| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,010 |
2 |
9 |
11 |
4,159 |
| Debt Contracts and Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
35 |
| Dynamic Contracts and Equilibrium Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
178 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
8 |
169 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
189 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
264 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
373 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
48 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
43 |
| Equilibrium Layoff As Termination of a Dynamic Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
215 |
| Equilibrium Lending Mechanism and Aggregate Activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
252 |
| Equilibrium lending mechanism and aggregate activity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
117 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
469 |
| Financial Intermediation Regime and Efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott Economy, A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
264 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,612 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
3,919 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
4 |
8 |
10 |
354 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
652 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
240 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
279 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
11 |
893 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
3 |
17 |
18 |
461 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
1 |
476 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
1,837 |
| Optimal Monitoring and Financing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
90 |
| Optimal Self-enforcing and Termination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
67 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
1 |
1 |
99 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
221 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
3 |
809 |
1 |
7 |
18 |
1,682 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
106 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
219 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
190 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
472 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
183 |
| Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
| Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
94 |
| Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
352 |
| Risk-Sharing Partners with Bilateral Moral Hazard and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
1 |
1 |
159 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
780 |
| Stock Grants As a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
12 |
190 |
| Stock Grants as Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
490 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
1 |
1 |
55 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
223 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
97 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
11 |
1,022 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
458 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
2,272 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
184 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
206 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
918 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
726 |
| When to Terminate a Long-Term Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
142 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
4 |
11 |
6,164 |
80 |
199 |
284 |
26,339 |
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