Access Statistics for Ruqu Wang

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Sorting Model of Labor Contracts: Implications for Layoffs and Wage-Tenure Profiles 0 0 0 90 0 1 9 520
Auctions Versus Posted-Price Selling 0 0 1 62 1 3 14 719
Common Value Auctions With Return Policies 0 0 0 27 0 4 48 209
Market Design With Correlated Valuations 0 0 1 39 0 3 20 193
More On Phantom Bidding 0 0 0 33 0 5 20 261
Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs 0 0 0 149 1 6 15 799
Signally By Jump Bidding In Private Value Auctions 0 0 0 63 2 5 14 348
Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values 0 0 0 1 0 2 5 317
Strategic Behavior and Information Revelation in Dynamic Auctions 0 0 1 4 0 1 8 241
Switching Costs In Infinitely Repeated Games 0 0 0 78 1 4 10 293
Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games 0 0 1 153 1 5 16 546
Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games 0 0 0 20 1 2 6 108
Switching Costs in Infinitely Repeated Games1 0 0 0 12 0 2 9 166
The Optimal Consumption and the Quitting of Harmful Addictive Goods 0 1 1 157 0 2 15 418
Total Working Papers 0 1 5 888 7 45 209 5,138

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A model of competing selling mechanisms 0 0 0 81 0 1 10 208
A note on redistributive fairness and economic reform 0 1 1 17 0 5 18 112
An Explanation of Inefficiency in Markets and a Justification for Buy-and-Hold Strategies 0 0 1 16 0 1 11 216
Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling 0 0 0 337 0 17 26 816
Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling: The Case of Correlated Private Valuations 0 0 0 18 0 3 19 799
Bargaining versus posted-price selling 0 0 2 147 0 6 18 373
Bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions 0 0 0 102 0 2 16 229
Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict 0 0 0 35 2 3 14 141
Common-value auctions with discrete private information 0 0 0 75 0 1 14 199
Competition, Wage Commitments, and Application Fees 0 0 0 15 0 1 8 133
Equilibrium Selling Mechanisms 0 0 0 22 0 3 16 203
LISTING PRICES AS SIGNALS OF QUALITY IN MARKETS WITH NEGOTIATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 96
Learning buyers' valuation distribution in posted-price selling 0 0 0 80 0 3 22 607
Market Design with Correlated Valuations 0 0 0 43 0 2 11 227
More on phantom bidding 0 0 0 81 0 5 13 603
Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly 0 0 0 108 0 0 11 484
Probation, layoffs, and wage-tenure profiles: A sorting explanation 0 0 1 94 0 2 11 377
Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty 0 0 0 85 0 0 4 370
Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values 0 0 0 62 0 1 14 219
Strategic Behavior in Dynamic Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 101
Strategic Invasion in Markets with Switching Costs 0 0 0 53 1 4 20 172
Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games 0 0 0 47 1 3 12 160
Switching costs in infinitely repeated games 0 0 0 34 0 2 12 109
The Dynamics of Firms in the Presence of Adjustment Costs 0 0 0 14 0 4 9 148
The Optimal Consumption and the Quitting of Harmful Addictive Goods 0 0 0 52 0 2 13 246
The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests 0 0 0 148 1 5 16 512
Total Journal Articles 0 1 5 1,766 5 76 352 7,860

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Statistics updated 2026-07-10