Access Statistics for Takuma Wakayama

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction 0 0 0 19 2 6 9 49
Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments 0 0 0 14 1 13 13 144
Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 102
Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies 0 0 0 88 0 2 4 844
Fair Reallocation in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences 0 0 0 39 1 7 9 51
Full-Truthful Implementation in Nash Equilibria 1 1 1 15 1 2 3 100
Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability 0 0 0 39 0 5 5 283
Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money 0 0 0 7 1 5 9 79
Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets 0 0 0 23 1 11 15 151
Strategy-Proof Sharing 0 0 0 31 3 12 15 268
Strategy-proof Sharing 0 0 0 30 0 1 3 222
Strategy-proof Sharing 0 0 0 35 1 4 7 212
The Pivotal Mechanism Versus the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism: An Experimental Comparison 0 0 0 18 0 3 5 56
The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction 0 0 0 10 3 6 12 51
Uniform, Equal Division, and Other Envy-free Rules between the Two 0 0 0 22 5 9 9 106
Total Working Papers 1 1 1 390 19 88 121 2,718

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results 0 0 0 1 0 4 10 27
Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments 0 0 0 24 0 3 6 178
Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 17
Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation 0 0 0 11 0 9 16 79
Ex post self-implementation 0 1 1 1 0 4 5 32
Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 1 1 7 10 20
Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money 0 0 0 9 1 3 7 85
New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 21
Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets 0 0 0 15 1 7 14 141
Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money 0 0 0 9 0 4 6 86
Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule 0 0 0 4 1 6 8 49
The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction 0 0 0 1 2 5 8 19
The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison 1 2 6 25 1 6 15 37
The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity 0 0 0 16 1 2 7 81
Total Journal Articles 1 3 7 117 8 66 128 872

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04