| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| AUCTION MECHANISMS AND BIDDER COLLUSION: BRIBES, SIGNALS AND SELECTION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
66 |
| AUCTIONS AND LEAKS: A THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
82 |
| Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signaling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
166 |
| Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
108 |
| Altruism, Partner Choice, and Fixed-Cost Signalling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
51 |
| Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
56 |
| Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
72 |
| Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
82 |
| Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
5 |
58 |
156 |
| Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
74 |
| Beyond Value: on the Role of Superficial Characteristics in Demand for Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
| Beyond Value: on the Role of Symmetryin Demand for Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
36 |
| Brothers in Arms: Cooperation in Defence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
93 |
| CAN HIGHER REWARDS LEAD TO LESS EFFORT? INCENTIVE REVERSAL IN TEAMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
188 |
| Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less E ort? Incentive Reversal in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
182 |
| Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
375 |
| Collusion and Information Revelation in Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
69 |
| Corporate Social Responsibility as a Signal in the Labor Market |
1 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
33 |
| Corporate Social Responsibility as a Signal in the Labor Market |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
18 |
| Corporate Social Responsibility as a Signal in the Labor Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
19 |
22 |
| Costly Superstitious Beliefs: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
110 |
| Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
79 |
| Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
87 |
| Examining the Generalizability of Research Findings from Archival Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
18 |
| Humans reciprocate intentional harm by discriminating against group peers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
71 |
| Imperfect Recall and Time Inconsistencies: An experimental test of the absentminded driver "paradox" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
141 |
| Information Aggregation in Arrow-Debreu Markets: An Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
87 |
| JOB SEARCH COSTS AND INCENTIVES |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
156 |
| Job Market Signaling and Job Search |
0 |
0 |
0 |
222 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
984 |
| Job Market Signaling and Job Search |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
300 |
| Job Market Signalling and Job Search |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
114 |
| Job Search Costs and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
18 |
| Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
318 |
| Let the Dummy Talk! - Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments - |
0 |
0 |
1 |
127 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
923 |
| Let the Dummy Talk! Unilateral Communication and Discrimination in Three-Person Dictator Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
362 |
| Leveraging Wage Subsidies to Facilitate Fair Wages and Increase Social Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
55 |
| MANIPULATION AND (MIS)TRUST IN PREDICTION MARKETS |
0 |
1 |
2 |
23 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
72 |
| Manipulation and (mis)trust in prediction markets |
1 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
42 |
146 |
| Punishment and Reward Institutions with Harmed Minorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
133 |
| Reputation and Cooperation in Defence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
51 |
| SOCIAL IMAGE, OBSERVER IDENTITY, AND CROWDING UP |
1 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
2 |
5 |
24 |
38 |
| SOCIAL MOTIVES IN INTERGROUP CONFLICT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
83 |
| STRATEGIC AND SOCIAL PREPLAY COMMUNICATION IN THE ULTIMATUM GAME |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
195 |
| See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
163 |
| See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams |
0 |
1 |
1 |
110 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
212 |
| Social Communication and Discrimination: A Video Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
268 |
| Social motives in intergroup conflict |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
159 |
| THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CYCLES ON JOB SATISFACTION IN A TWO-SECTOR ECONOMY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
187 |
| The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
297 |
| The uncontrolled social utility hypothesis revisited |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
53 |
| Time preferences of older people with mild cognitive impairment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
100 |
| Timing of Messages and the Aumann Conjecture: A multiple-Selves Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
161 |
| Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
521 |
| Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology |
0 |
0 |
2 |
153 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
803 |
| Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
1,479 |
| Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
684 |
| We sing the praise of good displays: How gamblers bet in casino roulette |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
119 |
| When Being Wasteful is Better than Feeling Wasteful |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
169 |
| When being wasteful appears better than feeling wasteful |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
92 |
| Total Working Papers |
4 |
6 |
19 |
2,590 |
11 |
69 |
880 |
11,947 |
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