| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars |
0 |
0 |
0 |
148 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
329 |
| A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars |
0 |
0 |
0 |
185 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
613 |
| A Theory of Economic and Political Cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
| A Theory of Fiscal Responsibility and Irresponsibility |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
18 |
| A Theory of Fiscal Responsibility and Irresponsibility |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
42 |
| A Theory of Political and Economic Cycles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
161 |
| Central Bank Credibility and Fiscal Responsibility |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
39 |
| Changing Central Bank Pressures and Inflation |
0 |
0 |
5 |
30 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
36 |
| Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
29 |
| Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
48 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
100 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion in a World Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
68 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement |
1 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
67 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Persistent Shocks |
1 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
98 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Persistent Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
24 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Persistent Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
68 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
46 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
34 |
| Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
59 |
| From Education to Democracy? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
537 |
2 |
4 |
19 |
1,485 |
| Future Rent-Seeking and Current Public Savings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
392 |
| Global Hegemony and Exorbitant Privilege |
1 |
2 |
8 |
14 |
2 |
9 |
50 |
63 |
| Imperfect Information and Political Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
56 |
| Income and Democracy |
0 |
0 |
5 |
679 |
2 |
3 |
22 |
1,722 |
| Income and Democracy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
382 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
1,371 |
| Inflating the Beast: Political Incentives Under Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
248 |
| Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
40 |
| Instrument-Based vs. Target-Based Rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
| Monetary Policy without Commitment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
30 |
2 |
6 |
15 |
65 |
| Online Appendix to "Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
| Optimal Debt Management and Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
| Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment: Beyond Lucas-Stokey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
152 |
| Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment: Beyond Lucas-Stokey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
| Optimal Fiscal Policy without Commitment: Revisiting Lucas-Stokey |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
68 |
| Optimal Government Debt Maturity Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
127 |
| Optimal Taxation and Debt Management without Commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
51 |
| Optimal Time-Consistent Government Debt Maturity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
100 |
| Optimal Time-Consistent Government Debt Maturity |
0 |
0 |
2 |
111 |
2 |
2 |
12 |
217 |
| Optimal fiscal policy without commitment: Revisiting Lucas-Stokey |
0 |
0 |
1 |
83 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
111 |
| Optimal time-consistent government debt maturity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
124 |
| Optimal time-consistent government debt maturity |
0 |
1 |
1 |
66 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
72 |
| Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
31 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
259 |
| Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
| Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
30 |
| Pandemic Lockdown: The Role of Government Commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
533 |
| Policy Discretion under Persistent Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
27 |
| Political Limits to Globalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
293 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
685 |
| Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
292 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
740 |
| Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis |
0 |
1 |
2 |
171 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
484 |
| Rising Government Debt: Causes and Solutions for a Decades-Old Trend |
0 |
0 |
2 |
52 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
122 |
| Technical Appendix to "Introduction: Principals, Agents, and Indirect Foreign Policies" |
0 |
0 |
2 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
106 |
| The 'Kill Zone': Copying, Acquisition and Start-Ups' Direction of Innovation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
79 |
| The Commitment Benefit of Consols in Government Debt Management |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
28 |
| The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959-61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
308 |
| The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine, 1959-61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
126 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
608 |
| The Optimal Public and Private Provision of Safe Assets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
58 |
| The Political Economy of Indirect Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
118 |
| The Political Economy of Indirect Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
55 |
| The Political Economy of Resource Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
128 |
| The Public and Private Provision of Safe Assets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
49 |
| The Use of Concessions in Forestalling War |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
28 |
| The commitment benefit of consols in government debt management |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
45 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
7 |
49 |
4,420 |
45 |
119 |
400 |
13,041 |
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