| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1,011 |
3 |
13 |
24 |
4,172 |
| Debt Contracts and Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
40 |
| Dynamic Contracts and Equilibrium Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
183 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
20 |
181 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
192 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
378 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
269 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
51 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
44 |
| Equilibrium Layoff As Termination of a Dynamic Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
219 |
| Equilibrium Lending Mechanism and Aggregate Activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
256 |
| Equilibrium lending mechanism and aggregate activity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
117 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
471 |
| Financial Intermediation Regime and Efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott Economy, A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
26 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
268 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1,613 |
3 |
16 |
24 |
3,935 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
1 |
6 |
15 |
360 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
4 |
7 |
12 |
659 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
4 |
13 |
17 |
253 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
280 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
895 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
7 |
25 |
468 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
476 |
0 |
10 |
17 |
1,847 |
| Optimal Monitoring and Financing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
93 |
| Optimal Self-enforcing and Termination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
70 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
112 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
2 |
3 |
811 |
3 |
23 |
33 |
1,705 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
11 |
29 |
33 |
248 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
2 |
17 |
25 |
238 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
2 |
2 |
192 |
4 |
26 |
32 |
498 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
187 |
| Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
39 |
| Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
96 |
| Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
355 |
| Risk-Sharing Partners with Bilateral Moral Hazard and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
159 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
782 |
| Stock Grants As a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
17 |
196 |
| Stock Grants as Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
494 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
0 |
10 |
13 |
233 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
102 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
14 |
1,026 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
16 |
193 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
463 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
3 |
10 |
17 |
2,282 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
8 |
16 |
734 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
206 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
923 |
| When to Terminate a Long-Term Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
144 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
6 |
14 |
6,170 |
54 |
321 |
565 |
26,660 |
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