| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,005 |
2 |
6 |
14 |
4,074 |
| Debt Contracts and Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
27 |
| Dynamic Contracts and Equilibrium Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
170 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
161 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
151 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
202 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
299 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
37 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
| Equilibrium Layoff As Termination of a Dynamic Contract |
0 |
0 |
1 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
205 |
| Equilibrium Lending Mechanism and Aggregate Activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
233 |
| Equilibrium lending mechanism and aggregate activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
426 |
| Financial Intermediation Regime and Efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott Economy, A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
331 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
236 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
2 |
4 |
12 |
1,588 |
4 |
13 |
38 |
3,798 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
1 |
1 |
4 |
80 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
204 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
3 |
177 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
618 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
268 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
57 |
871 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
415 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
1 |
466 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
1,771 |
| Optimal Monitoring and Financing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
86 |
| Optimal Self-enforcing and Termination |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
55 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
89 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
1 |
6 |
790 |
1 |
5 |
25 |
1,593 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
200 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
191 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
156 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
436 |
| Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
| Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
48 |
| Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
285 |
| Risk-Sharing Partners with Bilateral Moral Hazard and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
157 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
766 |
| Stock Grants As a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
174 |
| Stock Grants as Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
485 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
215 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
464 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
2,169 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
98 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
979 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
421 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
702 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
204 |
3 |
7 |
27 |
847 |
| When to Terminate a Long-Term Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
6 |
35 |
6,046 |
33 |
102 |
476 |
24,798 |
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