Access Statistics for Kiho Yoon

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Competitive mixed bundling of vertically differentiated products 0 0 0 175 0 0 11 371
Demand reduction and initial endowments in consignment auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dynamic mechanism design: An elementary introduction 0 0 1 5 0 0 10 15
Mechanism Design with Expenditure Consideration 0 0 0 56 1 1 4 221
On Budget Balance of the Dynamic Pivot Mechanism 0 0 0 62 0 0 7 169
On asymmetry in all-pay auctions 0 0 0 57 0 1 17 153
On the impact of digital music distribution 0 0 0 175 1 1 5 560
On the sufficiency of unidirectional incentive compatibility in auctions 2 6 6 6 0 7 7 7
Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack Environment 0 0 0 6 0 1 9 21
Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions: Full extraction of advertisers' surplus 0 0 0 93 1 1 16 296
Optimal robust allocation of private goods 0 0 0 52 0 0 8 115
Robust double auction mechanisms 0 0 0 8 0 1 8 24
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests: An auction approach 0 0 1 66 0 0 5 160
The uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms on restricted domains 0 0 0 4 1 2 21 26
The uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms on restricted domains* 0 0 1 19 0 1 16 87
Uniform price auction with quantity constraints 0 0 0 9 0 0 10 23
Upstream competition and exclusive content provision in media markets 0 0 2 6 0 1 25 31
Upstream competition, exclusive content provision, and vertical integration in media markets 0 0 5 97 0 1 21 192
When to sell an indivisible object: Optimal timing with Markovian buyers 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 18
Total Working Papers 2 6 16 899 4 18 207 2,489

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 375
An Anti-folk Theorem in Overlapping Generations Games with Limited Observability 0 0 0 103 1 1 11 812
An economic model of fair use: Comment 0 0 0 26 0 2 7 103
Bid preference in license auctions: Affirmative action can achieve economic efficiency 0 0 0 33 0 0 11 156
Bilateral trading with contingent contracts 0 0 0 4 1 1 5 27
Competitive Mixed Bundling of Vertically Differentiated Products 0 0 0 19 0 3 18 148
Design of multi-attribute procurement auction for the Korean clean hydrogen power generation auction market 0 1 1 1 1 5 14 14
Implementability with contingent contracts 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 25
Incentive-compatible double auction for Peer-to-Peer energy trading considering heterogeneous power losses and transaction costs 0 0 1 1 4 14 60 62
Interconnection Economics of All-IP Networks 0 0 0 169 1 1 12 371
Is Imitation Conducive To Cooperation in Local Interaction Models? 0 0 0 2 0 1 9 50
On Renegotiation-Proof Collusion under Imperfect Public Information 0 0 0 25 0 0 7 118
On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism 0 0 0 7 0 0 7 52
On the Impact of Digital Music Distribution 0 0 0 108 0 0 16 420
Optimal Quality Scores in Sponsored Search Auctions: Full Extraction of Advertisers' Surplus 0 0 1 26 1 2 9 110
Optimal energy procurement with long-term photovoltaic energy contracts considering generation uncertainty: A two-dimensional auction approach 0 0 1 3 3 4 14 17
Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter 0 0 1 13 1 1 9 102
The Modified Vickrey Double Auction 0 0 0 97 0 0 8 284
The Uniqueness of Dynamic Groves Mechanisms on Restricted Domains 0 0 0 3 0 0 23 35
The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games 0 0 0 20 0 0 7 196
The optimal level of copyright protection 0 0 1 265 0 0 8 641
The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism 0 0 0 59 0 0 17 234
Upstream Competition and Exclusive Content Provision in Media Markets 0 1 3 3 2 3 12 12
Total Journal Articles 0 2 9 988 15 38 296 4,364

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Statistics updated 2026-08-07