37 |
The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
452 |
The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch. A Conceptual Framework |
0 |
0 |
1 |
97 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
362 |
The Puzzling Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
128 |
The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth |
0 |
0 |
1 |
90 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
336 |
The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
228 |
The Rule of Law: Measurement and Deep Roots |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
173 |
The Rule of Law: Measurement and Deep Roots |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
156 |
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
The economic effects of direct democracy: A cross-country assessment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
262 |
The rule of law and Islam |
0 |
1 |
2 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
385 |
This Time is Different? - On the Use of Emergency Measures During the Corona Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
599 |
To cooperate or not to cooperate? An analysis of in-group favoritism among Syrian refugees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
186 |
Traditional law in times of the nation state: Why is it so prevalent? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
378 |
Unconstitutional States of Emergency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
285 |
Values and Norms Matter – On the Basic Determinants of Long-Run Economic Development |
0 |
1 |
1 |
173 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
577 |
Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält – Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden |
0 |
1 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
199 |
When to Expect a Coup D'État? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
244 |
When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
76 |
When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |
0 |
0 |
3 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
161 |
Why Adopt a Federal Constitution? And why Decentralize? – Determinants Based on a New Dataset |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
3 |
4 |
18 |
140 |
Zur Logik der Rentenanpassung: ein konstitutionenökonomischer Vorschlag |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
270 |
Total Working Papers |
2 |
21 |
96 |
10,415 |
41 |
145 |
526 |
47,197 |
Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Analyzing preliminary references as the powerbase of the European Court of Justice |
0 |
0 |
2 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
130 |
Arbitration is No Substitute for State Courts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
36 |
Are International Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds Doubt on the Legal Origin Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
Banking crises and human rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
37 |
Bessere europäische Wettbewerbspolitik durch den „more economic approach“ ? Einige Fragezeichen nach den ersten Erfahrungen / Does the more economic approach lead to a better competition policy? Some question marks after the first experiences |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
39 |
Book reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
43 |
Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
75 |
Choosing Not To Choose: When Politicians Choose To Delegate Powers |
0 |
0 |
8 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
458 |
Constitutional verbosity and social trust |
0 |
0 |
4 |
46 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
148 |
Courts as monitoring agents: The case of China |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
74 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
336 |
Determinants of judicial efficiency: a survey |
1 |
2 |
19 |
148 |
4 |
5 |
37 |
442 |
Determinants of social norms I – the role of geography |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
Determinants of social norms II – religion and family as mediators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
Die evolutionsorientierte Theorie der Verfassung – Bemerkungen zum Ansatz von Hayeks – |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
Die evolutionsorientierte Theorie der Verfassung – Bemerkungen zum Ansatz von Hayeks – |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
Die kontraktorientierte Theorie der Verfassung.Bemerkungen zum Ansatz Buchanans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
124 |
Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? An Empirical Evaluation across Seventy-eight Countries |
1 |
2 |
8 |
113 |
3 |
5 |
16 |
283 |
Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
93 |
Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
136 |
Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers |
2 |
2 |
4 |
92 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
329 |
Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment |
0 |
0 |
11 |
221 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
489 |
Economic growth and judicial independence, a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators |
1 |
2 |
15 |
229 |
6 |
9 |
47 |
694 |
Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators |
0 |
1 |
3 |
422 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
1,115 |
Editor's Choice The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
67 |
Emergencies: on the misuse of government powers |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
30 |
Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
146 |
Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don’t |
1 |
1 |
2 |
45 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
248 |
Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence |
0 |
1 |
4 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
121 |
Explaining constitutional garrulity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
154 |
Explaining de facto judicial independence |
0 |
0 |
5 |
169 |
5 |
8 |
33 |
549 |
Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
266 |
Fiscal Effects of Reforming Local Constitutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
Fiskalische Effekte der Kommunalverfassungsreformen der 1990er Jahre in Deutschland / Reforming Local Constitutions in Germany during the 1990s – Their Fiscal Effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
154 |
Flight and the preferences for truth-telling: An experimental study among refugees and non-refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Germany |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
Government and markets -- Establishing a democratic constitutional order and a market economy in former socialist countries: Hendrikus J. Blommestein and Bernard Steunenberg (eds.), (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994) ISBN 0-7923-3059-5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
167 |
How (Not) to measure institutions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
92 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
209 |
How (not) to measure institutions: a reply to Robinson and Shirley |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
93 |
How not to write a constitution: lessons from Chile |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
25 |
How to Measure the Rule of Law |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
204 |
How to measure informal institutions |
1 |
3 |
10 |
87 |
3 |
8 |
20 |
190 |
Implicit Consitutional Change-Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document |
0 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
174 |
Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence--the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
245 |
Incentivizing cooperation against a norm of defection: Experimental Evidence from Egypt |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
Inflation, Central Bank Independence, and the Legal System |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
496 |
Institutional details matter—more economic effects of direct democracy |
0 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
100 |
Is constitutionalized media freedom only window dressing? Evidence from terrorist attacks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
