| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Sense of No Future in an Uncertain Present: Altruism and Risk-Seeking among Syrian Refugees in Jordan |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
125 |
| Are International Merchants Stupid? - A Natural Experiment Refutes the Legal Origin Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
348 |
| Constitutions as Equilibria: A Game-theoretic Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
151 |
| Correlates and Determinants of Direct Democracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
| Courts as Monitoring Agents: The Case of China |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
390 |
| Der „more economic approach“ in der Missbrauchsaufsicht: Einige kritische Anmerkungen zu den Vorschlägen der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb |
0 |
0 |
0 |
435 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,419 |
| Determinant of Social Norms |
0 |
2 |
7 |
99 |
3 |
5 |
27 |
177 |
| Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government? |
1 |
1 |
3 |
384 |
3 |
6 |
43 |
4,624 |
| Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why do Countries Change their Form of Governments? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
2 |
6 |
40 |
3,543 |
| Does Arbitration Blossom when State Courts are Bad? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
179 |
| Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments' Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
319 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,946 |
| Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
407 |
| Does Membership in International Organizations Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
161 |
| Economic Growth and Judicial Independence, a Dozen Years On: Cross-Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators |
0 |
1 |
5 |
179 |
2 |
6 |
21 |
441 |
| Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators |
0 |
0 |
1 |
531 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
1,443 |
| Endogenous Constitutions: Leaders Matter for Changes in the Form of Government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
98 |
| Endogenous Constitutions: Politics and Politicians Matter, Economic Outcomes Don’t |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
300 |
| Explaining Constitutional Change: The Case of Judicial Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
310 |
| Explaining Constitutional Change: The Case of Judicial Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
187 |
| Explaining de facto Judicial Independence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
111 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
766 |
| Explaining de facto judicial independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
415 |
| Explaining de facto judicial independence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
230 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,058 |
| Family Types and Political Development |
0 |
1 |
4 |
54 |
1 |
11 |
25 |
453 |
| Federalism and Decentralization – A Critical Survey of Frequently Used Indicators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
291 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
909 |
| How (Not) to Measure Institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
627 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1,324 |
| How to Measure the Rule of Law |
0 |
0 |
2 |
390 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
819 |
| Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence: The Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
| Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System |
0 |
1 |
1 |
159 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
513 |
| Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System |
0 |
0 |
1 |
255 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
702 |
| Islam and the Institutions of a Free Society: Many Problems, Little Hope |
0 |
0 |
0 |
326 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
987 |
| Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
152 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
530 |
| Judicial Independence in the EU – A Puzzle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
78 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
155 |
| Judicial Independence: Why Does De Facto Diverge from De Jure? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
77 |
| Leader Characteristics and Constitutional Compliance |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
| Leader Characteristics and Constitutional Compliance |
1 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
146 |
| Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary |
0 |
0 |
1 |
233 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
751 |
| Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary+ |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
367 |
| Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey |
0 |
0 |
2 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
169 |
| Measuring Constitutional Loyalty: Evidence from the Covid-19 Pandemic |
0 |
1 |
3 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
119 |
| Membership has its Privileges - The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
186 |
| Membership has its Privileges: On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
26 |
| Membership has its privileges: The effect of membership in international organizations on FDI |
1 |
1 |
4 |
85 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
258 |
| Militant Constitutionalism – A Promising Concept to Make Constitutional Backsliding less likely? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
363 |
| Mind the Gap – Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality |
0 |
1 |
2 |
74 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
508 |
| No Man is an Island - Trust, Trustworthiness, and Social Capital among Syrian Refugees in Germany |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
201 |
| Non-Majoritarian Institutions - A Menace to Constitutional Democracy? |
1 |
2 |
2 |
24 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
113 |
| Norm Compliance and Lying Patterns: an Experimental Study Among Refugees and Non-refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Germany |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
146 |
| Perception vs. Experience: Explaining Differences in Corruption Measures Using Microdata |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
150 |
| Perception vs. Experience: Explaining Differences in Corruption Measures Using Microdata |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
319 |
| Perception vs. experience: Explaining differences in corruption measures using microdata |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
35 |
| Plea bargaining procedures worldwide: Drivers of introduction and use |
2 |
4 |
11 |
11 |
3 |
6 |
22 |
22 |
| Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments |
0 |
1 |
3 |
305 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
760 |
| Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
219 |
| Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
198 |
| Preliminary References - Analyzing the Determinants that Made the ECJ the Powerful Court it Is |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
283 |
| Preliminary References — Analyzing the Determinants that Made the ECJ the Powerful Court it Is |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
| Quantitative analysis of constitutions |
0 |
1 |
6 |
71 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
192 |
| Reforming federalism German style: A first step in the right direction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
| Risk-taking, Trust, and Traumatization of Refugees in Germany – A Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
97 |
| Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
199 |
| Strategic choices for redistribution and the veil of ignoranceː theory and experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Supreme Audit Institutions: Supremely Superfluous? A Cross Country Assessment |
1 |
1 |
3 |
94 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
300 |
| Syrian Civil War Victims Trust Each Other, but Punish When and Whomever They Can |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
224 |
| Taking the Rule of Law Seriously – How the EU Could Foster Its Own Values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
338 |
| Terrorism and Emergency Constitutions in the Muslim World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
286 |
| The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts - A Cross-Country Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
257 |
| The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts – A Cross-Country Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
| The Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database |
0 |
0 |
3 |
85 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
324 |
| The Comparative Constitutional Compliance Database |
0 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
24 |
| The Economic Effects of Competition Policy Cross Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators |
0 |
0 |
3 |
124 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
301 |
| The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating – and Extending – Persson and Tabellini |
0 |
0 |
1 |
275 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
897 |
| The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy - A Cross-Country Assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
221 |
| The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy – A First Global Assessment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
324 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2,335 |
| The Economic Effects of Federalism and Decentralization - A Cross-Country Assessment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
406 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
2,978 |
| The Economic Effects of Federalism and Decentralization – A Cross-Country Assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
229 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
780 |
| The Economic Effects of Human Rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
99 |
| The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability. Some Preliminary Insights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
229 |
| The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability: Some Preliminary Insights |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
38 |
| The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability |
0 |
1 |
1 |
78 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
197 |
| The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
166 |
| The Nation-State Foundations of Constitutional Compliance |
1 |
2 |
21 |
21 |
2 |
3 |
35 |
35 |
| The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
451 |
| The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch. A Conceptual Framework |
0 |
0 |
2 |
97 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
360 |
| The Puzzling Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De Facto Judicial Independence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
| The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
332 |
| The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
227 |
| The Rule of Law: Measurement and Deep Roots |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
155 |
| The Rule of Law: Measurement and Deep Roots |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
172 |
| The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
| The Violent and the Weak: When Dictators Care About Social Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
| The economic effects of direct democracy: A cross-country assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
256 |
| The rule of law and Islam |
0 |
0 |
1 |
94 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
383 |
| This Time is Different? - On the Use of Emergency Measures During the Corona Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
599 |
| To cooperate or not to cooperate? An analysis of in-group favoritism among Syrian refugees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
184 |
| Traditional law in times of the nation state: Why is it so prevalent? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
377 |
| Unconstitutional States of Emergency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
283 |
| Values and Norms Matter – On the Basic Determinants of Long-Run Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
575 |
| Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält – Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
198 |
| When to Expect a Coup D'État? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
242 |
| When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |
0 |
0 |
2 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
74 |
| When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |
0 |
1 |
3 |
43 |
2 |
4 |
17 |
159 |
| Why Adopt a Federal Constitution? And why Decentralize? – Determinants Based on a New Dataset |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
133 |
| Zur Logik der Rentenanpassung: ein konstitutionenökonomischer Vorschlag |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
270 |
| Total Working Papers |
8 |
26 |
131 |
10,375 |
37 |
113 |
592 |
46,940 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Analyzing preliminary references as the powerbase of the European Court of Justice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
126 |
| Arbitration is No Substitute for State Courts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
35 |
| Are International Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds Doubt on the Legal Origin Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
| Banking crises and human rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
30 |
