| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Adverse Selection in Credit Markets with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,010 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
4,150 |
| Debt Contracts and Financial Intermediation with Costly Screening |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
32 |
| Dynamic Contracts and Equilibrium Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
178 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
183 |
| Dynamic Costly State Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
161 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
372 |
| Dynamic Credit Relationships in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
262 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
| Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
| Equilibrium Layoff As Termination of a Dynamic Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
214 |
| Equilibrium Lending Mechanism and Aggregate Activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
250 |
| Equilibrium lending mechanism and aggregate activity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
116 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
467 |
| Financial Intermediation Regime and Efficiency in a Boyd-Prescott Economy, A Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
108 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
257 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1,611 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
3,913 |
| Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
345 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
236 |
| Financing development: the role of information costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
647 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
274 |
| Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
882 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
443 |
| Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating |
0 |
0 |
1 |
476 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1,831 |
| Optimal Monitoring and Financing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
| Optimal Self-enforcing and Termination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
66 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
213 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
215 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
1 |
3 |
809 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
1,674 |
| Quantifying the Impact of Financial Development on Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
102 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
176 |
| Quantifying the impact of financial development on economic development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
190 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
467 |
| Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
| Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
349 |
| Risk-Sharing Partners with Bilateral Moral Hazard and Balanced Budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
158 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
776 |
| Stock Grants As a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
179 |
| Stock Grants as Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
489 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
| Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,012 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
454 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
177 |
| Unemployment Insurance with Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2,267 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
719 |
| When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts |
0 |
1 |
1 |
206 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
916 |
| When to Terminate a Long-Term Contract |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
140 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
3 |
11 |
6,159 |
3 |
14 |
109 |
26,116 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.