| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1,013 |
1 |
8 |
36 |
4,190 |
| Debt Contracts and Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
45 |
| Dynamic Contracts and Equilibrium Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
186 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
25 |
187 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
197 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
272 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
381 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
56 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
46 |
| Equilibrium Layoff As Termination of a Dynamic Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
224 |
| Equilibrium Lending Mechanism and Aggregate Activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
260 |
| Equilibrium layoff as termination of a dynamic contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
| Equilibrium lending mechanism and aggregate activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
475 |
| Financial Intermediation Regime and Efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott Economy, A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
31 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
3 |
4 |
17 |
365 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
275 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,615 |
4 |
6 |
33 |
3,949 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
1 |
1 |
90 |
2 |
4 |
30 |
267 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
6 |
8 |
28 |
676 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
8 |
15 |
291 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
902 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
3 |
23 |
474 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
476 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
1,849 |
| Optimal Monitoring and Financing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
95 |
| Optimal Self-enforcing and Termination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
72 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
120 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
253 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
254 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
4 |
813 |
3 |
6 |
36 |
1,717 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
2 |
192 |
1 |
6 |
41 |
512 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
2 |
4 |
17 |
198 |
| Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
15 |
48 |
| Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
99 |
| Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance |
1 |
1 |
1 |
69 |
3 |
3 |
11 |
361 |
| Risk-Sharing Partners with Bilateral Moral Hazard and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
786 |
| Stock Grants As a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
196 |
| Stock Grants as Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
498 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
105 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
237 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
467 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
1,030 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
2,287 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
197 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
741 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
932 |
| When to Terminate a Long-Term Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
150 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
3 |
16 |
6,179 |
70 |
125 |
758 |
26,958 |
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