| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1,011 |
6 |
10 |
30 |
4,178 |
| Debt Contracts and Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
41 |
| Dynamic Contracts and Equilibrium Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
186 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
23 |
184 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
193 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
378 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
269 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
53 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
46 |
| Equilibrium Layoff As Termination of a Dynamic Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
221 |
| Equilibrium Lending Mechanism and Aggregate Activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
258 |
| Equilibrium lending mechanism and aggregate activity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
117 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
474 |
| Financial Intermediation Regime and Efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott Economy, A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
30 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1,613 |
6 |
14 |
29 |
3,941 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
4 |
5 |
15 |
272 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
361 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
7 |
14 |
24 |
260 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
4 |
8 |
16 |
663 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
282 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
897 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
3 |
5 |
28 |
471 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
476 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1,847 |
| Optimal Monitoring and Financing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
93 |
| Optimal Self-enforcing and Termination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
71 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
9 |
17 |
34 |
247 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
2 |
19 |
35 |
250 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
1 |
3 |
811 |
1 |
5 |
34 |
1,706 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
3 |
5 |
13 |
115 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
2 |
2 |
192 |
7 |
21 |
38 |
505 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
1 |
1 |
1 |
81 |
4 |
4 |
15 |
191 |
| Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
12 |
44 |
| Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
96 |
| Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
357 |
| Risk-Sharing Partners with Bilateral Moral Hazard and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
159 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
784 |
| Stock Grants As a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
196 |
| Stock Grants as Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
496 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
104 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
234 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
194 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
463 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
16 |
1,028 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
2,283 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
6 |
18 |
736 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
206 |
6 |
7 |
14 |
929 |
| When to Terminate a Long-Term Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
147 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
6 |
15 |
6,171 |
114 |
224 |
672 |
26,774 |
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