| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,012 |
6 |
6 |
38 |
4,188 |
| Debt Contracts and Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
41 |
| Dynamic Contracts and Equilibrium Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
186 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
193 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
184 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
379 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
271 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
46 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
55 |
| Equilibrium Layoff As Termination of a Dynamic Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
222 |
| Equilibrium Lending Mechanism and Aggregate Activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
258 |
| Equilibrium layoff as termination of a dynamic contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
| Equilibrium lending mechanism and aggregate activity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
117 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
474 |
| Financial Intermediation Regime and Efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott Economy, A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
31 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1,615 |
1 |
2 |
31 |
3,944 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
273 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
361 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
668 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
263 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
285 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
899 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
472 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
476 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
1,848 |
| Optimal Monitoring and Financing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
93 |
| Optimal Self-enforcing and Termination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
72 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
253 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
1 |
4 |
813 |
2 |
4 |
38 |
1,713 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
117 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
0 |
3 |
38 |
252 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
2 |
192 |
3 |
4 |
41 |
509 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
194 |
| Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
45 |
| Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
97 |
| Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
358 |
| Risk-Sharing Partners with Bilateral Moral Hazard and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
159 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
784 |
| Stock Grants As a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
196 |
| Stock Grants as Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
496 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
2 |
3 |
17 |
237 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
105 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
465 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1,029 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
2,286 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
195 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
931 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
3 |
20 |
739 |
| When to Terminate a Long-Term Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
148 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
2 |
17 |
6,176 |
26 |
55 |
724 |
26,859 |
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