24 |
Judicial independence in the EU: a puzzle |
0 |
0 |
4 |
30 |
1 |
4 |
22 |
122 |
Judicial independence: Why does de facto diverge from de jure? |
0 |
0 |
8 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
31 |
40 |
Let the data tell their own story: a tribute to Ted Eisenberg |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
Mehr Mut in der Rentenpolitik! Ein Vorschlag |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
Membership has its Privileges – The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
172 |
Militant constitutionalism: a promising concept to make constitutional backsliding less likely? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
23 |
No man is an island: trust, trustworthiness, and social networks among refugees in Germany |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
ON THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF HAYEK’S EVOLUTIONARY ORIENTED CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS – SOME GENERAL REMARKS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
On the Delegation of Powers: With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
42 |
On the editorial transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
On the optimal number of courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
On the wrong side of the law – Causes and consequences of a corrupt judiciary |
0 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
155 |
Perception vs. experience: Explaining differences in corruption measures using microdata |
1 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
103 |
Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey |
0 |
0 |
2 |
396 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
878 |
Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments |
1 |
1 |
3 |
135 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
365 |
Pure eclecticism—The tool kit of the constitutional economist |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
41 |
Reforming Federalism German Style |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
Reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
Robust political economy: The case of antitrust |
0 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
144 |
Separation of powers: new perspectives and empirical findings—introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
Shocking resilience? Effects of extreme events on constitutional compliance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
15 |
Soziale Marktwirtschaft im Grundgesetz? Eine gefährliche Verlockung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
Soziale Marktwirtschaft im Grundgesetz? Eine gefährliche Verlockung: Korreferat |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
Terrorism and emergency constitutions in the Muslim world |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
Testing Todd: family types and development |
0 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
61 |
The Economic Effects of Human Rights |
0 |
1 |
6 |
599 |
1 |
6 |
87 |
9,751 |
The Economics of Green Constitutions |
1 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
59 |
The Effects of Competition Policy on Development - Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators |
0 |
0 |
4 |
180 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
427 |
The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
31 |
The Legacy of Friedrich Von Hayek: Boettke, P.J. (Ed.), 3 Volumes; Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2000, 672, 493 and 450 pages: Hayek Revisited: Bouckaert, B., Godart-van der Kroon, A. (Eds.), Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2000, 178 pp.: Friedrich August von Hayek: Die Tradition der Freiheit: Hennecke, H.J. (Ed.), Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen, Dusseldorf, 2000, 440 pp.: Die Verfassung des Marktes: Friedrich August von Hayeks Lehre von Staat und Markt im Spiegel grundgesetzlicher Staats- und Verfassungsrechtslehre: Klaver, M. (Ed.), Lucius and Lucius, Stuttgart, 2000, 325 pp |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
388 |
The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
242 |
The Ripple Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
148 |
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
The Violent and the Weak |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
208 |
The comparative constitutional compliance database |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
2 |
4 |
16 |
19 |
The economic effects of constitutional budget institutions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
83 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
245 |
The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini |
0 |
3 |
5 |
158 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
474 |
The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
251 |
The economic effects of federalism and decentralization—a cross-country assessment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
91 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
365 |
The economic effects of judicial accountability: cross-country evidence |
0 |
0 |
3 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
187 |
The effects of lay participation in courts -- A cross-country analysis |
0 |
0 |
3 |
39 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
126 |
The long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence |
0 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
99 |
The role of ignorance in the emergence of redistribution |
1 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
125 |
The rule of law and constitutionalism in Muslim countries |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
172 |
The rule of law: Measurement and deep roots |
0 |
2 |
6 |
36 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
140 |
This time is different?—on the use of emergency measures during the corona pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
To cooperate or not to cooperate? An analysis of cooperation and peer punishment among Syrian refugees, Germans, and Jordanians |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
Toward ever closer union--or ever larger? Or both? Entry to the European Union from the perspective of constitutional economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
157 |
Towards ever more confusion? The Convention's proposal for a European constitution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
Traded services in the GATT — What’s all the fuss about? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
Traditional law in times of the nation state: why is it so prevalent? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
30 |
Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
50 |
Turning cheap talk into economic growth: On the relationship between property rights and judicial independence |
0 |
1 |
4 |
57 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
194 |
Unconstitutional States of Emergency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
Unternehmensfusionen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
Values, Norms, Institutions and the Prospects for Economic Growth in Central and Eastern Europe |
1 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
57 |
Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält – Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
187 |
What Are Your Most Underappreciated Works?: First Tranche of Responses |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
36 |
What makes prosecutors independent? Analysing the institutional determinants of prosecutorial independence |
1 |
2 |
3 |
46 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
96 |
When Does Terror Induce a State of Emergency? And What Are the Effects? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
37 |
When Syria was in Egypt’s land: Egyptians cooperate with Syrians, but less with each other |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
35 |
When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
177 |
Why do governments call a state of emergency? On the determinants of using emergency constitutions |
2 |
2 |
5 |
60 |
2 |
5 |
25 |
599 |
Zur Reform der Altersvorsorge – ein konstitutionenökonomischer Vorschlag |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
Total Journal Articles |
16 |
41 |
222 |
5,412 |
76 |
194 |
875 |
26,723 |