Access Statistics for Barry R. Weingast
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1,605 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
3,011 |
| A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
469 |
| Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Economic Development in the Antebellum Era |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
238 |
| Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives |
1 |
1 |
2 |
697 |
4 |
6 |
16 |
2,363 |
| From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese style |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
311 |
| From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style |
0 |
0 |
0 |
173 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
583 |
| From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style |
0 |
0 |
0 |
354 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,128 |
| Limited access orders in the developing world:a new approach to the problems of development |
1 |
7 |
27 |
2,347 |
10 |
29 |
135 |
5,266 |
| POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE THRIFT DEBACLE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
141 |
| Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style |
0 |
0 |
2 |
941 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
3,171 |
| Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
314 |
| Responses to Disaster: Planning for a Great Earthquake in California |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
170 |
| Safety Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
183 |
| The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Shorthaul Pricing Constraint |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
422 |
| The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
186 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
9 |
38 |
6,510 |
20 |
52 |
236 |
17,956 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation |
1 |
1 |
3 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
| A positive theory of statutory interpretation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
549 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1,687 |
| Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
1,785 |
| Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico |
0 |
0 |
2 |
71 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
209 |
| Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission |
1 |
2 |
13 |
521 |
3 |
8 |
39 |
1,492 |
| Capitalism, Democracy, and Countermajoritarian Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
37 |
| China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, chinese style |
2 |
5 |
18 |
176 |
4 |
12 |
58 |
641 |
| Congress and Regulatory Agency Choice: Reply [Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission] |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
152 |
| Congress as the |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
73 |
| Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England |
5 |
12 |
78 |
1,441 |
14 |
45 |
237 |
4,242 |
| Constructing Self-Enforcing Federalism in the Early United States and Modern Russia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
47 |
| Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild |
4 |
4 |
18 |
850 |
4 |
9 |
43 |
2,597 |
| Editors' introduction |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
31 |
| Exposing the neoclassical fallacy: McCloskey on ideas and the great enrichment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
50 |
| Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives |
0 |
0 |
3 |
242 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
1,049 |
| Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style |
0 |
1 |
2 |
117 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
336 |
| Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications |
1 |
1 |
1 |
67 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
257 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
50 |
| Political Solutions to Market Problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
44 |
| Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
206 |
| RUNAWAY BUREAUCRACY AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: WHY REFORMS FAIL |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
257 |
| Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style |
0 |
3 |
13 |
523 |
9 |
21 |
73 |
1,624 |
| Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
288 |
| Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
4 |
191 |
3 |
10 |
27 |
588 |
| Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives |
0 |
0 |
4 |
702 |
1 |
6 |
29 |
2,138 |
| Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic Stability In America's First Century |
0 |
1 |
5 |
44 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
175 |
| Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
80 |
| Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice |
0 |
1 |
5 |
51 |
2 |
5 |
22 |
260 |
| THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS |
2 |
7 |
35 |
409 |
7 |
15 |
66 |
1,062 |
| The "Reformation of Administrative Law" Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
70 |
| The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
4,425 |
| The Analytic Narrative Project - Analytic Narratives. By Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 296p. $65.00 cloth, $22.95 paper |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
29 |
| The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty |
0 |
0 |
3 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
335 |
| The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition |
0 |
0 |
6 |
102 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
298 |
| The Economic Incidence of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Short-Haul Pricing Constraint |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
1,458 |
| The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
33 |
5,155 |
| The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets |
0 |
4 |
15 |
593 |
0 |
11 |
39 |
2,508 |
| The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
91 |
| The Myth of Demócratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient. By Donald Wittman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 240p. $29.95 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
| The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics |
2 |
6 |
33 |
1,215 |
3 |
15 |
72 |
3,518 |
| The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law |
1 |
1 |
9 |
85 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
271 |
| The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
| The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
29 |
| The Role of Credible Commitments in State Finance: Review Article |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
85 |
| The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC) |
0 |
1 |
2 |
39 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
185 |
| Why are Congressional Committees Powerful? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
18 |
| Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
| Total Journal Articles |
19 |
51 |
283 |
8,357 |
61 |
214 |
950 |
40,121 |
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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