| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,009 |
2 |
5 |
29 |
4,128 |
| Debt Contracts and Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
| Dynamic Contracts and Equilibrium Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
175 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
167 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
160 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
23 |
251 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
6 |
25 |
360 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
| Equilibrium Layoff As Termination of a Dynamic Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
211 |
| Equilibrium Lending Mechanism and Aggregate Activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
235 |
| Equilibrium lending mechanism and aggregate activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
458 |
| Financial Intermediation Regime and Efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott Economy, A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
247 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
3 |
7 |
1,602 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
3,883 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
343 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
227 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
1 |
1 |
183 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
638 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
273 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
881 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
441 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
1 |
474 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
1,816 |
| Optimal Monitoring and Financing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
88 |
| Optimal Self-enforcing and Termination |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
62 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
2 |
5 |
799 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
1,640 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
213 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
211 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
1 |
1 |
188 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
458 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
1 |
1 |
1 |
78 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
169 |
| Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
| Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
24 |
80 |
| Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
8 |
26 |
334 |
| Risk-Sharing Partners with Bilateral Moral Hazard and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
773 |
| Stock Grants As a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
178 |
| Stock Grants as Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
487 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
219 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
157 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
467 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
2,245 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,008 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
443 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
711 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
204 |
3 |
11 |
31 |
904 |
| When to Terminate a Long-Term Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
8 |
21 |
6,121 |
16 |
74 |
293 |
25,766 |
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