Access Statistics for Ruqu Wang

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Sorting Model of Labor Contracts: Implications for Layoffs and Wage-Tenure Profiles 0 0 0 90 1 5 7 518
Auctions Versus Posted-Price Selling 0 0 1 62 5 9 12 716
Common Value Auctions With Return Policies 0 0 0 27 4 11 46 204
Market Design With Correlated Valuations 0 0 1 39 3 9 12 185
More On Phantom Bidding 0 0 0 33 7 13 14 255
Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs 0 0 0 149 0 4 7 791
Signally By Jump Bidding In Private Value Auctions 0 0 0 63 1 7 9 343
Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 315
Strategic Behavior and Information Revelation in Dynamic Auctions 0 0 0 3 2 4 5 238
Switching Costs In Infinitely Repeated Games 0 0 0 78 0 3 4 287
Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games 0 1 1 153 0 9 10 540
Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games 0 0 0 20 0 1 3 105
Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games1 0 0 0 12 0 3 6 163
The Optimal Consumption and the Quitting of Harmful Addictive Goods 0 0 0 156 3 8 11 414
Total Working Papers 0 1 3 886 28 89 149 5,074

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A model of competing selling mechanisms 0 0 0 81 4 8 10 207
A note on redistributive fairness and economic reform 0 0 1 16 1 8 12 105
An Explanation of Inefficiency in Markets and a Justification for Buy-and-Hold Strategies 0 1 1 16 0 8 10 215
Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling 0 0 0 337 1 2 10 797
Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling: The Case of Correlated Private Valuations 0 0 0 18 7 13 16 796
Bargaining versus posted-price selling 1 1 2 147 1 7 13 367
Bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions 0 0 0 102 3 9 14 227
Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict 0 0 0 35 3 8 11 138
Common-value auctions with discrete private information 0 0 0 75 4 8 11 196
Competition, Wage Commitments, and Application Fees 0 0 1 15 2 4 7 131
Equilibrium Selling Mechanisms 0 0 0 22 3 8 14 200
LISTING PRICES AS SIGNALS OF QUALITY IN MARKETS WITH NEGOTIATION 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 96
Learning buyers' valuation distribution in posted-price selling 0 0 0 80 5 13 18 603
Market Design with Correlated Valuations 0 0 0 43 2 7 9 225
More on phantom bidding 0 0 0 81 1 5 7 597
Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly 0 0 0 108 2 7 9 482
Probation, layoffs, and wage-tenure profiles: A sorting explanation 0 1 1 94 0 3 9 374
Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty 0 0 0 85 0 2 5 370
Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values 0 0 0 62 2 10 14 218
Strategic Behavior in Dynamic Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 5 7 100
Strategic Invasion in Markets with Switching Costs 0 0 0 53 1 13 17 167
Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games 0 0 0 47 1 4 8 156
Switching costs in infinitely repeated games 0 0 0 34 1 5 11 107
The Dynamics of Firms in the Presence of Adjustment Costs 0 0 0 14 1 2 5 144
The Optimal Consumption and the Quitting of Harmful Addictive Goods 0 0 0 52 4 9 11 243
The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests 0 0 0 148 2 9 12 507
Total Journal Articles 1 3 6 1,765 52 182 276 7,768

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04