| Bessere europäische Wettbewerbspolitik durch den „more economic approach“ ? Einige Fragezeichen nach den ersten Erfahrungen / Does the more economic approach lead to a better competition policy? Some question marks after the first experiences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
| Book reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
| Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
74 |
| Choosing Not To Choose: When Politicians Choose To Delegate Powers |
0 |
0 |
11 |
40 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
455 |
| Constitutional verbosity and social trust |
1 |
3 |
8 |
46 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
142 |
| Courts as monitoring agents: The case of China |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
| Determinants of constitutional change: Why do countries change their form of government? |
0 |
1 |
2 |
73 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
332 |
| Determinants of judicial efficiency: a survey |
2 |
5 |
18 |
143 |
2 |
10 |
33 |
427 |
| Die evolutionsorientierte Theorie der Verfassung – Bemerkungen zum Ansatz von Hayeks – |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| Die evolutionsorientierte Theorie der Verfassung – Bemerkungen zum Ansatz von Hayeks – |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Die kontraktorientierte Theorie der Verfassung.Bemerkungen zum Ansatz Buchanans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
123 |
| Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? An Empirical Evaluation across Seventy-eight Countries |
0 |
1 |
7 |
109 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
274 |
| Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
92 |
| Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence |
0 |
0 |
5 |
48 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
134 |
| Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers |
0 |
1 |
2 |
90 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
323 |
| Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment |
1 |
3 |
16 |
218 |
2 |
7 |
30 |
482 |
| Economic growth and judicial independence, a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators |
2 |
4 |
18 |
226 |
6 |
13 |
56 |
681 |
| Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators |
1 |
1 |
2 |
420 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
1,110 |
| Editor's Choice The Relevance of Judicial Procedure for Economic Growth |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
64 |
| Emergencies: on the misuse of government powers |
1 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
26 |
| Empirical constitutional economics: Onward and upward? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
143 |
| Endogenous constitutions: Politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don’t |
0 |
0 |
2 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
239 |
| Explaining constitutional change: The case of judicial independence |
0 |
0 |
5 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
118 |
| Explaining constitutional garrulity |
0 |
0 |
3 |
40 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
153 |
| Explaining de facto judicial independence |
1 |
2 |
13 |
168 |
2 |
9 |
46 |
537 |
| Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators |
0 |
0 |
1 |
83 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
264 |
| Fiscal Effects of Reforming Local Constitutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
| Fiskalische Effekte der Kommunalverfassungsreformen der 1990er Jahre in Deutschland / Reforming Local Constitutions in Germany during the 1990s – Their Fiscal Effects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
153 |
| Flight and the preferences for truth-telling: An experimental study among refugees and non-refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Germany |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
| Government and markets -- Establishing a democratic constitutional order and a market economy in former socialist countries: Hendrikus J. Blommestein and Bernard Steunenberg (eds.), (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994) ISBN 0-7923-3059-5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
165 |
| How (Not) to measure institutions |
0 |
0 |
4 |
91 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
206 |
| How (not) to measure institutions: a reply to Robinson and Shirley |
0 |
0 |
3 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
92 |
| How not to write a constitution: lessons from Chile |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
21 |
| How to Measure the Rule of Law |
0 |
0 |
4 |
74 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
200 |
| How to measure informal institutions |
0 |
0 |
8 |
81 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
178 |
| Implicit Consitutional Change-Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
165 |
| Improving credibility by delegating judicial competence--the case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council |
1 |
1 |
1 |
40 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
242 |
| Incentivizing cooperation against a norm of defection: Experimental Evidence from Egypt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Inflation, Central Bank Independence, and the Legal System |
0 |
0 |
1 |
92 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
494 |
| Institutional details matter—more economic effects of direct democracy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
96 |
| Is constitutionalized media freedom only window dressing? Evidence from terrorist attacks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
| Judicial independence in the EU: a puzzle |
1 |
1 |
4 |
28 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
112 |
| Judicial independence: Why does de facto diverge from de jure? |
1 |
3 |
9 |
9 |
1 |
8 |
28 |
28 |
| Let the data tell their own story: a tribute to Ted Eisenberg |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
22 |
| Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A Global Survey |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
| Mehr Mut in der Rentenpolitik! Ein Vorschlag |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
| Membership has its Privileges – The Effect of Membership in International Organizations on FDI |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
171 |
| Militant constitutionalism: a promising concept to make constitutional backsliding less likely? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
15 |
| No man is an island: trust, trustworthiness, and social networks among refugees in Germany |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
| ON THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF HAYEK’S EVOLUTIONARY ORIENTED CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS – SOME GENERAL REMARKS |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
31 |
| On the Delegation of Powers: With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
41 |
| On the editorial transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
| On the optimal number of courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
97 |
