| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Trade Policy Under Dictatorship and Democratization |
0 |
0 |
3 |
103 |
3 |
3 |
15 |
262 |
| A Theory of Trade Policy under Dictatorship and Democratization |
1 |
1 |
4 |
45 |
3 |
4 |
21 |
113 |
| Competition over Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
77 |
| Contesting an International Trade Agreement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
117 |
| Contesting an International Trade Agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
80 |
| Contesting an international trade agreement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
25 |
| Contesting an international trade agreement |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
55 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition Over Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
218 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
111 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
123 |
| Developing Country Second-Mover Advantage in Competition over Environmental Standards and Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
| HOTELLING TAX COMPETITION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
353 |
| Hotelling Tax Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Hotelling Tax Competition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
127 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
488 |
| Is the WTO Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
152 |
| Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
237 |
| Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
262 |
| Is the WTO's Article XXIV Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
275 |
| Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
| Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter |
1 |
1 |
1 |
82 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
408 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy and Trade Liberalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
128 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
217 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
| Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
45 |
| Patent Breadth in an International Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
62 |
| Public Good Differentiation and the Intensity of Tax Competition |
0 |
1 |
1 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
241 |
| Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
402 |
| Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
| Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
417 |
| Social Conflict and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem |
0 |
0 |
2 |
36 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
259 |
| Social Unrest in the Wake of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
| Social Unrest in the Wake of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs |
0 |
0 |
5 |
165 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
323 |
| Tax Competition Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
| Tax Competition Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
309 |
| Tax Competition Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
0 |
195 |
0 |
4 |
22 |
543 |
| The Efficiency, Equity and Politics of Emission Permit Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
705 |
| The GATT and Gradualism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
312 |
| The GATT and Gradualism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
398 |
| The Political Economy of Immigration, Investment, and Naturalization |
1 |
1 |
5 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
41 |
125 |
| The Structure and Performance of the World Market in a Cobb-Douglas Example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
295 |
| The efficiency, equity and politics of emissions permit trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
| Too Small To Protect? The Role of Firm Size in Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
84 |
| Too Small To Protect? The Role of Firm Size in Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
| Too Small To Protect? The Role of Firm Size in Trade Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
| WHY ARE TRADE AGREEMENTS REGIONAL? A Theory Based on Noncooperative Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
359 |
| Why Are Trade Agreements Regional? A Theory based on Noncooperative Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Why are Trade Agreements Regional? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
129 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
296 |
| Why are Trade Agreements Regional? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
| Why are Trade Agreements Regional? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
137 |
| Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
| Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives |
0 |
0 |
34 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
20 |
| World Price Shocks, Income, and Democratization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
| World Price Shocks, Income, and Democratization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
4 |
64 |
2,710 |
11 |
32 |
258 |
9,795 |
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