Access Statistics for M. Bumin Yenmez

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues 0 0 0 24 0 3 6 112
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues 0 0 0 0 2 4 7 9
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues 0 0 0 44 0 2 5 178
Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations 2 8 34 71 8 32 161 367
Affirmative Action with Overlapping Reserves 5 14 63 63 33 66 156 156
Closure and Preferences 0 0 0 19 0 2 5 50
College Admissions 0 0 2 27 1 5 11 61
Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions 0 6 36 75 8 27 162 304
Existence and Testable Implications of Extreme Stable Matchings 0 0 0 27 2 3 5 64
Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing 42 42 42 42 39 39 39 39
Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications 0 0 1 8 2 5 13 50
Incentivized Kidney Exchange 0 2 25 213 4 14 91 493
Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions 0 0 2 24 0 1 4 52
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment 0 0 1 2 2 4 18 25
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment 0 0 30 111 2 8 78 198
Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing 2 15 40 40 8 40 125 125
Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing 4 17 25 25 7 42 60 60
Matching with Externalities 2 2 42 42 8 13 59 59
Median Stable Matching 0 0 0 51 1 5 9 120
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 9 2 6 10 82
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 24 0 3 10 108
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 3 1 6 10 58
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 9 0 4 15 52
Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago 0 1 2 48 1 3 13 43
Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago 1 1 7 34 2 3 17 46
When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment? 1 2 15 54 2 5 37 81
Total Working Papers 59 110 367 1,089 135 345 1,126 2,992

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A college admissions clearinghouse 0 3 5 13 0 6 21 53
A simple characterization of responsive choice 0 0 1 4 3 7 22 31
A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues 0 0 0 40 0 2 7 136
Choice and Matching 0 0 3 15 0 1 12 52
Closure and preferences 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 2
Common enrollment in school choice 0 0 1 1 0 1 6 11
Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism 0 0 0 0 1 5 7 7
Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently 0 0 1 10 0 3 8 46
Effective affirmative action in school choice 0 0 2 50 1 6 17 267
How to Control Controlled School Choice 0 0 2 16 0 3 15 131
Incentive compatible market design with applications 0 0 2 12 0 3 12 49
Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions 0 0 1 13 0 2 7 74
Incentivized Kidney Exchange 0 3 3 3 7 27 27 27
Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms 0 0 0 4 1 3 6 34
Median stable matching for markets with wages 0 0 0 22 0 2 4 60
Median stable matchings in two-sided markets 0 0 0 6 0 3 7 42
On lexicographic choice 0 1 3 6 0 4 14 25
Pricing in position auctions and online advertising 1 1 1 10 1 2 5 51
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds 0 0 6 38 1 9 35 128
The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings 0 0 0 14 0 2 14 97
Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago 0 0 1 1 0 2 4 4
Total Journal Articles 1 9 33 279 15 95 252 1,327

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Statistics updated 2020-09-04