| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| AUCTION MECHANISMS AND BIDDER COLLUSION: BRIBES, SIGNALS AND SELECTION |
0 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
57 |
| AUCTIONS AND LEAKS: A THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
61 |
| Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signaling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
156 |
| Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
| Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
| Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
| Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
29 |
| Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
4 |
7 |
17 |
96 |
| Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
66 |
| Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
| Beyond Value: on the Role of Superficial Characteristics in Demand for Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
| Brothers in Arms: Cooperation in Defence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
81 |
| CAN HIGHER REWARDS LEAD TO LESS EFFORT? INCENTIVE REVERSAL IN TEAMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
170 |
| Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less E ort? Incentive Reversal in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
171 |
| Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams |
0 |
0 |
1 |
114 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
362 |
| Collusion and Information Revelation in Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
| Corporate Social Responsibility as a Signal in the Labor Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| Costly Superstitious Beliefs: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
95 |
| Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
| Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
| Examining the Generalizability of Research Findings from Archival Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
12 |
| Humans reciprocate intentional harm by discriminating against group peers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
| Imperfect Recall and Time Inconsistencies: An experimental test of the absentminded driver "paradox" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
128 |
| Information Aggregation in Arrow-Debreu Markets: An Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
60 |
| JOB SEARCH COSTS AND INCENTIVES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
139 |
| Job Market Signaling and Job Search |
0 |
0 |
1 |
222 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
968 |
| Job Market Signaling and Job Search |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
284 |
| Job Market Signalling and Job Search |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
105 |
| Job Search Costs and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
299 |
| Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
904 |
| Let the Dummy Talk! Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
344 |
| Leveraging Wage Subsidies to Facilitate Fair Wages and Increase Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
48 |
| MANIPULATION AND (MIS)TRUST IN PREDICTION MARKETS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
59 |
| Manipulation and (mis)trust in prediction markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
104 |
| Punishment and Reward Institutions with Harmed Minorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
99 |
| Reputation and Cooperation in Defence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
| SOCIAL MOTIVES IN INTERGROUP CONFLICT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
| STRATEGIC AND SOCIAL PREPLAY COMMUNICATION IN THE ULTIMATUM GAME |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
181 |
| See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
149 |
| See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams |
0 |
0 |
1 |
109 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
189 |
| Social Communication and Discrimination: A Video Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
259 |
| Social motives in intergroup conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
147 |
| THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CYCLES ON JOB SATISFACTION IN A TWO-SECTOR ECONOMY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
169 |
| The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
286 |
| The uncontrolled social utility hypothesis revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
41 |
| Time preferences of older people with mild cognitive impairment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
87 |
| Timing of Messages and the Aumann Conjecture: A multiple-Selves Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
151 |
| Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
509 |
| Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology |
0 |
0 |
2 |
151 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
776 |
| Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
675 |
| Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1,466 |
| We sing the praise of good displays: How gamblers bet in casino roulette |
0 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
111 |
| When Being Wasteful is Better than Feeling Wasteful |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
158 |
| When being wasteful appears better than feeling wasteful |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
84 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
3 |
13 |
2,524 |
12 |
36 |
139 |
10,980 |
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