Access Statistics for M. Bumin Yenmez

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues 0 0 1 2 3 3 8 48
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues 0 0 0 24 2 4 6 134
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues 0 0 0 44 4 15 16 208
Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations 1 1 8 202 8 14 43 928
Affirmative Action with Overlapping Reserves 0 1 8 161 6 18 45 517
Can Economic Theory Be Informative for the Judiciary? Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations 0 0 0 5 2 2 2 16
Can Economic Theory be Informative for the Judiciary? Affirmative Action in India via Vertical and Horizontal Reservations 0 0 0 2 8 10 11 39
Closure and Preferences 0 0 0 21 6 8 11 73
College Admissions 0 0 0 28 5 5 7 168
Constitutional Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies in India 0 0 0 9 3 3 6 23
Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions 0 0 1 133 8 13 17 597
Diversity in Choice as Majorization 0 0 0 6 0 9 17 21
Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives 0 0 0 5 1 7 8 24
Existence and Testable Implications of Extreme Stable Matchings 0 0 0 28 1 3 3 72
Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing 0 0 0 10 1 3 4 37
Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing 0 1 1 98 6 12 20 376
Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications 0 0 1 11 3 6 9 68
Incentivized Kidney Exchange 1 1 2 238 9 21 29 628
Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions 0 0 0 26 1 2 4 72
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment 0 0 1 151 3 5 10 330
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment 0 0 0 5 4 9 11 82
Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing 0 0 0 55 5 7 9 234
Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing 0 0 1 43 7 9 17 175
Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking 0 0 0 15 1 3 7 26
Market Design with Distributional Objectives 0 0 0 0 1 4 8 15
Matching with Externalities 0 0 1 64 5 9 15 128
Matching with externalities 0 0 1 20 5 9 14 42
Median Stable Matching 0 0 0 51 5 5 6 179
Rationalizing Path-Independent Choice Rules 0 0 0 13 5 7 10 21
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 5 3 8 13 156
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 28 15 18 24 222
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 1 13 8 12 17 208
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 2 12 2 5 9 119
Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago 0 0 0 48 2 3 7 62
Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago 0 0 1 45 3 7 11 76
When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment? 0 0 0 64 2 8 8 120
Total Working Papers 2 4 30 1,685 153 286 462 6,244

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A college admissions clearinghouse 0 0 0 22 3 6 8 126
A simple characterization of responsive choice 0 0 1 17 0 1 6 97
A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues 0 0 1 50 2 3 6 165
Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations 0 1 1 2 5 9 16 33
Choice and Matching 0 0 1 39 6 10 15 118
Closure and preferences 0 0 0 3 2 2 5 25
Common enrollment in school choice 0 0 0 7 4 5 8 39
Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism 0 0 0 5 5 5 9 28
Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently 0 0 0 10 5 6 7 67
Effective affirmative action in school choice 0 0 1 58 4 9 15 331
Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Healthcare Rationing 0 0 1 5 7 11 18 30
How to Control Controlled School Choice 0 0 0 23 5 9 14 191
Incentive compatible market design with applications 0 0 0 14 1 2 5 84
Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions 0 0 1 18 2 2 6 103
Incentivized Kidney Exchange 0 0 0 19 2 12 20 185
Interdistrict school choice: A theory of student assignment 0 0 1 8 8 12 15 46
Manipulability of Stable Mechanisms 0 0 0 8 6 9 14 86
Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations 0 0 0 0 7 12 13 13
Matching with Externalities 0 0 1 2 5 13 27 35
Median stable matching for markets with wages 0 0 0 28 3 6 8 164
Median stable matchings in two-sided markets 0 0 0 8 4 7 10 64
On lexicographic choice 0 0 0 12 1 5 9 48
Pricing in position auctions and online advertising 0 0 0 10 1 3 8 68
Quantile Stable Mechanisms 0 0 2 5 2 2 4 18
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds 0 1 9 97 4 10 37 358
Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings 0 0 0 2 2 3 7 16
The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings 0 0 0 18 4 7 9 134
Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago 0 0 0 5 4 7 13 33
When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? 0 0 0 1 16 23 27 30
Total Journal Articles 0 2 20 496 120 211 359 2,735

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12