Access Statistics for M. Bumin Yenmez

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues 0 0 1 2 2 5 9 50
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues 0 0 0 44 0 13 16 208
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues 0 0 0 24 0 3 6 134
Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations 1 2 8 203 11 24 50 939
Affirmative Action with Overlapping Reserves 0 1 7 161 2 15 44 519
Can Economic Theory Be Informative for the Judiciary? Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations 0 0 0 5 2 4 4 18
Can Economic Theory be Informative for the Judiciary? Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations 0 0 0 2 3 13 14 42
Closure and Preferences 0 0 0 21 0 7 11 73
College Admissions 0 0 0 28 1 6 8 169
Constitutional Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies in India 0 0 0 9 1 4 7 24
Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions 1 1 2 134 2 13 19 599
Distributional Preferences for Market Design 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Diversity in Choice as Majorization 0 0 0 6 3 8 20 24
Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives 0 0 0 5 0 7 8 24
Endogenous Inequality Aversion: Decision criteria for triage and other ethical tradeoffs 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
Existence and Testable Implications of Extreme Stable Matchings 0 0 0 28 1 4 4 73
Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing 0 0 1 98 2 10 21 378
Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing 0 0 0 10 3 6 7 40
Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications 0 0 1 11 0 4 9 68
Incentivized Kidney Exchange 0 1 2 238 1 16 29 629
Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions 0 0 0 26 0 2 4 72
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment 0 0 0 5 4 10 15 86
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment 0 0 1 151 3 7 13 333
Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing 0 0 0 55 2 8 11 236
Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing 0 0 0 43 0 9 16 175
Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking 0 0 0 15 2 4 9 28
Market Design with Distributional Objectives 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 15
Matching with Externalities 0 0 1 64 1 9 16 129
Matching with externalities 0 0 1 20 5 11 18 47
Median Stable Matching 0 0 0 51 0 5 6 179
Rationalizing Path-Independent Choice Rules 0 0 0 13 0 7 10 21
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 2 12 1 4 10 120
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 5 2 6 14 158
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 1 13 2 12 19 210
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 28 7 23 31 229
Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago 0 0 0 48 2 4 8 64
Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago 0 0 1 45 1 5 12 77
When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment? 0 0 0 64 0 5 8 120
Total Working Papers 5 8 32 1,690 68 297 516 6,312

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A college admissions clearinghouse 0 0 0 22 0 4 8 126
A simple characterization of responsive choice 0 0 1 17 1 1 6 98
A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues 0 0 1 50 0 2 6 165
Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations 0 1 1 2 0 9 15 33
Choice and Matching 0 0 1 39 1 10 16 119
Closure and preferences 0 0 0 3 2 4 7 27
Common enrollment in school choice 0 0 0 7 0 5 8 39
Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism 0 0 0 5 0 5 9 28
Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently 0 0 0 10 0 6 7 67
Effective affirmative action in school choice 0 0 1 58 0 7 15 331
Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Healthcare Rationing 0 0 1 5 1 9 17 31
How to Control Controlled School Choice 0 0 0 23 0 6 13 191
Incentive compatible market design with applications 0 0 0 14 0 2 5 84
Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions 0 0 1 18 4 6 10 107
Incentivized Kidney Exchange 1 1 1 20 2 13 20 187
Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment 0 0 1 8 2 12 17 48
Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms 0 0 0 8 7 15 21 93
Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations 0 0 0 0 1 12 14 14
Market design with distributional objectives: Efficiency, incentives, and property rights 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11
Matching with Externalities 0 0 1 2 1 10 28 36
Median stable matching for markets with wages 0 0 0 28 0 4 8 164
Median stable matchings in two-sided markets 0 0 0 8 2 7 11 66
On lexicographic choice 0 0 0 12 0 3 8 48
Pricing in position auctions and online advertising 0 0 0 10 0 1 8 68
Quantile Stable Mechanisms 0 0 2 5 0 2 4 18
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds 0 1 9 97 1 8 37 359
Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings 0 0 0 2 0 2 6 16
The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings 0 0 0 18 2 8 11 136
Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago 0 0 0 5 1 7 12 34
When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? 0 0 0 1 6 25 32 36
Total Journal Articles 1 3 21 497 34 216 390 2,780

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04