| On the wrong side of the law – Causes and consequences of a corrupt judiciary |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
147 |
| Perception vs. experience: Explaining differences in corruption measures using microdata |
1 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
2 |
4 |
22 |
93 |
| Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey |
0 |
1 |
3 |
395 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
877 |
| Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments |
0 |
0 |
3 |
133 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
360 |
| Pure eclecticism—The tool kit of the constitutional economist |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
| Reforming Federalism German Style |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
| Reviews |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
| Robust political economy: The case of antitrust |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
143 |
| Separation of powers: new perspectives and empirical findings—introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
141 |
| Soziale Marktwirtschaft im Grundgesetz? Eine gefährliche Verlockung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
| Soziale Marktwirtschaft im Grundgesetz? Eine gefährliche Verlockung: Korreferat |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
| Terrorism and emergency constitutions in the Muslim world |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
| Testing Todd: family types and development |
0 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
0 |
5 |
22 |
53 |
| The Economic Effects of Human Rights |
0 |
1 |
8 |
596 |
7 |
20 |
131 |
9,724 |
| The Economics of Green Constitutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
55 |
| The Effects of Competition Policy on Development - Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators |
1 |
1 |
4 |
179 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
422 |
| The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
30 |
| The Legacy of Friedrich Von Hayek: Boettke, P.J. (Ed.), 3 Volumes; Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2000, 672, 493 and 450 pages: Hayek Revisited: Bouckaert, B., Godart-van der Kroon, A. (Eds.), Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2000, 178 pp.: Friedrich August von Hayek: Die Tradition der Freiheit: Hennecke, H.J. (Ed.), Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen, Dusseldorf, 2000, 440 pp.: Die Verfassung des Marktes: Friedrich August von Hayeks Lehre von Staat und Markt im Spiegel grundgesetzlicher Staats- und Verfassungsrechtslehre: Klaver, M. (Ed.), Lucius and Lucius, Stuttgart, 2000, 325 pp |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
386 |
| The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
240 |
| The Ripple Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
147 |
| The Trade Policy Review Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
| The Violent and the Weak |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
208 |
| The comparative constitutional compliance database |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
13 |
13 |
| The economic effects of constitutional budget institutions |
1 |
1 |
3 |
83 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
240 |
| The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini |
0 |
0 |
5 |
154 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
466 |
| The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
249 |
| The economic effects of federalism and decentralization—a cross-country assessment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
361 |
| The economic effects of judicial accountability: cross-country evidence |
1 |
1 |
4 |
62 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
183 |
| The effects of lay participation in courts -- A cross-country analysis |
2 |
2 |
3 |
39 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
124 |
| The long-term relationship between de jure and de facto judicial independence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
90 |
| The role of ignorance in the emergence of redistribution |
1 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
123 |
| The rule of law and constitutionalism in Muslim countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
166 |
| The rule of law: Measurement and deep roots |
1 |
2 |
4 |
33 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
133 |
| This time is different?—on the use of emergency measures during the corona pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
| To cooperate or not to cooperate? An analysis of cooperation and peer punishment among Syrian refugees, Germans, and Jordanians |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
| Toward ever closer union--or ever larger? Or both? Entry to the European Union from the perspective of constitutional economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
157 |
| Towards ever more confusion? The Convention's proposal for a European constitution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| Traded services in the GATT — What’s all the fuss about? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
| Traditional law in times of the nation state: why is it so prevalent? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
| Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
48 |
| Turning cheap talk into economic growth: On the relationship between property rights and judicial independence |
1 |
1 |
3 |
56 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
190 |
| Unconstitutional States of Emergency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
| Unternehmensfusionen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
| Values, Norms, Institutions and the Prospects for Economic Growth in Central and Eastern Europe |
0 |
2 |
3 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
53 |
| Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält – Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
187 |
| What Are Your Most Underappreciated Works?: First Tranche of Responses |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
34 |
| What makes prosecutors independent? Analysing the institutional determinants of prosecutorial independence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
90 |
| When Does Terror Induce a State of Emergency? And What Are the Effects? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
36 |
| When Syria was in Egypt’s land: Egyptians cooperate with Syrians, but less with each other |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
27 |
| When to expect a coup d’état? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants |
0 |
1 |
2 |
32 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
169 |
| Why do governments call a state of emergency? On the determinants of using emergency constitutions |
1 |
2 |
7 |
57 |
3 |
4 |
35 |
585 |
| Zur Reform der Altersvorsorge – ein konstitutionenökonomischer Vorschlag |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| Total Journal Articles |
22 |
49 |
257 |
5,313 |
61 |
189 |
899 |
26,273 |
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