Access Statistics for Takuro Yamashita

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality 0 0 0 55 0 0 1 48
A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 10
A mediator approach to mechanism design with limited commitment 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10
Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2
Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure 0 0 2 32 0 0 4 70
Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 29
Auction Design with Heterogeneous Priors 0 0 1 6 0 0 4 15
Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 77
Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 42
First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 6
First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition 0 0 1 6 0 0 9 27
First best implementation with costly information acquisition 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 6
Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 54
Information Design in Concave Games 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
Information Design in Concave Games 0 0 1 32 0 1 4 27
Information Design in Games: Certification Approach 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Information Design in Smooth Games 0 0 1 15 0 0 4 13
Information design in concave games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Large mechanism design with moment-based allocation externality 0 0 0 8 1 2 2 18
On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms 0 0 0 23 1 1 1 64
On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 6
On the veil-of-ignorance principle: welfare-optimal information disclosure in Voting 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 5
Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation 6 9 15 15 10 17 34 34
Optimal Investment in Network Infrastructures 10 21 21 21 3 9 9 9
Optimal Public Information Disclosure by Mechanism Designer 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 26
Optimal Trade Mechanism with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 11
Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 13
Order on Types based on Monotone Comparative Statics 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 33
Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information 0 0 0 17 1 1 5 32
Revenue-capped efficient auctions 0 0 0 12 0 1 1 39
Revenue-capped efficient auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation 0 0 0 43 0 0 1 44
Type-contingent Information Disclosure 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 14
Total Working Papers 16 30 42 509 19 36 91 809

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem 0 0 2 3 1 1 4 6
Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 43
Auction design with heterogeneous priors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 38
Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism 0 0 2 8 1 1 12 94
Maximal miscommunication 0 0 1 4 0 0 1 12
Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents 0 0 1 61 0 0 1 243
On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms 0 1 1 3 0 1 2 6
Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling 0 0 1 2 0 1 5 7
Optimal student allocation with peer effects 0 2 2 2 1 3 3 3
Order on types based on monotone comparative statics 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 13
Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 9
Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 23
Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation 0 0 0 16 1 1 1 65
Total Journal Articles 0 3 10 119 6 10 33 562

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Statistics updated 2024-11-05