Access Statistics for Tom Wilkening

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms 0 0 0 136 0 0 4 179
Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation 0 0 0 43 0 2 5 62
Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 98
Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach 0 0 1 62 0 0 4 123
Land Trade and Development: A Market Design Approach 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 35
Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self-Enforcement 0 0 0 138 0 0 0 1,617
Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases? 0 0 0 32 0 1 2 56
Protecting Antiquities: A Role for Long-Term Leases? 0 0 0 11 0 0 2 109
Recursive Contracts, Firm Longevity and Rat Races: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
Recursive Contracts, Firm Longevity, and Rat Races: Theory and Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 68 0 0 3 167
Regulatory Fog: The Informational Origins of Regulatory Persistence 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 121
The Informational Properties of Institutions: An Experimental Study of Persistence in Markets with Certification 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 84
The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive E ects of Power 0 0 0 69 0 0 3 421
The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power 0 0 0 94 0 0 2 118
The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power 0 0 0 21 0 2 5 222
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation 0 0 0 20 0 1 4 280
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation 0 0 0 36 0 0 4 83
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 80
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 17
The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 102
The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power 0 0 0 109 0 1 2 370
The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation 0 0 0 122 0 1 3 251
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 1,026 0 8 51 4,616

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Long Way Coming: Designing Centralized Markets with Privately Informed Buyers and Sellers 0 0 1 23 1 2 3 133
Auctions and Economic Design 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 35
Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms 0 0 0 58 0 3 7 213
Cognitive heterogeneity and complex belief elicitation 0 0 0 1 1 2 5 20
Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules 0 0 0 46 1 1 2 105
Experimental guidance for eliciting beliefs with the Stochastic Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism 0 1 2 22 1 4 7 112
Information and the persistence of private-order contract enforcement institutions: An experimental analysis 0 0 0 4 2 2 2 68
Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement 0 0 2 67 0 2 9 236
Recursive contracts, firm longevity, and rat races: An experimental analysis 0 0 0 10 3 3 3 105
Regulatory fog: The role of information in regulatory persistence 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 61
The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power 0 0 3 108 2 2 10 470
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation 0 2 2 17 0 4 9 109
Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade 0 0 1 11 2 2 4 46
Using meta-predictions to identify experts in the crowd when past performance is unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Total Journal Articles 0 3 11 389 13 27 62 1,717

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Statistics updated 2025-08-05