| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "From Exchange It Comes to Tears". A Dutch Folk Theorem Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
| A Behavioral Approach to a Strategic Market Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
25 |
| A Behavioral Approach to a Strategic Market Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
2 |
9 |
13 |
679 |
| A model of market-making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
747 |
0 |
7 |
9 |
3,265 |
| ACE Models of Endogenous Interactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
29 |
| An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
22 |
| An Illustration of the Essential Difference between Individual and Social Learning, and its Consequences for Computational Analyses |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
40 |
| An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
268 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
1,767 |
| Categorization and Coordination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
17 |
| Categorization and Coordination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
38 |
| Do Boundedly Rational People Imitate? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
14 |
| Does eeasoning enhance learning? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
1,166 |
| Dynamic Models of Segregation in Small-World Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
127 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
417 |
| Dynamic Models of Segregation in Small-World Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
17 |
| Imitation of succesful behavior in Cournot markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
2 |
9 |
9 |
1,356 |
| Learning Frames |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
33 |
| Learning frames |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
7 |
12 |
13 |
23 |
| On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
7 |
29 |
| On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
11 |
21 |
| On Smiles, Winks, and Handshakes as Coordination Devices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
15 |
20 |
38 |
| On the Behavior of Proposers in Ultimatum Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
13 |
| On the Behavior of Proposers in Ultimatum Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
228 |
| On the Behavior of Proposers in Ultimatum Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
217 |
| On the Role of Non-equilibrium Focal Points as Coordination Devices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
14 |
19 |
55 |
| On the Stochasticity of Ultimatum Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
13 |
| On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
453 |
| Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
10 |
22 |
| Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
2 |
8 |
13 |
147 |
| Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
11 |
19 |
| Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
2 |
9 |
13 |
118 |
| Schelling's Neighborhood Segregation Model Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
564 |
| Schelling's Spatial Proximity Model of Segregation Revisited |
0 |
0 |
1 |
653 |
3 |
10 |
17 |
3,093 |
| Schelling's Spatial Proximity Model of Segregation Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
8 |
11 |
46 |
| Schelling's Spatial Proximity Model of Segregation Revisited |
0 |
0 |
1 |
135 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
388 |
| Segregation in Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
565 |
| Segregation in Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
206 |
| Segregation in Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
9 |
10 |
58 |
| Segregation in Social Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
512 |
| Self-Orgainzed Market in a Decentralized Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
206 |
| The East End, the West End and King's Cross: On clustering in the four-player Hotelling game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
15 |
15 |
39 |
| The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: On Clustering in the Four-Player Hotelling Game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
19 |
| The East End, the West End, and King's Cross: On clustering in the four-player hotelling game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
125 |
| The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
15 |
| The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
28 |
| The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
23 |
| The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
| The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
30 |
| The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
52 |
| The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
84 |
| The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter * |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
25 |
| The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter * |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
15 |
| WAS HAYEK AN ACE? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
394 |
| Was Hayek an Ace? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
25 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3,248 |
54 |
297 |
421 |
16,824 |