Access Statistics for Cédric Wasser
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Working Paper | File Downloads | Abstract Views | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last month | 3 months | 12 months | Total | Last month | 3 months | 12 months | Total | |
| Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 19 |
| Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests | 0 | 0 | 1 | 51 | 0 | 4 | 10 | 256 |
| Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests | 0 | 1 | 3 | 64 | 1 | 6 | 12 | 132 |
| Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 35 |
| Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information | 1 | 1 | 3 | 57 | 3 | 5 | 20 | 228 |
| Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests | 0 | 0 | 1 | 69 | 2 | 4 | 11 | 121 |
| Signaling in Auctions among Competitors | 2 | 2 | 7 | 127 | 2 | 4 | 24 | 400 |
| Total Working Papers | 3 | 4 | 15 | 391 | 8 | 24 | 89 | 1,191 |
| Journal Article | File Downloads | Abstract Views | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last month | 3 months | 12 months | Total | Last month | 3 months | 12 months | Total | |
| A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 43 |
| Bilateral k+1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 2 | 2 | 9 | 77 |
| Buyer-optimal extensionproof information | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 5 |
| Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 78 |
| On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 38 |
| Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests | 0 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 11 | 43 |
| Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 70 |
| Total Journal Articles | 0 | 2 | 5 | 61 | 5 | 12 | 46 | 354 |
Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items
Top Working Paper series and Journals
Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.
Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.
Authors with no registered papers
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.
Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail