| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Trade Policy Under Dictatorship and Democratization |
1 |
1 |
2 |
106 |
3 |
6 |
15 |
286 |
| A Theory of Trade Policy under Dictatorship and Democratization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
135 |
| Competition over Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
93 |
| Contesting an International Trade Agreement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
145 |
| Contesting an International Trade Agreement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
1 |
4 |
25 |
114 |
| Contesting an international trade agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
40 |
| Contesting an international trade agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
7 |
19 |
85 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition Over Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
5 |
23 |
244 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
130 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
142 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
122 |
| HOTELLING TAX COMPETITION |
0 |
0 |
1 |
89 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
372 |
| Hotelling Tax Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
127 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
502 |
| Hotelling Tax Competition |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
36 |
| How and Why Dictators Forestall Democratization Using International Trade Policy |
1 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
41 |
| Is the WTO Article XXIV Bad? |
1 |
1 |
1 |
38 |
2 |
7 |
16 |
175 |
| Is the WTO Article XXIV bad? |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
17 |
| Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
281 |
| Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
262 |
| Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
1 |
8 |
18 |
298 |
| Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
5 |
28 |
442 |
| Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
258 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy and Trade Liberalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
140 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
234 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
64 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
20 |
| Patent Breadth in an International Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
91 |
| Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
8 |
15 |
260 |
| Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
90 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
417 |
| Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
34 |
| Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
441 |
| Social Conflict and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
308 |
| Social Unrest in the Wake of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
168 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
339 |
| Social Unrest in the Wake of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
21 |
| Tax Competition Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
322 |
| Tax Competition Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
39 |
| Tax Competition Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
195 |
0 |
8 |
48 |
606 |
| The Efficiency, Equity and Politics of Emission Permit Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
714 |
| The GATT and Gradualism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
6 |
17 |
446 |
| The GATT and Gradualism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
325 |
| The Political Economy of Immigration, Investment, and Naturalization |
1 |
2 |
2 |
32 |
2 |
6 |
21 |
170 |
| The Structure and Performance of the World Market in a Cobb-Douglas Example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
316 |
| The efficiency, equity and politics of emissions permit trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
23 |
| Too Small To Protect? The Role of Firm Size in Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
112 |
| Too Small To Protect? The Role of Firm Size in Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
96 |
| Too Small To Protect? The Role of Firm Size in Trade Agreements |
1 |
1 |
1 |
49 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
50 |
| WHY ARE TRADE AGREEMENTS REGIONAL? A Theory Based on Noncooperative Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
373 |
| Why Are Trade Agreements Regional? A Theory based on Noncooperative Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
13 |
| Why are Trade Agreements Regional? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
4 |
22 |
162 |
| Why are Trade Agreements Regional? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
15 |
34 |
| Why are Trade Agreements Regional? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
309 |
| Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
15 |
| Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives |
1 |
1 |
2 |
36 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
37 |
| Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
23 |
| World Price Shocks, Income, and Democratization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
97 |
| World Price Shocks, Income, and Democratization |
1 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
91 |
| Total Working Papers |
8 |
10 |
20 |
2,794 |
29 |
209 |
781 |
10,962 |
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