Access Statistics for Shmuel Zamir

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Class of Games with Positive Value of Information 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 372
A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 40
A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions 0 0 0 54 0 1 4 159
A Sealed-Bid Auction that Matches the English Auction 0 0 0 103 1 1 7 564
A class of games with positive value of information 0 0 0 43 0 1 1 201
A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction 0 0 1 5 1 1 5 168
Advances in Auctions 0 1 4 180 1 5 13 268
Advances in Auctions 0 2 5 170 4 12 32 322
Advances in Auctions 0 0 0 46 2 5 13 96
Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case 0 0 0 85 1 2 4 201
Asymmetric Auctions: Analytic Solutions to the General Uniform Case 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 107
Average Speed Bumps: Four Perspectives on Averaging Speeds 0 0 0 67 0 0 2 235
Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study 0 1 9 82 3 8 39 280
Bayesian games: Games with incomplete information 0 1 3 320 0 2 17 766
Bayesian games: games of incomplete information 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 23
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 0 14 0 1 1 85
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 1 38 0 1 8 203
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 30
Contradicting Beliefs and Communication 0 0 1 118 1 1 5 925
First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations 0 0 0 141 0 0 1 949
First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge 0 0 0 27 0 2 4 176
First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge 0 0 0 41 0 1 4 123
Games in the Nervous System: The Game Motoneurons Play 0 0 0 63 0 0 3 545
Games in the Nervous System: The Game Motoneurons Play 0 0 0 71 1 2 3 1,074
Incomplete Information Games and the Normal Distribution 0 0 1 24 0 1 5 295
Leadership Games with Convex Strategy Sets 0 0 1 56 0 0 4 191
Leadership games with convex strategy sets 0 0 1 21 0 1 2 26
Michael Maschler: In Memoriam 0 0 1 92 0 1 7 277
Multiple Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions 0 0 2 95 1 3 11 219
Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions 0 0 1 49 0 0 9 134
On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 0 0 0 26 0 2 4 147
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions 0 0 1 133 0 1 3 358
One Team Must Win, the Other Need Only Not Lose: An Experimental Study of an Asymmetric Participation Game 0 0 0 79 0 0 1 286
Positive value of information in games 0 0 0 86 0 1 2 388
Positive value of information in games 0 0 0 59 0 2 3 249
Repeated Games. Part A: Background Material 0 2 12 162 1 5 20 438
Repeated Games. Part B: The Central Results 0 2 3 67 0 2 5 159
Repeated Games. Part C: Further Developments 0 0 1 49 0 0 4 103
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information 0 0 0 23 0 1 3 37
Type Indeterminacy: A Model of the KT(Kahneman-Tversky)-man 0 0 0 405 0 0 0 1,383
Total Working Papers 0 9 48 3,139 17 68 255 12,602

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction 0 1 1 32 0 1 3 94
A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler 0 1 1 16 0 1 1 51
AN EXPERIMENT WITH ULTIMATUM BARGAINING IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 55
Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case 0 0 1 24 1 1 6 99
Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study 1 17 57 943 7 38 162 2,931
Biographical information: Michael B. Maschler 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Common belief and common knowledge 0 0 0 46 0 0 3 122
Cooperation in Intergroup, N-Person, and Two-Person Games of Chicken 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 10
Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Cores 0 0 1 25 0 0 3 105
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury 0 0 2 14 0 2 5 34
Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior 0 0 1 63 0 2 5 293
First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge 0 0 0 95 0 2 5 353
Inspection games in arms control 0 0 1 30 0 0 4 85
Leadership games with convex strategy sets 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 93
Letter from the Editor 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 24
Memorial 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 34
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions 0 0 0 50 0 1 2 272
On the value of information in a strategic conflict 0 0 1 62 1 1 2 116
Positive value of information in games 0 0 2 34 0 1 3 136
Proportional taxation: Nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 116
Skill in Games 0 0 1 17 0 0 2 51
Teacher, colleague and coauthor 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 18
The Fisherman's Problem: Exploring the tension between cooperative and non-cooperative concepts in a simple game 0 0 1 129 1 3 6 806
The game for the speed of convergence in repeated games of incomplete information 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 208
Total Journal Articles 1 19 70 1,684 10 55 217 6,119

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Game Theory 0 0 0 0 9 27 86 199
Total Books 0 0 0 0 9 27 86 199

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Inspection games 0 1 12 386 0 6 39 1,828
Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum 0 0 1 148 3 4 5 357
Total Chapters 0 1 13 534 3 10 44 2,185

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Statistics updated 2019-07-03