Access Statistics for Takuma Wakayama

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction	0	0	0	19	0	2	3	42
Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments	0	0	0	14	0	0	1	131
Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100
Dominant Strategy Implementation in Pure Exchange Economies	0	0	0	88	0	0	1	841
Fair Reallocation in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences	0	0	0	39	2	2	2	44
Full-Truthful Implementation in Nash Equilibria	0	0	0	14	1	1	2	98
Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability	0	0	0	39	0	0	0	278
Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money	0	0	0	7	1	2	3	73
Secure Implementation in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets	0	0	0	23	0	0	2	138
Strategy-Proof Sharing	0	0	0	31	1	1	1	254
Strategy-proof Sharing	0	0	0	35	0	0	1	206
Strategy-proof Sharing	0	0	0	30	1	1	1	220
The Pivotal Mechanism Versus the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism: An Experimental Comparison	0	0	0	18	0	1	1	52
The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction	0	0	0	10	0	2	5	42
Uniform, Equal Division, and Other Envy-free Rules between the Two	0	0	0	22	0	0	0	97
Total Working Papers	0	0	0	389	6	12	24	2,616

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results	0	0	0	1	1	1	7	22
Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments	0	0	0	24	1	1	6	175
Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	12
Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation	0	0	0	11	4	4	7	69
Ex post self-implementation	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	27
Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences	0	0	0	1	0	1	4	13
Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money	0	0	0	9	0	1	3	81
New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation	0	0	0	0	2	2	5	18
Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets	0	0	0	15	4	4	6	132
Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money	0	0	0	9	1	1	2	82
Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule	0	0	0	4	0	1	2	43
The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	14
The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison	0	0	5	23	1	2	10	30
The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity	0	0	0	16	0	1	4	77
Total Journal Articles	0	0	5	114	16	21	65	795

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Statistics updated 2025-11-08