Access Statistics for Lin Zhou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Refined Bargaining Set of an n-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation 0 0 0 112 2 8 11 656
An 'Average' Lyapunov Convexity Theorem and Some Core Equivalence Results 0 0 1 137 0 3 7 650
Bayesian Utilitarianism 0 0 1 17 1 4 9 719
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point 0 0 0 0 3 6 7 514
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 451
Consistent Allocation Rules in Atomless Economies 0 0 0 0 4 8 10 178
Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences 0 0 0 473 1 9 15 1,544
IMPOSSIBILITY OF STRATEGY-PROOF MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIES WITH PURE PUBLIC GOODS 0 0 0 0 0 8 10 208
Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies 0 0 1 112 1 7 8 336
Integral Representation of Continuous Comonotonically Additive Functionals 0 0 0 12 2 7 7 501
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 0 2 5 5 252
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 119 3 4 6 871
Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems 0 0 0 53 2 9 10 441
Strictly Fair Allocations in Large Exchange Economies 0 0 0 98 0 5 7 456
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions 0 0 0 78 3 8 9 615
Voting by Committees 0 0 0 167 1 8 11 670
Total Working Papers 0 0 3 1,379 25 101 135 9,062

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation 0 0 0 119 0 8 13 380
A Simple Proof of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 9 13 560
A Theorem on Open Coverings of a Simplex and Scarf's Core Existence Theorem through Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem 0 0 0 0 1 7 11 235
A Weak Monotonicity Property of the Nucleolus 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 145
A characterization of demand functions that satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference 0 0 0 15 0 4 6 116
Choice problems with a 'reference' point 0 0 0 103 4 8 11 326
Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies 0 0 0 46 5 12 15 241
Game Theory via Revealed Preferences 0 0 1 96 3 5 12 290
General equilibria in large economies with endogenous structure of division of labor 0 0 1 83 1 6 11 275
Harsanyi's Utilitarianism Theorems: General Societies 0 1 2 87 1 6 13 270
Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules 0 0 0 95 3 4 5 498
Nash implementation in pure public good economies 0 0 1 91 0 0 4 245
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 292
On a conjecture by gale about one-sided matching problems 0 0 2 475 3 7 13 843
Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies 0 0 0 28 2 2 12 172
Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees 0 0 0 100 1 16 18 283
Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems 0 0 0 51 1 3 5 235
Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points 0 0 1 116 0 3 4 400
Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem 0 0 0 198 0 9 12 814
Subjective probability theory with continuous acts 0 0 0 55 0 5 11 231
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions 0 0 1 62 2 9 14 238
The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems 0 0 0 0 3 5 9 428
The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice 0 0 0 447 1 8 10 1,015
The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games 0 0 0 55 1 3 4 207
Voting by Committees 0 0 0 108 2 9 17 496
Total Journal Articles 0 1 9 2,430 34 153 252 9,235

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04