Access Statistics for Lin Zhou

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Refined Bargaining Set of an n-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation 0 0 0 112 0 5 16 661
An 'Average' Lyapunov Convexity Theorem and Some Core Equivalence Results 0 0 1 137 0 1 8 651
Bayesian Utilitarianism 0 0 1 17 1 3 11 722
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 516
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 452
Consistent Allocation Rules in Atomless Economies 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 183
Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences 0 0 0 473 0 3 15 1,547
IMPOSSIBILITY OF STRATEGY-PROOF MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIES WITH PURE PUBLIC GOODS 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 208
Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies 0 0 1 112 0 3 11 339
Integral Representation of Continuous Comonotonically Additive Functionals 0 0 0 12 0 2 9 503
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 119 1 4 9 875
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 0 1 3 8 255
Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems 0 0 0 53 0 1 11 442
Strictly Fair Allocations in Large Exchange Economies 0 0 0 98 0 3 10 459
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions 0 0 0 78 0 1 10 616
Voting by Committees 0 0 0 167 0 3 12 673
Total Working Papers 0 0 3 1,379 3 40 168 9,102

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation 0 0 0 119 0 3 16 383
A Simple Proof of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 3 14 563
A Theorem on Open Coverings of a Simplex and Scarf's Core Existence Theorem through Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem 0 0 0 0 2 3 14 238
A Weak Monotonicity Property of the Nucleolus 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 147
A characterization of demand functions that satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference 0 0 0 15 1 5 11 121
Choice problems with a 'reference' point 1 1 1 104 2 3 13 329
Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies 0 0 0 46 0 3 18 244
Game Theory via Revealed Preferences 0 0 0 96 1 15 25 305
General equilibria in large economies with endogenous structure of division of labor 0 0 1 83 0 3 14 278
Harsanyi's Utilitarianism Theorems: General Societies 0 0 2 87 0 2 13 272
Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules 0 0 0 95 0 1 6 499
Nash implementation in pure public good economies 0 0 1 91 0 4 6 249
Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets 0 0 0 0 1 5 9 297
On a conjecture by gale about one-sided matching problems 1 1 1 476 1 6 16 849
Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies 0 0 0 28 0 2 7 174
Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees 0 0 0 100 1 2 20 285
Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems 0 0 0 51 0 4 9 239
Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points 0 0 1 116 0 1 5 401
Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem 0 0 0 198 0 3 14 817
Subjective probability theory with continuous acts 0 0 0 55 0 1 12 232
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions 0 0 1 62 3 4 17 242
The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 429
The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice 0 0 0 447 4 5 15 1,020
The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games 0 0 0 55 0 5 9 212
Voting by Committees 0 0 0 108 1 3 19 499
Total Journal Articles 2 2 8 2,432 17 89 316 9,324

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04