Access Statistics for Charles Zheng

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Coase Theorem Based on a New Concept of the Core 0 0 0 37 0 0 9 92
A Coase Theorem based on a new concept of the core 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 8
An Optimal Auction When Resale Cannot Be Prohibited 0 0 0 97 0 0 7 284
Application of Mechanism Design to Electric Power Markets 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 201
Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition 0 0 0 76 1 1 16 313
Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders 0 0 1 37 0 0 16 168
Collusion Via Resale 0 0 0 82 2 3 14 196
Core Equivalence Theorem with Production 0 0 0 8 0 0 11 198
Corrigendum to "Core equivalence theorem with production" [J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007) 246–270] 0 1 1 34 1 2 12 82
Debt- Versus Equity-Financing in Auction Designs 0 0 0 46 0 1 7 137
Debt- versus equity-financing in auction designs 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 9
Existence of Monotone Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Resale 0 0 0 20 0 0 16 48
High Bids and Broke Winners 0 0 0 4 0 2 20 210
Interactive Blocking in Arrow-Debreu Economies 0 0 0 10 0 0 7 73
Interactive blocking in Arrow-Debreu economies 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 10
Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions 0 0 0 38 0 0 16 174
Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World 0 0 0 217 0 0 7 438
Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World 0 1 1 255 1 2 14 627
Optimal Auction with Resale 0 0 0 13 0 0 9 151
Optimal Search Auctions 0 0 0 45 0 0 7 138
Optimal Search Auctions 0 0 0 43 0 0 7 281
Optimal Search Auctions 0 0 0 9 3 3 6 145
Optimal Search Auctions with Correlated Bidder Types 0 0 0 6 1 2 10 131
Optimal Selling Mechanisms wth Costly Information Acquisition 0 0 0 84 0 0 20 267
Optimal search auctions 0 0 0 43 0 2 23 260
Stochastic Blocking and Core Convergence in Nonconvex Production Economies 0 0 0 21 0 0 12 163
Stochastic blocking and core convergence in nonconvex production economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
The Default-Prone U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan 0 0 0 27 0 0 6 145
Total Working Papers 0 2 3 1,253 10 22 300 4,951

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctions with costly information acquisition 0 0 2 73 0 2 16 196
Bidding collusion without passive updating 0 0 0 1 0 0 19 41
Collusion via Resale 0 0 0 39 0 1 13 298
Core equivalence theorem with production 0 0 0 19 0 0 17 102
Goethe's secret reserve price 0 0 0 2 1 1 13 25
High Bids and Broke Winners 1 2 2 114 1 4 29 326
Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions 0 0 0 8 0 0 15 62
Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security 0 0 0 14 0 0 14 88
Optimal Auction with Resale 0 0 0 224 0 0 11 810
Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers 0 0 0 2 0 1 14 23
Optimal search auctions 0 0 0 79 0 1 12 219
Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types 0 0 1 20 0 0 11 75
The Default-Prone U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan 0 0 0 13 0 0 6 112
Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 16
Total Journal Articles 1 2 5 610 2 10 202 2,393

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10